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ABSTRACT
The dissertation research exam ined four research questions. First, th e question of
w hether or not imagery processing could b e m easured w as addressed. It w as assum ed that
mental imagery d o es exist and can b e m easured in three dim ensions: quality, quantity, and
elaboration. Support for this assum ption is provided by th e psychom etric properties of th e scale
developed to m easure Imagery processing in concert with th e support tow ard nomological
validity of the construct that w as provided by applying the scale in an experiment.
Second, anteced en ts to mental imagery w ere examined, namely, th e imagery-eliciting
strategies of pictures and instructions to imagine, and their effects on co n seq u en ce variables of
memory, beliefs, attitudes, and intentions. A range of pictures w as exam ined instead of simple
pictures versus words. Also, it w as shown that Including instructions to imagine within m essage
stimuli w as m ore effective than not including instructions to imagine within m essag e stimuli for
several co n seq u en ce variables studied.
Pictures included in a print advertisem ent enhanced brand attitudes; m ore specifically,
concrete pictures resulted in greater brand attitudes than either abstract or no pictures. More
positive attitudes toward the advertisem ent were evident from concrete pictures a s o p p osed to
abstract pictures. Instructions to imagine enhanced inferred beliefs and attitudes.
Third, the m oderating role of processing preference on relationships betw een imageryeliciting strategies and co nsequence variables and between imagery-eliciting strategies and
dim ensions of imagery processing w as examined. This hypothesis w as not supported.
Fourth, the mediating role of imagery processing on relationships found betw een
imagery-eliciting strategies and co n seq u en ce variables w as examined. W hen th e mediating role
of imagery processing, specifically elaboration and quality, w as examined, relationships betw een
imagery-eliciting strategies and co nsequence variables w ere completely or partially explained by
those dim ensions. Thus, further understanding of th e effects of imagery-eliciting strategies in a
print advertising context is provided.
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CHAPTER ONE
OVERVIEW OF THE TOPIC AND RESEARCH

INTRODUCTION

The dissertation research examined imagery-eliciting strategies in advertisements. More
specifically, the research:

1.
2.
3.
4.

addressed measurement of mental imagery as the central
research issue;
examined antecedents to mental imagery;
examined individual differences that may influence relationships
between antecedents and consequence variables and between
antecedents and mental imagery; and
studied effects of mental imagery on memory, beliefs, attitudes, and
intentions.

Mental imagery is defined as "a process by which sensory information is represented in
working memory" (Maclnnis and Price 1987, p. 473), and it is typically in the absence of genuine
and perceptual counterparts (Richardson 1969). While several studies have attributed results to
mental imagery, very few have attempted to asse ss imagery processing evoked by a stimulus.
This chapter provides an overview of the topic and the dissertation research.
Specifically, the prevalent research paradigm is discussed followed by research questions
addressed by the dissertation. A brief description of the dissertation research design is
presented next. Finally, contributions and limitations of the dissertation research are discussed.

Prevalent Research Paradigm
A stimulus-response paradigm has been adopted in most imagery research, especially in
psychology. Thus, variables believed to be high in imagery content (i.e, pictures or concrete
words) were manipulated and effects on memory or learning were measured. It was assum ed
that imagery was the explanatory construct causing the results. However, no m easurem ent of

1

imagery w as typically performed. While these studies can easily be criticized for lacking
construct validity, it is important to point out that most of these studies w ere performed in the
1970’s when construct validation was not routinely performed In studies. Studies performed in
the 1980’s have attem pted to substantiate this assum ption by including scales to m easure
imagery processing, especially in marketing.
More researchers in marketing have tried expanding the stim ulus-response paradigm to
a stim ulus-organism-response paradigm in which attem pts have been m ade to m easure the
presence of imagery processing. These attem pts have been haphazard and inconsistent in
nature. R esearchers in psychology have not neglected scale development altogether; indeed,
considerable effort has been put forth in developing scales, but such efforts have concentrated
on measuring individual differences in imagery processing or spatial ability rather than imagery
processing itself. The dissertation research adopted a systematic program for developing a
m easure of imagery processing by following the paradigm set forth by Churchill (1979) and
recom m endations given in Anderson and Gerbing (1988).
As in most stimulus-response applications, the prevalent research design has been an
experiment. As will be discussed in Chapter Two, most imagery experiments in psychology
have concentrated on the superior effect of pictures over words and concrete w ords over
abstract w ords in memory studies. Consequently, the majority of imagery studies in marketing
have utilized an experimental design (exceptions include Gould 1990; Maclnnis and Price 1990;
Rethans and Hastak 1982; Smith, Houston and Childers 1984).
In contrast to experiments in psychology, however, several marketing studies have
examined dependent variables other than memory. For instance, Bone and Ellen (1990), Burns,
Biswas, and Roach (1991), Dickson, Burnkrant, Minlard, and Unnava (1986), Edell and Staelin
(1983), Gregory, Cialdini, and Carpenter (1982), Holbrook and Moore (1981), Kisielius and
Sternthal (1984), Oliver, Robertson and Mitchell (1989), Rossiter and Percy (1978; 1980), and
Wright and Rip (1980) have all studied attitudes as dependent variables. Even though several

marketing studies have concentrated on the relationship between imagery and memory (e.g.,
Childers and Houston 1984; Childers, Houston, and Heckler 1985; Gardner and Houston 1986;
Houston, Childers and Heckler 1987; Lutz and Lutz 1977; Rethans and Hastak 1982; Robertson
1987), It is evident that studies have incorporated expanded areas of interest; indeed, Maclnnis
and Price (1990) have even studied the relationship between imagery and consumer satisfaction.
However, no studies have examined the relationship between either the level of elaboration of
imagery processing and memory or the level of elaboration of imagery processing and attitudes.
Maclnnis and Jaworskl (1989) propose that high-elaboration processing results in self-generated
persuasion, and consequently, stronger attitudes. This is a research gap that was addressed by
the dissertation research.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Research questions that prompted the dissertation research were stimulated from the
review by Maclnnis and Price (1987) and from research gaps that becam e evident after review of
previous imagery studies. They focus on measurement of imagery processing, factors in an
advertisement that influence mental imagery processing, impact of individual differences, and
effects on memory, attitudes, and intentions. Specifically, the dissertation research sought to
answer the following questions, and each is elaborated on below:

1.
2.

3.
4.

Can imagery processing be measured?
Do various imagery-eliciting strategies used alone and in
combination in print advertisements differentially impact Imagery
processing?
Is imagery processing subject to individual differences in
processing preferences?
What are the effects of imagery processing on awareness,
beliefs, attitude toward the ad, attitude toward the brand, and
intentions?

Assessment o f Imagery Processing
The question of whether or not imagery can be measured is open to criticism on two
accounts. First, and most extreme, it could be argued that no mental process can be measured
adequately with verbal responses because individuals are unable to tell us what they know or
how they think (Nisbett and Wilson 1977). Second, it could also be argued that verbal scales
are inappropriate for measuring nonverbal phenomena (Holbrook, Chestnut, Oliva and Greenleaf
1984; Maclnnis and Price 1987; Sheehan et al. 1983). Thus, an individual must translate a
nonverbal process into a verbal response. As an example of an attempt to overcome this,
Holbrook et al. (1984) combined verbal and nonverbal reference points in a scale to measure
processing style. Each item contained a stimulus (a word or picture) and an anchor (a word or
picture), and subjects were asked to place a check closer to the anchor that w as more strongly
associated with the stimulus. However, this is still primarily verbal and does not adequately
overcome the last criticism. Nevertheless, pencil and paper tests to assess imagery processing
have been developed, which represent the best alternative possible at the present time.

Imagery-Eliciting Strategies
Maclnnis and Price (1987) discuss four imagery-eliciting strategies: pictures, concrete
words, instructions to imagine, and guided imagery (more applicable in clinical applications).
These were compiled from reviews by Lutz and Lutz (1978) and Alesandrlni and Sheikh (1983),
and these reviews, in turn, were compiled primarily from the psychology literature. Paivio (1970)
enumerates the typical types of imagery manipulation as concrete stimuli, instructions, and
selection of subjects based on individual imagery capability. Rossiter (1978) also lists these a s
three basic ways for advertisers to take advantage of mental imagery. Finally, Wollman (1981)
discusses the use of guided imagery in studying social psychological phenomena. In sum, there
is a substantial base of literature that shows that there are different types of imagery-eliciting
strategies. However, with the exception of Slee (1978), no studies have examined whether there

are differences among these strategies. Slee examined the differences among the use of
concrete words, instructions to imagine, and individual differences as imagery-eliciting strategies
and found that each type of strategy caused different effects on memory.
While guided imagery may not be realistic in an advertising context, the remaining three
strategies enumerated by Maclnnis and Price (1987) are viable alternatives for print
advertisements and could be compared separately and in combination to determine the impact
on memory and brand attitudes. In a normative paper, Rossiter (1978) boldly states, "high
imagery visuals work far better than instructions to imagine" (p. 102). He bases this assertion on
Slee’s (1978) work, whose study, however, did not compare high imagery visuals (i.e., pictures)
to instructions to imagine. Furthermore, Rossiter never states what high imagery visuals work
better for - recall? attitude? This is not specified. Thus, it is apparent that empirical investigation
seem s warranted to address the question of the relative efficacy of alternative imagery-eliciting
strategies.

Style o f Processing
Style of processing is an individual difference variable, and several scales exist to assess
this variable. It was hypothesized in the dissertation that a presentation format that was
congruent with an individual’s preferred style of processing would amplify effects of imageryeliciting strategies, particularly for individuals preferring a visual styie of processing. While this
variable has been included in several marketing studies as a predictor variable (e.g., Gould 1990;
Holbrook et al. 1984; Maclnnis and Price 1990; Oliver et al. 1989; Rossiter and Percy 1978) or as
a moderator (Burns et al. 1991, 1992; Childers and Houston 1984), results have been mixed.
Thus, consistent with extant studies, the dissertation research included style of processing as a
moderator between imagery-eliciting strategies and consequence variables and between
imagery-eliciting strategies and dimensions of imagery processing.

Consequence Variables
While memory plays an important role in brand awareness, beliefs, attitudes, and
intentions are also major communication effects for advertising research (Rossiter and Percy
1983, 1987). Brand attitudes are believed to be the precursor to behavioral intention, and hence,
actual behavior. Thus, consequence variables studied in this research included beliefs, attitudes
(brand attitude and attitude toward the advertisement), and behavioral intentions in addition to
awareness.
Consequence variables examined in the dissertation research are consistent with
previous imagery studies. As will be seen in Chapter Two, with respect to imagery studies,
memory has been the dominant dependent variable, especially in the psychology literature.
However, several studies in marketing have also examined the effect of an imagery-eliciting
strategy on recall and recognition of brand names (e.g., Childers and Houston 1984; Childers et
al. 1985; Houston et al. 1987; Lutz and Lutz 1977; Robertson 1987) or m essage recall (Gardner
and Houston 1986). Finally, several studies in marketing have examined the impact of some
imagery-eliciting strategy on attitude toward the product or brand (e.g., Bone and Ellen 1990;
Burns et al. 1991, 1992; Dickson et al. 1986; Edell and Staelin 1983; Gregory et al. 1982;
Holbrook and Moore 1981; Kisielius and Sternthal 1984; Mitchell 1986; Mitchell and Olson 1981;
Oliver et al. 1989; Rossiter and Percy 1978, 1980; Wright and Rip 1980), and subsets of these
have also examined the impact on attitude toward the ad (e.g., Bone and Ellen 1990; Burns et
al. 1991, 1992; Mitchell 1986; Mitchell and Olson 1981), behavioral intentions (e.g., Burns et al.
1991, 1992; Dickson et al. 1986; Edell and Staelin 1983; Gregory et al. 1982; Kisielius and
Sternthal 1984; Mitchell 1986; Mitchell and Olson 1981; Rossiter and Percy 1878, 1980; Oliver et
al. 1989), and actual behavior (e.g., Gregory et al. 1982).

THE DISSERTATION RESEARCH
Following the stimulus-organism-response framework of Maclnnis and Price (1987),
antecedent, moderating, processing, and consequence variables were studied In a print
advertising context. Specifically, an experiment was conducted in which two imagery-eliciting
strategies were manipulated: pictures and instructions to imagine. Levels of pictures included a
concrete/interactive picture, a concrete/noninteractive picture, an abstract picture, or no picture.
The instruction manipulation involved embedding instructions to imagine within m essage stimuli
or not including instructions at all. As will be reviewed in Chapter Two, several studies have
manipulated one of these strategies in a given experiment, but none have examined the range of
pictures examined in the dissertation or have effectively examined embedding instructions to
imagine within m essage stimuli.
Style of processing was proposed as a moderating variable between relationships of
imagery-eliciting strategies and consequence variables. Two published scales were utilized to
a ssess this variable.
In contrast with several previous studies, a scale was developed to m easure presence
and elaboration of imagery processing. Dimensions of imagery processing were proposed, and
a scale was developed to m easure those dimensions.
C onsequence variables examined in the experiment included aw areness, beliefs, attitude
toward the brand, attitude toward the advertisement, and intentions. Awareness w as analyzed
independently from attitudes and intentions, for the relationship between memory and attitudes is
equivocal (Srull 1989); indeed, examination of this relationship alone could be another
dissertation. Consequence variables studied in the dissertation research have been studied
extensively in other imagery studies, and m easures followed those previously used.

CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE RESEARCH

The major contribution of the dissertation research w as th e system atic attem pt to
develop a scale to m easure imagery processing. By integrating past efforts w here possible, this
scale can serve as a b a se for future research. Furthermore, with th e exception of Ellen and
Bone (1991), previous scale attem pts have failed to specify the dom ain of th e construct and to
propose dim ensions of Imagery processing. Finally, psychometric properties of th e m easures
were assesse d , and support toward nomological validity of the m easures w as provided by the
final experiment. Thus, support toward construct validity of the mental imagery construct w as
provided.
A seco n d contribution holds implications for advertisers. First, it w as found that
em bedding instructions to imagine within m essag e stimuli resulted in stronger beliefs inferred
from the m essag e a s well as more positive attitudes toward the brand and advertisement.
Second, this research gives advertisers a better understanding of which combination of stimulus
characteristics are relatively m ore effective for print advertisements. It w as found that including
a picture in a print advertisem ent enhanced attitudes, but concrete pictures were superior to
abstract pictures.
Finally, it w as found that quality and elaboration of imagery processing effectively
m ediated relationships between imagery-eliciting strategies and con seq u en ce variables. Thus,
empirical support w as given for theoretically-based hypotheses.

LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH

Like any mental process, it is difficult to m easure imagery processing, and the u se of
verbal reports is subject to limitations and criticisms. Furthermore, use of verbal reports to
m easure a nonverbal p ro cess is also subject to criticism. However, this m ethod is in line with
extant practices, and th e se criticisms were tem pered by a system atic attem pt to m easure this
construct.

Second, due to the nature of the stimuli, there is no way of knowing for sure if the
manipulation caused the effect or something else in the ad did. Thus, there is a potential for
criticism because it is difficult to control for other ad aspects. Kisielius and Sternthal (1984)
discuss this problem and point out that many of the studies that have used relatively realistic
advertisements are open to this criticism. However, there is a trade-off, and it has also been
suggested that more natural settings for research are called for in imagery research (Maclnnis
and Price 1987). To mitigate this criticism, strict adherence to good experimental design to
assure internal validity was adopted in this research.
Third, som e of the insignificant results reported in Chapter Four may have been due to
the experimental procedure followed. Thus, improvements for future research are discussed in
Chapter Five.
Finally, the assumptions of the study can be criticized. The experiment w as necessarily
an artificial situation in which subjects were highly motivated to process the ad information.
Additionally, "real" ads were not used for the study. That is, a fictitious product nam e was used,
and the print advertisements were black and white, not four-color glossy print advertisements
such as those found in magazines. However, the prints ad s were consistent with past research,
and they were used under the cover story of early advertisement development. The dissertation
study also used undergraduate students as respondents, which may be considered a criticism
by some. However, the dissertation was concerned with a mental process, not necessarily
application, so a homogeneous sample was required (Calder, Phillips, and Tybout 1981).
Therefore, the use of undergraduate students was acceptable. However, one can only
generalize results to this population for the type of product (automobiles) used in the study.

STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION
This chapter has provided a brief overview of the dissertation research. Chapter Two
provides an extensive literature review of constructs examined in the dissertation. Conceptual

and empirical literature from both psychology and marketing is reviewed. Chapter Three
outlines the dissertation study as well a s methodology fotlowed. A conceptual framework,
hypotheses, and details concerning experimental stimuli development, experimental design,
experimental procedure, sample, manipulation checks, and measurement of variables is given in
Chapter Three. Considerable detail concerning how m easures assessing dimensions of imagery
processing were developed, evaluated, and refined is given in Chapter Three, also. Chapter
Four presents results of hypotheses tested with the final experiment data. Finally, discussion,
implications, and directions for future research are given in Chapter Five.

CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW

INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, conceptualization, m easurem ent, and empirical studies of imagery are
reviewed. Following this introduction, the chapter is organized into eleven sections.
First, a working definition of imagery is given. While several types of imagery have been
defined, thought (or memory) imagery is relevant to the dissertation. Thus, th e definition of
imagery utilized in the dissertation research is b ased upon this type of imagery.
Second, an overview of g a p s in imagery research provides a preview of the constructs
a s well a s their m easures an d empirical studies including them. This section se ts th e stag e for
the rest of th e chapter.
Third, a brief history of imagery research is provided. Imagery research in psychology is
not new by any m eans, but it has only enjoyed increased attention in marketing during the last
decade.
Fourth, four imagery-eliciting strategies are reviewed, two of which w ere manipulated in
the dissertation research. The strategies are conceptualized in this section, and studies utilizing
the strategies of interest to th e dissertation research are reviewed in th e eighth through the tenth
sections.
Fifth, constructs and m easures of individual differences in imagery processing are
reviewed since the dissertation used style of processing a s a m oderating variable. Individual
differences in imagery processing represent an individual trait, and they have been
conceptualized a s imagery ability, imagery content, and processing style. Each individual
difference variable is reviewed with respect to conceptualization, m easures, and applications in
empirical studies, and the rationale for including processing style instead of one of th e other
individual difference variables in the dissertation research is provided.
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The sixth section reviews measurement attempts of imagery processing. This construct
differs from individual differences because it may be influenced by an imagery-eliciting
communication regardless of ability or preference. As will be seen, there is a definite need for
conceptual and scale development of this construct.
Seventh, empirical studies investigating awareness (recognition an d /o r recall) as a
dependent variable are reviewed. A large number of studies has examined one of these
imagery-eliciting strategies and awareness. General findings and marketing applications are
reviewed for those studies manipulating pictures or instructions to imagine, respectively.
Eighth, empirical studies examining beliefs as dependent variables are reviewed.
However, very few imagery studies have done so, and alt of them have been marketing
applications.
The ninth section is similar to the seventh, except attitudes as dependent variables are
reviewed. Again, general findings and marketing applications manipulating pictures or
instructions to imagine are reviewed.
In the tenth section, a review of imagery studies examining behavioral intentions as a
dependent variable is provided. However, not many studies have done so, but those studying
intentions have also investigated attitudes (c.f., Anderson 1983).
Finally, the last section involves a summary of the entire chapter as well as conclusions
that can be drawn from the review. While several studies are reviewed throughout the chapter,
this section highlights the important conclusions relevant to the dissertation research.

DEFINITION OF MENTAL IMAGERY

One of the problems in imagery research has been the confusion over what mental
imagery means. Some researchers treat imagery as a process in short-term, or working,
memory, while others treat it as a representation of how information is structured in long-term
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memory. This section will define how imagery was applied in this research, which provided the
foundation for how imagery was conceptualized and measured.
Holt (1964) offers definitions of principal types of imagery. In general term s an image is
defined as, "a generic term for all conscious subjective presentations of a quasi-sensory but
nonperceptual character" (p. 255). He then defines eleven other specific types of imagery, such
as thought imagery, phantom limb, hypnogogic images, hallucinations, and dream images.
Thought imagery is relevant to this research, and is defined as follows:

Thought imagery is a faint subjective representation of a sensation or perception
without an adequate sensory input, present in waking consciousness a s part of
an act of thought. Includes memory images and imagination Images; may be
visual, auditory, or of any other sensory modality, and also purely verbal (p.
255).
As such, a thought image is a purely natural mental process that can be, and most likely is,
experienced by any individual (Betts 1909). This is in contrast to the other types of imagery.
For example, phantom iimb imagery refers to an individual experiencing an image or sensation
of an amputated limb, or hallucination is often referred to as an illusion and is not common to
most individuals.
In concert with Holt (1964), Richardson (1969, pp. 2-3) provides a comprehensive
definition of mental imagery:
Mental imagery refers to (1) all those quasi-sensory or quasi-perceptual
experiences of which (2) we are self consciously aware and which (3) exist for
us in the absence of those stimulus conditions that are known to produce their
genuine sensory or perceptual counterparts, and which (4) may be expected to
have different consequences from their sensory or perceptual counterparts.

However, he later states that the fourth characteristic is inadequate due to evidence indicating
that consequences from self-initiated thought imagery and their genuine sensory counterparts
appear to be indistinguishable (Richardson 1983).
Richardson (1969) also provides a classification, albeit an arbitrary one, of four types of
imagery. The first type of imagery is referred to as after imagery. This type of imagery involves

a prolonged or intense stimulation of one or more senses followed by sensorylike consequences
when the actual stimulation ceases. For example, for a time after being on a boat one still
experiences the motion of the rocking boat. The second type of imagery is eidetic imagery.
This is similar to what has often been referred to as photographic memory. Thus, an individual
experiencing this type of imagery is able to form an image of such clarity that it seem s real.
This type of imagery has usually been reported in children (Holt 1964), The third type of
imagery is imagination imagery. Richardson points out that the content of this type of imagery
may be more intense and unexpected as well as unconnected with any identifiable memories
from one’s past. Thus, this type of imagery is usually experienced by individuals undergoing
sensory deprivation or taking hallucinogenic drugs and is not applicable to this research. The
final type of imagery enumerated by Richardson is memory imagery, which is also referred to as
thought imagery (e.g., Holt 1964), This type of imagery holds the most relevance for the present
research in that voluntary thought imagery can be stimulated by instructions from oneself or
from another. Thus, some kind of quasi-sensory or quasi-sensory perceptual experience from
long-term memory can be brought into working memory by an individual and possibly
elaborated upon by using one’s imagination. This type of imagery has also been the basis of
most imagery research in cognitive psychology and in marketing.
Definitions of imagery in the marketing literature are consistent with the definitions of
thought imagery given in the psychology literature. For example, Lutz and Lutz (1978, p. 611)
define imagery as "a mental event involving visualization of a concept or relationship.” Maclnnis
and Price (1987, p. 473) define imagery as "(1) a process (not a structure) by which (2) sensory
information is represented in working memory." Thus, like discursive processing (i.e., symbolic,
language-like information processing), imagery is considered as a mode of processing
information and ranges from low- to high-elaboration depending on the extent to which
information in working memory is integrated with information stored in long-term memory
structures (Maclnnis and Price 1987). However, unlike discursive processing, imagery can be
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multi-sensory. Thus, imagery can involve images made up of sight, smell, taste, sound, and
feeling sensations.
In sum, the definition of imagery adopted for this dissertation research is consistent with
that espoused by Maclnnis and Price (1987) and Richardson (1969):

Mental im agery is a p ro cess by which sen so ry information is represented in
working m em ory in th e a b se n c e of gen u in e and perceptual counterparts.

Memory and imagination play a significant role in determining how elaborate imagery processing
will be (Maclnnis and Price 1987). Elaboration implies incorporating additional information or
details, either from one’s memory or imagination. If an individual forms an image in his/her
mind but does not add additional information from long-term memory or does not elaborate
further on the image, then the individual is engaging in low-elaboration mental imagery.
Conversely, if memories of events from long-term memory are added to the image or if the
image is further expanded upon by using one’s imagination, then the individual is engaging in
high-elaboration mental imagery. Thus, a major goal of this dissertation research is to measure
the relative elaboration of mental imagery undertaken by an individual as a result of being
exposed to various imagery-eliciting strategies.
While imagery processing is the main focus of the dissertation research and the idea of
imagery processing is accepted in the literature, the issue of how knowledge is represented in
long-term memory wilt not be addressed. Some theorists (e.g., Anderson 1978; Pylyshyn 1973,
1981) claim that knowledge is represented solely by verbal propositional networks, w hereas
others (e.g., Bugelski 1983; Kieras 1978; Kolers 1983; Kosslyn 1975) argue that knowledge can
also be stored a s images. This debate is still unresolved in the psychology literature, and
Anderson (1978, p. 249) states, "barring decisive physiological data, it will not be possible to
establish whether an internal representation is pictorial or propositional." Furthermore, since
imagery processing is concerned with working memory and only draws information from long
term memory, this debate is irrelevant to the dissertation research.
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OVERVIEW OF GAPS IN IMAGERY RESEARCH
The following review will serve to substantiate several gaps in imagery research which
are addressed in the dissertation. These gaps are:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

measurement of imagery processing;
inclusion of individual differences in processing style as a moderating variable in
imagery studies;
examination of the effects of pictures and instructions to imagine on memory,
attitudes, and intentions in the sam e study;
examination of brand attribute beliefs a s a consequence variable; and
examination of instructions to imagine embedded within a m essage stimulus
rather than externally provided by the experimenter.

The major gap in imagery research has been the conceptualization and measurement of
imagery processing, which the dissertation addressed. Next, two imagery-eliciting strategies,
pictures and instructions to imagine, have not been examined within the sam e study. Finally,
most studies investigating instructions to imagine have provided these instructions externally to
the m essage stimulus. However, from an advertiser’s standpoint, it would be useful to examine
the impact of instructions to imagine embedded within m essage stimuli.
In the following review, each of the constructs in the dissertation are explained, and
empirical studies examining them are reviewed. Furthermore, rationale for the inclusion or
exclusion of constructs is provided. First, however, a brief history of imagery research is
provided.

BRIEF HISTORY OF IMAGERY RESEARCH
Holt (1964) provides a thorough history which will be recapitulated in this section.
Basically, the history of imagery research has undergone three distinct eras that have mirrored
developments in psychology (Holt 1964): concentration on introspection, banishment of
mentalistic concepts, and "return of the ostracized."
Prior to and around the turn of the twentieth century, psychology concentrated on the
science of mind in an introspectionist era, and imagery was given a great deal of attention. The
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primary task of psychology from this perspective w as to describe and explain the mind, and
imagination a s well a s memory, thinking, and perception played major roles. Through the
examination of o n e's own thoughts and feelings, subjects gave information to the psychologist,
who then studied them on an N of one - himself (Holt 1964).
During th e years 1901-1908, however, studies carried out at Wurtzburg lead to the
conclusion that introspection w as fruitless a s It yielded nothing that m ade any sense (Holt 1964).
Thus, prior to World War I, researchers ventured into an era that was not founded on the study
of consciousness: behaviorism and psychoanalysis. Both were concerned with behavior, and
both assum ed that conscious descriptions of mental content did not explain anything.
According to the behaviorist perspective, then, the primary task of psychology becam e to
describe and explain objective observable behavior on subjects other than oneself. Thus,
mentaltstic topics such as imagery had no place in this era.
Holt enum erates several factors that have lead to the re-em ergence of imagery during
the 1950’s and 1960’s, which he refers to as the “return of the ostracized." These factors
include:
1.

2.
3.
4.
5.

6.
7.

practical problems, especially when individuals such a s pilots on long distance
flights or radar operators required to stare at sco p es for long periods of time
began to hallucinate causing potential for serious accidents;
accounts of individuals confined in concentration cam ps;
increased usage of hallucinogenic drugs;
relatively normal people reporting seeing unidentified flying objects;
advances in brain research (Holt reported that som e researchers were able to
drill a hole in a subject’s head under local anesthesia and, while applying an
electrode to the exposed cortex, were able to cau se the subject to
spontaneously describe an event from their past);
m ost individuals hallucinate in their sleep; and
the change in psychological thinking.

The last factor, the change in psychological thinking, has spurred an increase in cognitive
research. Thus, psychology is now in an era in which model construction of the processing
organism has becom e the primary task. Indeed, this is evident from the increased interest in
artificial intelligence to simulate human thought.

The contem porary background of imagery studies in psychology can be divided into
experiential and behavioral considerations (Richardson 1983). The majority of the factors listed
above fall under experiential considerations; that is, im ages becam e som ething to explain.
However, the move h as been m ore toward behavioral considerations, such a s learning, in which
imagery is used a s an explanatory construct. Thus, imagery h as becom e an independent
variable of interest. This will becom e evident a s th e review of th e literature will reveal how
imagery has been used to explain the picture superiority effect and concrete word superiority
over abstract w ords in memory research. The behavioral direction h as also been adopted in the
marketing literature.
While th e 1970’s and early 1980’s saw th e greatest increase in imagery research in
psychology, imagery has only becom e an independent variable of interest during the past
d eca d e in marketing studies. Maclnnis and Price (1987) enum erate several fruitful areas of
research in which imagery is applicable. For example, they propose that imagery is likely to
have effects on consum er problem framing, probability assessm en t and satisfaction, and
purchase intentions and purchase timing. Furthermore, they posit that imagery can becom e a
consum ption experience.
An advertising context also ap p ears to lend itself well to imagery applications. Lutz and
Lutz (1977), in one of the earliest applications of imagery to marketing phenom ena, used
imagery in advertisem ents. In a review of imagery-eliciting strategies, they also speculate that
uses of imagery in advertising are m ade in several decision areas, such a s advertising design,
media selection, measuring advertising effectiveness, and advertising regulation and public
policy (Lutz and Lutz 1978). Finally, review of the marketing literature will also reveal the
increased interest of imagery in advertising research.

IMAGERY-ELICITING STRATEGIES
Mental imagery is generally thought to be elicited by one of four types of strategies,
which are external treatm ent variables: (1) pictures; (2) concrete words; (3) instructions to
imagine; and (4) guided imagery (Alesandrini and Sheikh 1983; Lutz and Lutz 1978; Maclnnis
and Price 1987). Each of th ese strategies will be defined and described below along with
explanations concerning why two of the strategies, concrete words and guided imagery, were
not manipulated in the dissertation research.

Pictures
Pictorial material is defined a s "any two-dimensional representation in which the stimulus
array contains at least one element that is not alphabetic, numeric, or arithmetic" (Lutz and Lutz
1978, p. 611). As such, photographs, drawings, and illustrations fall under the rubric of pictures.
It is believed that pictures influence the process of mental imagery (Bugelski 1983;
Paivio 1971; Rossiter 1978; Shepard 1967). The picture superiority effect, which implies that
visual information tends to be remembered over verbal information, has been explained through
Imagery by Paivio’s (1986) dual code theory. The theory posits that not only do pictures
activate a visual encoding process, but they also activate a verbal encoding process. Moreover,
the visual co d e is thought to be qualitatively superior to the verbal code. Thus, two retrieval
paths can be activated at the time of recall, which increases recall. Words, on the other hand,
most likely only activate a verbal encoding process, thus resulting in poorer recall. However,
w ords can also stimulate mental imagery, and this is discussed under concreteness of wording.
Pictures can be classified according to the level of concreteness and the degree of
interaction depicted. C oncreteness can range from very concrete and realistic to abstract
(Rossiter and Percy 1983). A concrete picture is one that is easily identifiable of a person, place,
or object, w hereas an abstract picture is one that is not easily identifiable (Rossiter and Percy
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1983). For example, an advertisement containing a realistic picture of a product is more
concrete than one that contains a silhouette.
The elements within a picture can also be interactive or noninteractive in nature (Lutz
and Lutz 1977, 1978). An interactive picture is one in which a person an d /o r objects are
figurally integrated in such a manner as to be associated in some mutual or reciprocal action,
whereas a noninteractive picture depicts the items side by side (Alesandrini and Sheikh 1983).
Since it is unusual for an abstract picture to contain interactive elements, an interactive or
noninteractive picture is first considered a concrete picture. Thus, concrete pictures can be
interactive or noninteractive, and abstract pictures are simpiy that, abstract.

Concrete Words
Concrete words are more likely to elicit a mental image in the mind of the reader
because of their higher "imagery value" than abstract words. By asking readers to rate words
with respect to their ease of arousing sensory images, imagery values have been established for
nouns (Paivio, Yuille, and Madigan 1968), for verbs (Lippman 1974), and for 1,000 frequentlyused words (van der Veur 1975). For example, it is easier to form an image given the concrete
word "dog" than it is given the abstract word "justice." There is substantial evidence indicating
the positive effects of concrete words on memory (Paivio 1969).
Concreteness of wording was not manipulated in the dissertation research for three
reasons. First, there is a large body of evidence corroborating the superiority of concrete words
over abstract words for memory applications and a few for attitude applications. This research
is summarized in Table 2.1. Second, as can be seen from Table 2.1, most studies that have
manipulated the concreteness of wording have also manipulated another imagery-eliciting
strategy (e.g., instructions to imagine or pictures). Finally, it is unrealistic that practical
applications of advertisements would utilize abstract wording. Indeed, in a normative paper,
Rossiter (1978, p. 101) states, "High imagery words should be used in advertising." Therefore,

T a b le 2 .1
EM PIR IC A L S T U D IE S M A N IPU LA TING C O N C R E T E N E S S O F W O R D IN G

Source

Independent Variables

Relevant Results

General Findings:
Anderson (1974)

Study 2: (n = 28 undergraduates)
1) sentence list (concrete; redundant)
2) type of modifier (concrete; redundant)

Concrete modifiers led to better recall.

Craig (1973)

(n = 20 blind, 20 deaf, & 40 normal
undergraduates)
1) concreteness of words (concrete;
abstract)
2) subject group (blind; deaf; normal)

All groups exhibited greater recall of high-imagery than
low-imagery words, but normals exhibited far greater
recall of low-imagery words than the other groups.

D'Agostino, O'Neill, &
Paivio (1977)

(n = 72 undergraduates)
1) type of stimulus (abstract word; concrete
word; picture)
2) processing task (structural; phonemic;
semantic)
3) response judgement (yes; no)

Recall increased as a direct function of the processing
task variable only under the concrete word condition.

Elliott (1973)

(n = 48 undergraduates)
1) instructional set (imagery; rote repetition)
2) word imagery value (low; high)
3) interpolated task activity (none; figures;
numerical; word category)

Recall performance was greater for high imagery words
than low imagery words.

Lippman (1974)

Studies 2 & 3: (n2= 4 8 ; n3 = 18
undergraduates)
1) enactive imagery ratings of pair (highhigh; high-low; low-high; low-low)

In both studies, the number of words recalled was
greatest in the high-high enactive imagery combination of
words.
ro

Table 2.1 (C ontinued)

EMPIRICAL STUDIES MANIPULATING CONCRETENESS OF WORDING

Source

Independent Variables

Relevant Results

McKelvie & Demers
(1979)

(n =70 high schoolers)
1) imagery ability (low; high)
Stimuli were abstract nouns, concrete
nouns, and pictures.

High visualizers recalled more concrete and abstract words in
immediate test than low visualizers, but they recalled more
concrete words for 1-week recall.

Paivio & Csapo (1969)

Study 1: In=96 undergraduates)
1) stimulus concreteness (pictures;
concrete words; abstract words)
2) memory task (immediate memory span;
free recall)

Both pictures and concrete words greater recall and
recognition than abstract words. The order of effectiveness
was pictures > concrete words > abstract words in serial
learning and in both nonsequential tasks.

Study 2: (n = 192 undergraduates)
- same as Study 1 except addition of 2
memory tasks (serial learning; recognition
memory
Peterson & McGee
(1974)

Study 1: (n = 64 undergraduates)
1) instructions (imagery; rote repetition)
2) imagery rating of nouns (low; high)

High imagery word pairs led to greater recall.

Studies 2 & 3: (n2= 64; n3= 192
undergraduates)
1) number of dictionary meanings (few;
many)
2) instructions (imagery; rote repetition)
3) imagery rating of nouns (low; high)
Robins, Bray, Irvin, &
Wise (1974)

(n = 60 undergraduates)
Interactive-imagery instructions led to superior recall only
with high-imagery cues
11 instructions (interactive-imagery;
separation-imagery; rote repetition)
2) imagery rating of nouns (HH; HL; LH; LL)

T able 2 .1 (Continued)
EMPIRICAL STUDIES MANIPULATING CONCRETENESS OF WORDING

Source

Independent Variables

Relevant Results

Slee (1978)

Study 1: (n =40 undergraduates)
1) concreteness of nouns (abstract;
concrete)
2) instructions (imagery; verbal)
3) imagery ability (low; high)

Concrete nouns produced greater recall than abstract nouns.

Wittrock & Goldberg
(1975)

Study 1: (n=48 undergraduates)
1| instructions (imagery; story; sentence;
control)
2) imagery value of noun (low; high)
3) meaningfulness of word (low; high)

For both studies, high imagery words had greater recall,
regardless of instructions.
Study 1; Meaningfulness adds to recall when imagery rating
is high.
Study 2: Meaningfulness more important for the children
than the adults in Study 1.

Study 2; (n=48 6th graders)
• same as Study 1
Wortman & Sparling
(1974)

(n=36 undergraduates)
1) concreteness of stimuli (abstract;
concrete)
2) instructions (bizarre images; common
images; verbal connections)

Concrete stimuli better recalled than abstract stimuli in
immediate and 1-week delay tests.

Marketing Applications:
Concrete wording led to more positive attitudes toward the
advertisement and brand.

Burns, Biswas, &
Roach (1991)

(n = 60 undergraduates)
1) concreteness of wording (concrete;
abstract)
2) brand familiarity (familiar; unfamiliar)

Robertson (1987)

(n=69 undergraduates)
More high imagery brand names recalled and recognized in
1) imagery rating of brand names (low; high) both 1-hour and 2-day recall and recognition.

T a b le 2 .1 (C o n tin u e d )
EM PIRICAL S T U D IE S M A N IPU LA TIN G C O N C R E T E N E SS O F W O R D IN G

Source

Rossiter & Percy
(1 9 7 8 ,1 9 8 0 )

Independent Variables

(n= 88 non-student adults)
1) visual (strong; weak)
2) advertisement copy (concrete; abstract)
3) imagery ability (verbal; visual) - 1 9 7 8
study only

Relevant Results

Strongest attitude elicited by combination of strong visual
and concrete copy.

only concrete copy was utilized as experimental stimuli, which is in concert with other
researchers (e.g., Bone and Ellen 1990; Dickson et al. 1986; Edell and Staelin 1983; Kisielius and
Sternthal 1984).

Pictures and Words Hierarchy
Rossiter and Percy (1983) derived from the literature a hierarchy of advertising stimuli,
given pictures and words, ranked in term s of memorability. This hierarchy Is reproduced in
Table 2.2. While they included video, print, and audio stimuli, the hierarchy for print stimuli is
applicable to the dissertation research. Specifically, the hierarchy from most to least effective is:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Static
Static
Static
Static
Static

concrete pictures
abstract pictures
concrete sentences or phrases
concrete words
abstract sentences, phrases, or words

In general, this hierarchy indicates the superiority of pictures, concrete or abstract, over words in
memory applications. This also shows the superiority of concrete over abstract stimuli. The
dissertation, however, will expand this hierarchy by including interactive and noninteractive
concrete pictures and another imagery-eliciting strategy, namely, instructions to imagine.

Instructions to Imagine
This imagery-eliciting strategy is a more direct way to encourage imagery processing
than the two previously discussed strategies. Typically, instructions to imagine have involved the
experimenter giving instructions to the recipient to form mental images, especially in empirical
studies in psychology. Subjects are told to "form a mental picture..." or to "picture yourself in
the situation." These instructions, however, are not part of the stimuli the subject is required to
learn or remember, which is impractical from an advertising standpoint.
Embedding instructions to imagine within a m essage stimulus is a viable alternative for
advertising. A few researchers have analyzed the effects of embedding instructions to imagine

Table 2.2
HIERARCHY OF ADVERTISING STIMULI RANKED
IN TERMS OF MEMORABILITY (AWARENESS)
1.

Dynamic concrete pictures (video)

2.

Static concrete pictures (print)

3.

Dynamic abstract pictures (video)

4.

Static abstract pictures (print)

5.

Dynamic concrete sentences or phrases (audio)

6.

Dynamic abstract sentences or phrases (audio)

7.

Dynamic concrete words (audio)

8.

Dynamic abstract words (audio)

9.

Static concrete sentences or phrases (print)

10.

Static concrete words (print)

11.

Static abstract sentences phrases or words
(print)

Source: Rossiter and Percy (1983), "Visual Communication in Advertising," in Information
Processing Research in Advertising. Richard J. Harris, ed. Hillsdale, NJ:
Lawrence Erlbaum Associations, p. 105.
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within a promotional m essage (e.g., Burns et al. 1992; Bone and Ellen 1990; Gregory et al. 1982;
Wright and Rip 1980), but results have been mixed. However, a s will be discussed, som e of the
manipulations have been Inadequate and could have been the cause of poor results.
Paivio (1971) reviewed several studies on experimenter-provided mental imagery
instructions and concluded that such instructions facilitate learning. Another advantage of
instructing the viewer to form their own mental image as opposed to providing a picture for
them is that the self-generated mental imagery will probably be more personally relevant. This
could result in self-generated persuasion and stronger attitudes (Maclnnis and Jaworski 1989).
While Rossiter (1978) states, "high imagery visuals work far better than instructions to imagine,"
no adequate empirical study has been performed to test this hypothesis. Thus, there is a need
to assess the relative efficacy of instructions to imagine embedded within a m essage stimulus.

Guided Imagery
Wollman (1981) discusses the employment of "guided imagery" to study social
psychological phenomena. This strategy resembles methods used in clinical applications and is
not practical in an advertising context for several reasons.
First, subjects must participate in relaxation exercises, which includes the suggestion
that the forthcoming imagery they experience should be lifelike. This step requires considerable
time and effort from both experimenter and subject alike. Second, subjects go through several
guided-imagery exercises to becom e accustomed to the imagery experience. Third, subjects
are then guided through an imagery situation concerning the phenomenon the experimenter is
interested in. Finally, a dependent measure is taken. In sum, the imagery experience is used to
supplant the actual behavior because it may be too impractical or costly to study the actual
behavior.
Even though Maclnnis and Price (1987) include guided imagery as an imagery-eliciting
strategy that may be useful to consumer researchers, it does not appear to be practical in an
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advertising context, particularly print advertisements. Thus, this imagery-eliciting strategy was
not included in the dissertation research.

Summary
In this section, four imagery-eliciting strategies have been described: (1) pictures; (2)
concrete words; (3) instructions to imagine; and (4) guided imagery. Two of these strategies
were manipulated in the dissertation research. Specifically, pictures were manipulated ranging
on a continuum of concrete/interactive, concrete/noninteractive, abstract, and no picture.
Instructions to imagine were either em bedded in the m essage stimulus or absent from the
m essage stimulus. C oncreteness of wording was not manipulated, but the m essage stimulus
consisted of concrete copy. Finally, it was argued that guided imagery is impractical for
advertising applications in general and print advertisements in particular.

CONSTRUCTS AND MEASURES OF INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES
IN IMAGERY PROCESSING
Individual differences in imagery processing have received attention in a number of
studies. The areas of interest are studies of individual differences in (1) spatial ability, (2)
imagery ability, (3) imagery content, and (4) processing style. These dimensions of individual
differences have been studied both for their direct and indirect roles on the processing of
information. A summary of these studies is provided in Table 2.3, and it can be seen that the
majority have treated individual differences in imagery ability, imagery content, a n d /o r
processing style a s a predictor variable. Typically, these individual differences have been
assessed, not manipulated.

However, the dissertation research included individual differences

in processing style a s a moderator between the relationship of the antecedents (imagery-eliciting
strategy) and the relevant dependent variables. These studies, a s well as the scales that have
been used to m easure the individual difference variable of interest, will be discussed below.

Table 2.3
STUDIES EXAMINING INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCE VARIABLES
Authors
(Source)

Individual Difference
Variable (Measurement)

Relevant Results

Burns, Biswas, &
Roach (1991)
(marketing)

1) processing style (SOPa: used visual
and verbal components separately)

Visual dimension of style of processing was
significant as moderator for attitude toward
the advertisement and intentions.

Childers & Houston
(1984) (marketing)

1) imagery vividness (VVIQb)
2) visual imagery control (Gordon's VICe)
3) processing style (VVQd)

None of the individual difference variables
had an effect.

Childers, Houston, &
Heckler 1985)
(marketing)

1) imagery vividness
(VVIQb: alpha = .84 & .85)
2) visual imagery control
(VICe: alpha = .72 & .76)
3) processing style
(VVQd: alpha = .57; SOP1: alpha = .88)

SOP significantly related to both aided recall
and recognition. Negative correlation
indicates that retention was strongest among
verbally-oriented processors.
VVQ, VVIQ, and VIC not correlated with
either retention measures.

Giambra (1977)
(gerontology)

1) imagery content (IPl“)

Neurotic-anxious absorption in daydreaming
decreased with increasing age.

Gould (1990)
(marketing)

1) processing style (SOP*: alpha for
visual = .67; verbal = .77)

High verbals and high processors tend to be
less involved with TV and more involved with
books.
High processors were more involved with
magazines than high verbals or high visuals
alone.
High visual and high processors were more
likely to visualize or plan a shopping trip and
to be most publicly and privately selfconscious.
rv>
to

T a b le 2 . 3 (C o n tin u e d )
S T U D IE S EX AM IN ING INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCE VA RIABLES

Authors
(Source)

Individual Difference
Variable (Measurement)

Relevant Results

Holbrook, Chestnut,
Oliva, & Greenleaf
(1984) (marketing)

1) processing style (V/V Index')

Individual differences in processing style did
not have an effect on performance.
More favorable emotional response to a
match between style of processing and game
format.

Maclnnis and Price
(1990) (marketing)

1) tendency to engage in vivid imagery
(alpha = .83)
2) use of imagery to plan future (alpha = .78)
3) tendency to engage in fantasy (alpha = .56)
(All measured with modified IPI°)

Individual differences had no impact on
imagery processing.

Marks (1973)
(psychology)

1) visual imagery vividness (VVIQb: testretest = .74; split-half = .85)

Subjects who reported vivid visual imagery
were more accurate in recall than those who
reported poor visual imagery.

McKelvie and Demers
(1979) (psychology)

1) visual imagery vividness (VVIQb)

High visualizers better than low visualizers on
all three types of items (abstract and
concrete words; pictures) in short-term recall,
but they were only superior on the concrete
words and pictures in long-term recall. Both
groups performed equally well on recognition
test.

Oliver, Robertson, &
Mitchell (1989)
(marketing)

1) imagery vividness (VVIQb: alpha = .87)
2) processing style (SOP*: alpha = .63)

Only processing style w as marginally
positively related to imaging.
CO

o

T a b le 2 . 3 (C o n tin u e d )
S T U D IE S EX AM IN ING INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCE VARIABLES

Authors
(Source)

Individual Difference
Variable (Measurement)

Relevant Results

Rossiter & Percy
(1978) (marketing)

1) processing style (VVQd)

Visualizers showed greatest degree of
affective learning overall. The relationship
between visual imaging preference and brand
attitudes induced by visually-oriented ads
appears to hold only for the combination of
visually oriented advertising with abstract
copy.

Sheehan (1966)
(psychology)

1) imagery vividness (Betts' QMI°)

Vivid imagers accurately reproduced the
stimulus as they perceived it. Familiarity with
the object imagined makes for more vivid
imagery only in those who have the capacity
to image vividly.

Slee (1978)
(psychology)

1) visual imagery ability (8etts* QMI°: visual
section only

Imagery ability had no effect on recall of
either words or pictures.

*SOP - Style of Processing Questionnaire (Childers, Houston, and Heckler 1985)
bVVIQ - Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (Marks 1973)
‘Gordon's VIC - Gordon's Test of Visual Imagery Control (Richardson's (1969) version)
dVVQ - Visualizer-Verbalizer Questionnaire (Richardson 1977)
•IPI - Imaginal Process Inventory (Singer and Antrobus 1963)
'V/V Index - Visualizer/Verbalizer Index (Holbrook, Chestnut, Oliva, and Greenleaf 1984)
"Betts' QMI - shortened form of Betts' Questionnaire Upon Mental Imagery (given in Sheehan 1967)
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While there has been a dearth of acceptable m easures of imagery processing per se, there has
been considerable effort in the development of scales measuring individual differences on one of
the dim ensions mentioned above. These scales are summarized in Table 2.4 with the exception
of scales of spatial ability. While there are several scales of spatial ability (e.g., Bennett,
Seashore, and W esman 1947; Likert and Q uasha 1970; Thurstone 1938; Thurstone and Jeffrey
1956), th ese are not included in Table 2.4 b ecau se they have been found to be insignificantly
correlated to imagery ability m easures (Sheehan et al. 1983) and have rarely been applied in
imagery studies.

Imageiy Ability
Imagery ability refers to vividness and controllability of an individual’s mental imagery
(Maclnnis 1987). Vividness refers to clarity of mental imagery, while control implies an
individual's ability to perform manipulations such a s mental rotations (Childers et al. 1985).
These dim ensions focus on one’s cognitive ability as the determinant of type of processing
strategy evoked. Ability has typically been treated as a predictor variable (e.g., Childers et al.
1985; Marks 1973; McKelvie and Demers 1979; Oliver et al. 1989; Slee 1978) or a s a covariate
(e.g., Childers and Houston 1984; Sheehan 1966), but results have been mixed. Before
discussing th ese studies, a brief description of scales that have been used to m easure imagery
ability is warranted.
Scales of Imagery Ability. Three scales have been widely used to m easure imagery
ability, two of which concentrate on imagery vividness. The oldest established scale developed
to m easure imagery vividness was developed by Betts (1909), and a shortened version was
developed by S heehan (1967). From the visual portion of Betts’ (1909) questionnaire, Marks
(1973) developed the Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (WIG) to m easure visual
imagery vividness. Finally, Gordon (1949) developed a test of imagery control, which has been
revised by Richardson (1969).

T a b le 2 . 4
S C A L E S O F INDIV ID U AL D IFFERENCES IN IM A GERY A B IL IT Y /PR O C E SSIN G

Scale and Authors

Description of Scale

Scales o f imagery vividness:
Betts Questionnaire Upon Mental Imagery
(QMI): Betts (1909); Sheehan (1967)

Betts' version: 150 items investigating imagery in 7 modalities: visual, auditory,
cutaneous, kinaesthetic, gustatory, olfactory, organic.
Sheehan's version: 35 items to measure imagery vividness in same 7 modalities.

Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire
(VVIQ): Marks (1973)

An extended 16-item version of the QMI visual imagery subscale.

Scale o f imagery control:
Gordon's Test of Imagery Control (VIC):
Gordon (1949); Richardson (1969)

12-item test to differentiate autonomous from controlled visual imagery.
Richardson revised it with a true/false or unsure response format.

Scale o f imagery content:
Imaginal Process Inventory (IPi):
Singer & Antrobus (1963); Huba et al. (1982)

2 of the 28 scales relevant to imagery:
Visual Imagery in Daydreams & Auditory Imagery in Daydreams
Huba et al.'s shorter version taps imagery vividness and use/usefulness of imagery
in various applications.

Scales o f processing style:
Verbalizer-Visualizer Questionnaire (VVQ):
Richardson (1977)

8 items tapping visual processing and 7 items for verbal processing utilizing a
true/false response format.

Style of Processing Questionnaire (SOP):
Childers et al. (1985)

11 items tapping verbal preference and 11 tapping visual preference utilizing a 4
response format.

Visualization/Verbalization Index (V/V Index):
Holbrook et al. (1984)

10 items utilizing both pictorial and verbal anchors for each item.
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Betts' Questionnaire Upon Mental Imagery (QMI) consists of 150 items investigating
imagery vividness in seven modalities (visual, auditory, cutaneous, kinaesthetic, gustatory,
olfactory, and organic), but Sheehan’s (1967) version was reduced to 35 items to m easure
imagery vividness in the sam e seven modalities (five items per modality). For example, in the
visual modality, respondents rate the visual clarity of the sun a s it drops below the horizon on a
7-point response scale with (1) indicating the image as perfectly clear and a s vivid as the actual
experience and (7) indicating no imagery present. In a review, Maclnnis (1987) reports that this
scale has attained test-retest reliabilities ranging from .59 (for longer intervals) to .91 and
reliability coefficients ranging from .91 to .95.
Marks’ (1973) Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (WIQ) is an extended 16-item
version of the visual imagery subscale of the QMI because the QMI w as often improperly used
to predict performance on visual tasks (Maclnnis 1987). This m easure is designed to specifically
a sse ss vividness of visual images. A 5-point scale is used to indicate vividness of familiar
scenes that are visualized. Test-retest reliabilities range from .67 to .74, and reliability
coefficients range from .84 to .96 (Maclnnis 1987). As can be seen from Table 2.3, the W IQ has
been used more frequently than the Betts QMI, which is mostly due to its concentration on
visual imagery vividness.
Gordon’s Test of Visual Imagery Control (VIC, 1949; Richardson 1969) is a 12-item test
to differentiate autonom ous from controlled visual imagery. The original version consisted of a
y es/n o only response format, but Richardson (1969) revised it with a true/false or unsure
response format and shortened it to 11 items. Respondents are asked if they can see various
modifications on images of an object. For example, they are asked to visualize an automobile,
then to picture it standing at a garden gate or to picture it lying upside down. Test-retest
reliabilities range from .83 to .84, and reliability coefficients range from .64 to .95 (Maclnnis
1987). If imagery control is measured, this is the scale that has been used.

Studies o f Imagery Ability. Most studies of imagery ability have examined a memory
variable (i.e., recall a n d /o r recognition) a s the dependent variable, and results are equivocal.
For example, Childers and Houston (1984) included imagery vividness (WIQ: Marks 1973) and
visual imagery control (VIC: Richardson 1969) a s covariates assum ing that individual differences
may have an effect. However, it w as found that the assum ption of within-factor homogeneity
am ong the regression coefficients was met, and thus individual differences in imagery ability did
not have an effect. Childers et al. (1985) included imagery vividness (WIQ: Marks 1973) and
visual imagery control (VIC: Richardson 1969) predictor variables, but they found that neither
w as correlated with aided recall or recognition of print advertising stimuli. Furthermore, Slee
(1978) examined the relationship between visual imagery ability (QMI: Sheehan 1967) and recall
of w ords (concrete and abstract) and pictures, but she also failed to find an effect on the recall
of either words or pictures. On the other hand, Marks (1973) found that vivid visualizers were
more accurate in recall than poor visualizers, with visual imagery vividness m easured by the
W IQ (Marks 1973). Similarly, McKelvie and Demers (1979) found that vivid visualizers (WIQ:
Marks 1973) performed better than low visualizers on three types of items (abstract words,
concrete words, and pictures) in short-term recall, and they were superior for concrete words
and pictures in long-term recall. In sum, no concise statem ent can be proclaimed concerning
the relationship between individual differences in imagery ability and retention.
Other studies have analyzed an individual’s imagery ability, namely vividness, and its
impact on imaging. Oliver et al. (1989) found that imagery vividness (WIQ: Marks 1973) w as
not related to the type of processing that occurred (i.e., imaging or analyzing). Sheehan (1966),
however, found that vivid imagers (QMI: Sheehan 1967) accurately reproduced the stimulus a s
they perceived it, and he also found that more vivid imagery of familiar objects resulted only in
those who had the ability to image vividly. Thus, on the one hand, it appears that imagery
ability, specifically vividness, may influence imagery processing (Sheehan 1966), and, on the
other hand, it may not (Oliver et al. 1989).
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Summary. Review of the studies analyzing individual differences in imagery ability does
not allow strong conclusions to be drawn. For this reason, imagery ability was not included as
an individual difference variable in the dissertation research.

Imagery Content
Individuals also differ with respect to general content of their images and fantasies a s
well as their use of imagery in everyday life. This construct reflects individual tendencies to
engage in vivid imagery, to use imagery to plan the future, and to engage in fantasy (Maclnnis
and Price 1990). Very few researchers, however, have studied this individual difference variable,
and those who have (e.g., Glambra 1977; Maclnnis and Price 1990), have found disappointing
results.
Scale o f Imagery Content. Singer and Antrobus (1963) developed the Imaginal Process
Inventory (IPl), which is a 344 item inventory of 29 subscales assessing individual differences in
daydreaming content, frequency, controllability, vividness, and general attitudes about
daydreaming (Maclnnis 1987). While several of the subscales tap other dimensions, such as
vividness and control, two of them are relevant to imagery content, namely, Visual Imagery in
Daydreams and Auditory Imagery in Daydreams (Sheehan et al. 1983). Items are scored on a 1to 7-polnt scale. Reported reliabilities have been poor, with test-retest reliabilities ranging from
.49 to .86 and reliability coefficients ranging from .31 to .95 (Maclnnis 1987).
Huba, Singer, Aneshensel, and Antrobus’ (1982) revised version (45 items) of the IPl
taps imagery vividness and the use/usefulness of imagery in various applications such as
fantasy and problem solving. In a recent application, Maclnnis and Price (1990) used a modified
version of this scale and reported reliabilities ranging from .56 to .83.
Studies o f Imagery Content. In contrast to imagery ability and style of processing,
individual differences in imagery content are infrequently studied. Giambra (1977) used the IPl
(Singer and Antrobus 1963) and correlated imagery content with chronological age. He was
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only able to find, however, that “Neurotic-anxious absorption in daydreaming" decreased with
increasing age. Similarly, Maclnnis and Price (1990) found that individual differences in the
tendency to engage in vivid imagery, the use of imagery to plan the future, and the tendency to
engage in fantasy were unrelated to imagery processing when students were retrospectively
asked if they had imagined their spring break vacation prior to the actual trip.
Summary. Imagery content is an infrequently used individual difference variable.
Moreover, from the scant research that has analyzed this variable, ft appears unlikely that it
would have a moderating effect on relationships between imagery-eliciting strategies and
consequence variables. For these reasons, the dissertation research did not address this
individual difference variable.

Style o f Processing
Similar to imagery ability, style of processing (or processing preference) has been
examined in several studies, especially in marketing. In contrast to imagery ability, however, this
individual difference variable has received more support as being effective as a predictor variable
(e.g., Childers et al. 1985; Gould 1990; Holbrook et al. 1984; Oliver et al. 1989; Rossiter and
Percy 1978) and as a moderating variable (Burns et al.1991).
While imagery ability and style of processing may appear to be similar constructs,
Richardson (1977) argues that they are independent dimensions, and Childers et al. (1985)
provides support for this argument. Recall that ability refers to an individual’s basic cognitive
ability. Preference for using a specific processing style (i.e., discursive (verbal) or imagery
(typically visual)) reflects one’s tendency to utilize one type of processing style. More
specifically, Childers et al. (1985, p. 130) conceptualize processing style "as a preference and
propensity to engage in a verbal and/or visual modality of processing." Thus, while an individual
may possess a strong imagery or verbal ability, he/she may be indifferent as to the style of
processing preferred. Indeed, Betts (1909) found that most, if not all, individuals possess some
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imagery ability and can imagine when asked to do so. Therefore, processing preference may be
the superior, differentiating individual difference variable.
Scales o f Processing Style. Three scales have been developed to a ssess style of
processing, the first two of which have been frequently used: Verbalizer-Visualizer Questionnaire
(WQ: Richardson 1977), Style of Processing Questionnaire (SOP: Childers et al. 1985), and the
Visualization/Verbalization Index (V/V Index: Holbrook et al. 1984). Each is relatively short and
simple to administer.
The Verbalizer-Visualizer Questionnaire (WQ) consists of 8 items tapping visual
processing and 7 items for verbal processing. This scale utilizes a true/false, 2-response format.
Respondents are asked to indicate the extent to which visual or verbal processes are normally
engaged in activities such as work or daydreaming. Reported reliabilities have been poor, with
test-retest reliabilities ranging from .29 to .91 and reliability coefficients ranging from .54 to .66
(Maclnnis 1987). This may be due to the multidimensionality of the scale, for Childers et al.
(1985) found that the scale items loaded on three factors (vividness, control, and preference)
rather than on one (preference). They pointed out that some of the visual items of the scale
were assessing ability rather than preference. To compensate, Childers et al. (1985) revised and
expanded the W Q into the Style of Processing Questionnaire (SOP).
The SOP Questionnaire incorporates several changes made to the W Q, and it exhibits
better internal consistency, discriminant validity, and criterion validity than the W Q (Childers et
al. 1985). The first change involved expanding the 2-response format to a 4-response format
(i.e., (1) Always true; (2) Usually true; (3) Usually false, and (4) Always false). The original W Q
was given to 41 subjects with 20 subjects receiving the original 2-response format and 21
subjects receiving the revised 4-response format. Alphas increased from .69 to .76 for the visual
component and from .61 to .74 for the verbal component. Thus, the 4-response format was
more consistent and was subsequently used in the revised measure. The second change
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involved following Churchill’s (1979) paradigm for developing better m easures. More items were
generated and pretested, resulting in a final scale of 22 items (11 verbal and 11 visual).
Finally, to a s s e s s reliability and validity of the SOP, 106 subjects evaluated ten print
advertisem ents while also com pleting the SOP (54 subjects), the W Q (52 subjects), th e WIQ,
the VIC, and Crowne and Marlowe's (1964) social desirability scale. Alpha for th e SOP w as .88,
for the W Q it w as .57, for the W IQ it w as .84 and .85, and for th e VIC it w as .72 and .76. A
confirmatory factor analysis indicated that all items of the SOP loaded a s hypothesized. The
SOP exhibited low intercorrelations with the two m easures of imagery ability, thus indicating
discriminant ability. Also, it did not correlate with the m easure of social desirability. The W Q
also dem onstrated discriminant validity. The SOP w as significantly correlated with both aided
recall and recognition, while neither the W Q , the W IQ , nor the VIC did so. Thus, the SOP
dem onstrated criterion validity. In sum, the SOP exhibits psychometric properties superior to
those of the W Q , which is presumably also a m easure of processing style.
Holbrook et al. (1984) have developed a scale to a sse ss processing preferences called
the Visualization/Verbalization Index (V/V Index). Since it could be argued that verbal scales
are inappropriate for measuring nonverbal phenom ena, Holbrook et al. (1984) com bined verbal
and nonverbal reference points to m easure processing style. Each of th e ten items contains a
stimulus (a word or a picture) and an anchor (a word or a picture). Subjects are asked to place
a check closer to the anchor that is more strongly associated with the stimulus. Thus, if an
individual responds closer to the picture end of the response scale regardless of w hether the
stimulus is verbal o r visual, h e /sh e would be indicating a visual preference. Similar to the SOP,
an individual may indicate no preference for verbal or visual processing. Holbrook et al. (1984)
report an alpha of .67 in their first application of the scale.
Studies of Processing Style. The majority of studies analyzing style of processing as an
individual difference variable have treated it as a predictor variable. Childers et al. (1985) found
a significant negative correlation between style of processing (SOP: Childers et al. 1985) and

retention, which indicated that retention of the 10 print advertising stimuli was strongest among
verbally-oriented processors. By dividing the SOP into its two subscales, Gould (1990) found
that high verbals and high processors were less Involved in television and more involved with
books than high visuals and low processors. Additionally, he found that high processors were
more involved with magazines than were high verbals or high visuals alone. Finally, he also
found that high visuals and high processors were more likely to plan a shopping trip a s well a s
being more publicly and privately self-conscious. Holbrook et ai. (1984) also found that
respondents exhibited favorable emotion when the game format (visual or verbal) was congruent
with their preferred style of processing (visual or verbal measured by the V/V Index: Holbrook et
al. 1984), but style of processing did not have an effect on their actual performance of the game.
Oliver et al. (1989) found that style of processing (SOP: Childers et al. 1985) was marginally
positively related to imagery. Thus, respondents that preferred an imagery style of processing
exhibited more imaging than analyzing processing. Finally, Rossiter and Percy (1978) found that
visualizers (WQ: Richardson 1977) showed the greatest degree of affective learning overall.
However, the relationship between a visual processing preference and brand attitudes appeared
to hold only for the combination of a visually-oriented advertisement (i.e., a large picture instead
of a small picture) and abstract copy.
As a moderating variable, style of processing has received support, albeit minimal.
Burns et al. (1991) hypothesized that individual differences in processing preferences (SOP:
Childers et al. 1985) would moderate effects of high/low imagery words and familiar/unfamiliar
stimuli on attitudes and intentions. However, only the visual dimension achieved significance as
a moderator for attitude toward the ad and purchase intentions. Finally, similar to imagery
ability, Childers and Houston (1984) found that processing style (WQ: Richardson 1977) did not
have an effect on memory when analyzed as a covariate.
Summary. Style of processing has been widely applied in empirical studies a s a
predictor variable (e.g., Childers et al. 1985; Gould 1990; Holbrook et al. 1984; Oliver et al. 1989;
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Rossiter and Percy 1978) or as a moderating variable (e.g., Burns et al. 1991; Childers and
Houston 1984), especially in marketing. Three scales exist to a sse ss this individual difference
variable (WQ, SOP, and V/V Index), but Childers et al. (1985) have shown the W Q to be
inadequate.

Summary
Several individual difference variables, scales to m easure them, and studies
incorporating them have been reviewed. First, Imagery ability refers to one’s cognitive ability to
image vividly a s well a s control the image. Three scales (QMI, WIQ, and VIC) have been widely
used to a s s e s s this construct. The results, however, have been equivocal a s to the usefulness
of this variable in imagery studies.
Second, imagery content refers to the general content, frequency, and use of imaging
by an individual. One scale, the IPI, exists to m easure imagery content. However, the
appropriateness and usefulness of this construct in marketing studies in general and the
dissertation research in particular is questionable; indeed, it has been included in very few
studies, and results have been dismal.
Finally, the third individual difference variable reviewed was style of processing, which
appears to hold more relevance to the dissertation research. Three scales exist to a sse ss this
construct (W Q, SOP, and V/V Index), however, it has been shown by Childers et al. (1985) that
the W Q is inadequate. Therefore, they developed a better measure, the SOP Questionnaire to
asse ss style of processing. Though typically treated a s a predictor variable, the dissertation
research included style of processing a s a moderating variable between imagery-eliciting
strategies and consequence variables.
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MEASURING IMAGERY PROCESSING

Instead of scales or manipulation checks to a sse ss imagery processing, th e majority of
researchers have relied on criterion-based responses (Macinnis and Price 1987). Typically, an
imagery-eliciting strategy is manipulated, and imagery processing is inferred from the results.
Thus, it is assum ed that imagery processing w as the causal factor In the positive resp o n ses for
the imagery-eliciting condition.
Som e researchers, however, have either attem pted to m easure imagery processing or
attem pted to provide manipulation checks. These efforts are summarized in Tables 2.5 and 2.6
and will be discussed in this section. As can be seen from the tables, these attem pts have been
haphazard and inconsistent in nature. Ellen and Bone (1991) provide the only system atic
attem pt to develop a scale to m easure stimulus-evoked imagery processing, however, they did
not follow the paradigm for developing better m easures set forth by Churchill (1979). Thus,
there is a clear need for rigorous and systematic scale development in this area - a need the
dissertation attempted to fulfill.

Alternative Approaches to Measuring Imagery Processing
While a paper and pencil scale to m easure stimulus-evoked imagery processing was
developed in the dissertation research, there have been other approaches to measuring imagery
processing. One approach involves interrupting an individual involved in imagery processing,
which is referred to a s “thought sampling" or "event sampling" (Klinger 1978). Another approach,
called Experiential Analysis Technique (EAT), involves videotaping individuals a s they are
imagining and later having them interpret the video (Sheehan et al. 1983). Finally, physiological
m easures have also been used to a sse ss imagery processing. Each will be discussed along
with reasons why they were not utilized in the dissertation.
'Thought sampling" (Klinger 1978) requires the experimenter to interrupt individuals
involved in imagery processing. Subjects are then asked to describe the content of their

images. In a similar vein, "event sampling" requires individuals to indicate whenever a certain
type of image is aroused. However, the assumptions surrounding these techniques open them
up for criticism. First, it is assum ed that individuals are articulate about their experiences and
are able to translate their imagery into verbal responses (Sheehan et al. 1983). Thus, individual
differences in verbosity or vocabulary could lead the researcher to misinterpret the degree of
imagery processing (Maclnnis and Price 1987). Second, since conscious events involving
imagery are subtle, variable, and complex, the experimenter may resort to providing assistance,
resulting in the possibility of experimenter bias. Finally, asking individuals to describe their
imagery may not be measuring the content of the image, but rather individuals’ ability to control,
or hold, an image in their head while describing it (Maclnnis and Price 1987). In sum, not only
does this method of assessing imagery processing entail considerable intervention from the
researcher, it also suffers from severe criticism. Thus, it does not appear to be a superior
alternative to a paper and pencil assessm ent of imagery processing.
A technique that has been used in an attempt to overcome the above criticisms is
referred to as the Experiential Analysis Technique (EAT: Sheehan et al. 1983). While it is similar
in som e respects to "thought sampling," EAT attempts to provide a more objective assessm ent
of imagery processing. The technique involves video protocols of an individual while imagining.
Thus, this technique is still subject to the criticism that individuals must be articulate about their
imagery. However, to interpret the protocol, the videotape is then played back to the individual
in the presence of an independent investigator who prompts the individual to describe his/her
experience at the time of the taping. Therefore, the tape is used a s an aid to recalling feelings,
imagery, and cognitions that occurred at the time. The investigator’s role is to focus on the
individual’s experiences while minimizing the cues a s to "appropriate" responses (Sheehan et al.
1983). Again, however, this is a subjective technique and was not used in the dissertation.
Finally, physiological reactions, such as brain wave patterns, have been used a s
indicators of imagery processing (Maclnnis and Price 1987). These techniques may provide a
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superior assessm ent of imagery processing. However, not only are these measures inferential,
highly obtrusive, and require technical sophistication, they were neither practical nor feasible for
the dissertation.
Clearly, there is a need to conceptualize and objectively measure imagery processing.
Thus, a paper and pencil test in line with extant practices in the literature (Churchill 1979) was
developed to measure imagery processing. Though this technique is also open to criticism, we
are dealing with a process of successive approximation in all of our research, and this method is
the best possible alternative at the present time (Hunt 1983).

Measurement ‘Attempts' in Psychology
The title of this subsection is actually a misnomer for the studies in psychology have not
really attempted to measure the extent of imagery processing. The attempts discussed here
were, at best, performed as manipulation checks and are summarized in Table 2.5. These
attempts can be classified into three groupings: (1) asking subjects to rate the vividness of their
imagery (e.g., Anderson and Hidde 1971; Grossberg and Wilson 1968; Rigney and Lutz 1976;
Sheehan 1966); (2) asking subjects what learning strategy they had used (e.g., Elliott 1973;
Erdelyi and Becker 1974; Milgram 1967; Nelson and Brooks 1973); or (3) experimenter checking
the subject-provided written or verbal record of what they had done (e.g., Anderson 1983; Bull
and Wittrock 1973; Nappe and Wollen 1973; Wortman and Sparling 1974). Studies utilizing
these checks have typically manipulated instructions that are given to respondents or the
presentation format of the stimuli. Furthermore, the type of manipulation check employed has
been fairly consistent within a given manipulation.
Manipulation Checks for Instructions to Imagine. While all three types of manipulation
checks have been employed, when the experiment involved instructions to imagine, the most
commonly used checks have been the third and first types, respectively. Anderson (1983)

T a b le 2 . 5

MEASUREMENT OF IMAGERY PROCESSING IN PSYCHOLOGY
Authors

Description of Measurement

Anderson and Hidde (1971)

Subjects rated vividness of imagery in imagery instruction condition.

Anderson (1983)

Subjects drew cartoons that experimenter analyzed to ensure proper scenario was
imagined.

Elliott (1973)

Subjects answered a questionnaire designed to verify the learning strategy used.

Erdelyi & Becker (1974)

The subjects in Study 2 that did improve said they tried to form an image to aid recall.

Grossberg & Wilson (1968)

"1.
"2.

How vivid and clear were the scenes that you were told to imagine? (1) realistically
vivid; (2) very clear: (3) moderately clear; (4) dim image; (5) little or no picture."
How well were you able to picture yourself actually being in the imagined scene,
rather than here in this room? (1) scene felt very real to (5) I felt like a spectator."

Milgram (1967)

Subjects were asked what, if anything, they had done to more easily learn the right
answers. Then specifically asked if they had said anything to themselves or had imagined
any pictures in their mind.

Nappe & Wollen (1973)

Subjects gave a self-paced verbal description of the image just formed. Four judges rated
each as (1) common to (6) bizarre (interjudge reliability: .65-.S2).

Nelson & Brooks (1973)

Subjects asked how each pair was learned. Experimenter classified description as rote,
verbal mediation, or imagery.

Rigney & Lutz (1976)

Subjects asked to rate the vividness of their mental visualizations elicited from the lesson.

Sheehan (1966)

Imagery-instructed group rated vividness of image on a 7-point scale.

Wortman & Sparling (1974)

Subject was required to write down either a description of the image or the actual verbal
connection.
■b.

cn
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instructed subjects to draw cartoons of various scenarios, and he later examined them to ensure
that the proper scenario w as imagined, which was confirmed. Bull and Wittrock (1973)
manipulated the type of instructions -- self-discovered imagery, imagery-given, o r verbal - given
to fifth grade students in which they had to draw their image, trace the given image, or write a
definition, respectively. The authors then inspected the booklets to ensure that subjects drew,
traced, or wrote a s per instruction, which w as confirmed. Nappe and Wollen (1973) instructed
subjects to form a bizarre image for each of 24 noun pairs and a common image for each of
another 24 noun pairs, following which the subject gave an audio-taped, self-paced verbal
protocol of the image formed for each pair. Afterward, four judges rated each description on a
scale from (1), for very com mon image, to (6), very bizarre image. It w as found that subjects
were generally able to form the appropriate type of image, and interjudge reliability ranged from
.65 to .82. Wortman and Sparling (1974) required subjects to write down either a description of
the image they had formed or the actual verbal connection they were instructed to construct. In
sum, these studies manipulated the instructions given and checked these manipulations by
requiring subjects to generate a record, typically written or drawn, of what they had actually
done in the experiment. These records were then examined to verify that subjects had followed
the specific instructions given to them.
The first type of check - asking subjects to rate the vividness of their imagery - has
aiso been commonly employed when instructions have been manipulated. Subjects were given
either imagery instructions or pronunciability instructions for a set of sentences in a study by
Anderson and Hidde (1971). Those in the imagery instruction condition were told to form an
image of the event described in each sentence and to rate the vividness of that image, whereas
those in the pronunciability instruction condition were told to repeat the sentence three times
and to rate the pronunciability of that sentence. However, the rating scale is not given by the
authors. They found that vivid images were better recalled than vague images, but only weakly
so. Ratings of pronunciability were not related to recall. Grossberg and Wilson (1968)

instructed subjects to imagine a neutral sc en e and a fearful s c e n e that w ere described to them,
and then the experimenter asked them to rate the vividness of the s c e n e s that they were told to
imagine and to rate how well they w ere able to picture them selves in the sc en es. The
researchers were interested in the effect of imaging neutral and fearful s c e n e s on heart rate, skin
conductivity, and forehead m uscle activity, but they only found that heart rate increases were
significantly correlated with subjects’ reports of their s u c c e s s in visualizing the scen es.

However, no other results are given with respect to the su ccess of the manipulation. Finally,
S heehan (1966) instructed subjects to form an image, to form an im age after a twice-perceived
stimulus display (referred to a s re-image condition), or to simply recall a pattern of blocks given
on a screen. In the image conditions, subjects rated th e vividness of their im ages from 7 (no
image), through 5 (vague and dim) to 1 (perfectly clear and vivid). However, in th e recall
condition, the instructions stated, "Do not try to evoke any mental im age or picture of the
pattern" (p. 1019), and no manipulation check w as performed. By simply mentioning not
forming an image, however, th e experim enters may have actually encouraged im age formation,
which would dam ag e their manipulation. Unfortunately, there is no way to determ ine the
su c c e ss of the manipulation.
The only study to manipulate instructions and utilize th e seco n d type of check -- asking
subjects what learning strategy they had used -- w as performed by Elliott (1973). S ubjects were
given either imaginal or rote repetition instructions upon presentation of 64 sets of 3 nouns for
later recall. To ensure the instructions were followed, subjects answ ered a questionnaire
designed to verify the learning strategy they had used. While th e authors d o not report results
concerning th e manipulation check, it is assum ed that they w ere successful.
Manipulation Checks fo r Presentation Format. Of the studies that have manipulated
presentation format of the stimuli, most have asked subjects what learning strategy they had
used (except Rigney and Lutz 1976). Erdelyi and Becker (1974) used either w ords or pictures
a s stimuli. While not formally checking manipulations, the authors did ask subjects in the word
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condition that did Improve in performance what strategy they had employed. It w as found that
the ones that tried to form a mental image of the input items performed better than the ones that
tried to form meaningful categories. Milgram (1967) also manipulated verbal or visual
representation of a series of sentences. Subjects were asked to answer freely concerning what,
if anything, they had done to more easily learn the right answer. Then they were specifically
asked if they had imagined any pictures in their mind or had said anything to themselves. Since
the sample consisted of 4-, 7-, and 9-year old children, it was difficult to analyze their responses
a s many were incomprehensible. Nevertheless, two judges concluded that the verbal category
w as reported most frequently in the verbal condition group, but the visual category was only
reported by 6 of the 30 subjects in the visual condition group. Finally, Nelson and Brooks
(1973) manipulated the type of representation as a picture, a picture with a name, or a word.
Subjects were asked to describe how each pair was learned, and the experimenter classified the
strategy as rote, verbal mediation, or imagery mediation. It was found that the tendency to
utilize imagery mediation varied with type of representation. Specifically, imaging was reported
most often in the picture condition, next often in the picture-name condition, and least often in
the word conditions, but this does not represent a statistically significant difference.
Utilizing the first type of manipulation check, Rigney and Lutz (1976) attempted to
measure mental imagery by asking subjects to rate the strength (interpreted as vividness here)
of their visualizations elicited from either a verbal format or verbal and visual format computerassisted instruction lesson. However, the authors lead one to believe that the manipulation was
unsuccessful because they state, "however, self-report has shortcomings in providing convincing
evidence that external imagery elicits mental imagery" (p. 311). No further discussion of the
attempt to measure imagery processing is provided by the authors.
Summary. In this section, attempts to check for imagery processing in psychology
studies have been discussed. These attempts can be classified into three groups: (1) asking
subjects to rate the vividness of their imagery; (2) asking subjects what learning strategy they
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had used; or (3) experimenter checking the subject-provided written or verbal record of what
they had done. Typically, experiments that manipulated the instructions given to respondents
have relied on the third (e.g., Anderson 1983; Bull and Wittrock 1973; Nappe and Wollen 1973;
Wortman and Sparling 1974) or first (e.g., Anderson and Hidde 1971; Grossberg and Wilson
1968; Sheehan 1966) type of manipulation check, while those manipulating presentation format
of the stimuli have typically relied on the second type of manipulation check (e.g., Erdelyi and
Becker 1974; Milgram 1967; Nelson and Brooks 1973). These attempts are summarized In Table
2.5.
None of these checks constitute an effort to really measure the presence and extent of
imagery processing. Several researchers in marketing, however, have been a little more diligent
in this regard. These efforts are the topic of the next subsection.

Measurement Attempts in Marketing

While researchers in psychology only attempted to perform manipulation checks, those
in marketing have attempted to develop scales to indicate the presence of imagery processing
as well as the content and elaboration of that processing (except Holbrook and Moore 1981 and
Lutz and Lutz 1977). With exception of Ellen and Bone (1991), however, actual
conceptualization and scale development of imagery processing has been lacking. In this
section, these measurement attempts (summarized in Table 2.6) will be reviewed with special
attention given to Ellen and Bone’s (1991) proposed conceptualization of dimensions of
communication-evoked imagery processing and the scale developed to assess these
dimensions. However, at the conclusion of this review it will be clearly apparent that theoretical
grounding and scale development is necessary in this area, which echoes the plea by Maclnnis
and Price (1987).

Measurement attempts can be grouped into three classifications: (1) manipulation
checks (e.g., Holbrook and Moore 1981; Lutz and Lutz 1977); (2) protocols (e.g., Rethans and

T able 2 .6

MEASUREMENT OF IMAGERY PROCESSING IN MARKETING STUDIES
Authors

Description of Measure

Bone & Ellen (1990)

1 item: "Did you experience any imagery?" yes/no
If yes, then completed 7-item imagery scale (alpha = .87):
1. "The imagery from the ad was aroused" anchored "with great difficulty" and "with great ease."
2. "The imagery from the ad was" anchored with "not at all vivid, a very vague image almost like
nothing at all" and "very vivid, image was almost like a real experience."
3. Final 5 items were 7-point Likert items (e.g., "I had no difficulty imagining the scene in my head,"
and "All sorts of pictures, sounds, and smells came to my mind while I listened to the ad").

Ellen & Bone (1991)

Quantity/Ease Dimension (alpha = .88 & .91):

1.

"As you listened to the ad, to what extent did any images come to mind? (To a very small
extent...To a very great extent)"
2. "While listening to the ad, I experienced (Lots of im ages...Few or no images)"
3. "All sorts of pictures, sounds, tastes and/or smells came to my mind while I listened to the ad.
(Strongly Agree...Strongly Disagree)"
4. "How difficult or easy were the images to create? (Extremely Easy...Extremely Difficult)"
5. "How quickly were the images aroused? (Very Quickly...Not quickly at all)"
6. "I had no difficulty imagining the scene in my head. (Strongly Agree...Strongly Disagree)"
Vividness and Paleness Dimensions (alphas = .84 to .89):
"The imagery which occurred while I listened to the ad was: clear; pale; fuzzy; detailed; weak; vivid;
intense; vague; lifelike; sharp; well-defined. (Does not Describe at All...Describes Perfectly)"
Links Dimension (alpha = .91 & .93):
(Strongly Agree...Strongly
Disagree)"
1 . "The ad reminded me of other times in mylife.
2. "The ad brought back memories of events that
happened to me in the past. (Strongly
Agree...Strongly Disagree)"
Holbrook & Moore

(1981)

"When I rated the sweaters, I tried to form a mental picture of what each sweater would look like."

T a b l e 2 . 6 ( C o n tin u e d )

MEASUREMENT OF IMAGERY PROCESSING IN MARKETING STUDIES
Authors

Description of Measure

Lutz & Lutz (1977)

Type of processing w as assessed by self-report nominal scale for the following question:
"What best describes how you spent the time looking at each page of the booklet?”
Forced choices: visual, verbal, and task-unrelated processing

Maclnnis and Price
(1990)

4 items to a ssess the extent to which consumers generated imagery about spring break (alpha = .84)
e.g., "When I thought about spring break, my thoughts included the sights, smells, and/or sounds of the
activities I would be engaged in."
5 items to a ssess the extent to which they imagined many different scenarios (alpha = .85)
e.g., "In my mind, I played out many different scenarios of what I w as going to do."
1 item to measure time spent imagining:
"I spent considerable time imagining what I would do."
All reported on a 1-7 scale.

Oliver, Robertson, &
Mitchell (1989)

7 items
e.g.,
7 items
e.g.,

Rethans & Hastak
(1982)

After verbal protocols, subjects responded to 1 item:
"Virtually none of my thoughts were in picture or image form" to "virtually all of my thoughts were in
picture or image form."
Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (Marks 1973) w as used to evaluate the vividness of the evoked
imagery.

Smith, Houston, &
Childers (1984)

Written protocols:
1. Subjects rated each action in terms of whether they had visualized or verbalized it.
2. If visualized, evaluated whether image was vivid (clear) or pale (indistinct).

for analyzing
"Did you analyze its pros and cons?"
for imaging
"Did you visualize this new printer on your desk?"
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Hastak 1982; Smith et al. 1984); or (3) scales (e.g., Bone and Ellen 1990; Ellen and Bone 1991;
Maclnnis and Price 1990; Oliver et al. 1989). Each will be discussed separately below.
Manipulations Checks. Manipulation checks to a sse ss imagery processing have been
used in two studies in marketing. Lutz and Lutz (1977), in the first application of imagery in
marketing, simply used a nominal, self-report item to classify whether visual, verbal, or taskunrelated processing had been used. As in m ost imagery studies in psychology, it was
assum ed that subjects in the imagery-eliciting condition -- in this case, interactive and
noninteractive pictures - would more likely use mental imagery than those in a nonimageryeliciting condition. This assumption was verified by Lutz and Lutz (1977) for they found that
experimental subjects reported greater frequency of visual processing than did control subjects.
Holbrook and Moore (1981) utilized four items to represent task-related processing strategy, only
one of which, however, relates to mental imagery. Subjects responded to the statement, "When
I rated the sweaters, I tried to form a mental picture of what each sweater would look like" on a
7-point strongly disagree to strongly agree scale. Though no effect of mental imagery occurred,
the authors did report a significant interaction indicating the use of mental imagery in reducing
the relative advantage of pictures over words in evoking feature interactions. However, this
m easure was collected som e undisclosed time after the subjects had actually participated in the
study.
Protocols. Som e researchers have used items in conjunction with protocols (e.g.,
Rethans and Hastak 1982; Smith et al. 1984). Rethans and Hastak (1982) asked subjects to
provide protocols concerning knowledge of product-based hazards and to indicate whether their
thoughts were in picture or image form. Subjects then evaluated the vividness of the imagery.
The authors concluded that images and information contained in them were being activated,
and, thus, research on information representation may be incomplete if it only concentrates on
linguistic information. Smith et al. (1984) asked respondents to list actions when using the
Placement Service at their school and then indicate whether they had visualized or verbalized

53
each action. Furthermore, if visualized, they were asked to evaluate whether the image w as
vivid or pale. As hypothesized, it w as found that schematic subjects visualized more of the
actions than did aschem atics, and their images were reported as more vivid as well.

Sca/es. In contrast to the studies in psychology, several attempts have been made in
marketing to utilize a scale to m easure imagery processing. These attem pts have been very
recent, which is another indication that this is a necessary attempt in studies involving imagery.
Oliver et al. (1989) developed a scale to measure imaging and analyzing in a study
investigating pre-decision Imagery and analyzing of consumption with respect to the adoption
process. The authors generated a list of 20 items pertaining to analyzing-type thoughts and
imaging-type thoughts. Pretesting revealed a two-factor solution explaining 52% of the variance.
Fourteen of the original items were retained for use in the study (7 for analyzing and 7 for
imagining). Items from the analyzing scale refer to considering pros and cons of the stimulus
(i.e., a computer printer) or analyzing the features, while the imaging items refer to visualizing
the new printer on a desk or imaging oneself using the printer. Responses range from "no not
at all," to "yes, once," "twice," and “more than twice." Reliability for the analyzing scale was .77,
and for the imaging scale it was .75. The authors found that analyzing w as more prevalent than
imaging, which really is not surprising due to the utilitarian nature of the stimulus. There were,
however, reasonable, but not high, levels of imaging.
Maclnnis and Price (1990) used 10 items to assess imagery processing -- 4 to assess
the extent to which subjects generated imagery (alpha = .84), 5 to a ssess the extent to which
many different scenarios were imagined (afpha = .85), and 1 to assess time spent imagining.
Correlations among these scales ranged from .60 to .64. Thus, consum ers who d o image seem
to generate many scenarios and to spend a greater amount of time imaging than those who do
not generate imagery. The authors used the scale to examine the relationship between imagery
processing and satisfaction, and they found that imagery processing had a positive effect on
satisfaction.
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Bone and Ellen (1990) provided a clear definition of imagery to respondents and used
one y es/n o question to determine if they had used imagery. If yes, then the subjects responded
to a 7-item imagery scale (alpha = .87). The items given by the authors a s examples, however,
appear to be measuring ability, specifically vividness, rather than the degree of elaboration of
Imagery processing. In a more recent attempt, Ellen and Bone (1991) developed a scale
specifically intended to m easure communication-evoked imagery processing.
Scale Developed by Ellen and Bone (1991). In a more diligent effort to m easure
communication-evoked imagery processing, Ellen and Bone (1991) proposed that
communication-evoked imagery may be reflected in five dimensions: vividness an d /o r clarity,
quantity, ease, and links experienced from the m essage. Vividness has been identified as the
major dimension of imagery and usually indicates the quality of the imagery (Morris and
Hampson 1983). This dimension is similar, but not identical, to the dimension of clarity. Clarity
refers to detail while vividness refers to intensity (Ellen and Bone 1991). However, this
distinction is not very clear in the literature. For example, Childers et al. (1985) define vividness
as "the clarity of the mental image an individual evoked” (p. 126). Nevertheless, these
dimensions were initially considered separately.
Quantity refers to the number of different images evoked Irrespective of quality or clarity.
A few or many very vague images may be evoked, or a few or many very vivid images may be
evoked.
The authors also propose ease of imagining as another dimension. They argue that the
more information an individual has concerning a subject, the easier it is to generate images.
This is a result of familiarity with the stimulus, which influences an individual’s ability to generate
im ages since h e/sh e has a sufficient knowledge base to do so (Maclnnis and Price 1987).
The final dimension proposed by Ellen and Bone (1991) is imagery links. Links refer to
the association of information in working memory with information stored in long-term memory.
It is proposed that imagery processing allows activation of stored information via more paths
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than simply sem antic links. Thus, an individual is better able to a c c e ss information and
elaborate further on it due to the greater relative availability a s com pared to verbal processing.
As a result, when it is time to make a judgm ent or decision, information is probably more
available (Ellen and Bone 1991). The is probably the most important dimension of imagery
processing, and, unfortunately, Ellen and Bone only generate two items to tap this dimension.
While Ellen and Bone (1991) proffer a scale, their attem pt suffers from a number of
criticisms, which the dissertation attem pted to overcome. First, the authors did not generate a
very large inventory of items to begin with; indeed, they started with nineteen items and ended
with nineteen items. Second, they used radio ad s from their previous study a s stimuli (see Bone
and Ellen 1990), which may have resulted in dem and characteristics since six out of the seven
ad s were high imagery-eliciting ad s beginning with the statem ent "Imagine this." It may be more
appropriate to use a spectrum of stimuli that range from high to low imagery-eliciting
characteristics. Third, the authors only collected data once to develop the scale (although they
did use two studies with one data collection each). This is inconsistent with the paradigm
proposed by Churchill (1979) in which new data is recom m ended to purify the m easure and
asse ss validity. Furthermore, when attempting to a sse ss validity, it appears that subjects from
only 2 out of the 7 cells in their study were used. Finally, the authors changed the dimensions
in the process. Specifically, the quantity and ease dimensions becam e the quantity/ease
dimension, and clarity becam e paleness. In a three factor solution, vividness and paleness
loaded together, but the four factor solution w as significantly better. It ap p ears that this attem pt
does not clarify the appropriate dimensions of imagery processing.
Summary. Two conclusions becom e apparent as a result of the review on m easurem ent
attem pts in marketing. First, several researchers recognize the need to m easure imagery
processing in imagery studies. Any study on imagery will not be acceptable to peers in the area
without an effort to m easure imagery processing. Thus, there is a need for an acceptable scale,
and the best method for developing one involves a rigorous and systematic effort. This is
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something that yet needs to be done. Second, the scales available are unacceptable. Even
though Ellen and Bone (1991) propose a scale, the development of the scale was not much
different than the haphazard attempts that preceded it.

Summary
In this section, attempts to measure imagery processing (summarized in Tables 2.5 and
2.6) have been reviewed. Researchers in psychology have been much less diligent in this effort;
indeed, the majority of what has been done in this body of literature can merely be classified as
manipulation checks. Researchers in marketing recognize the need to assess imagery
processing, and recent studies reflect this concern. Manipulation checks, protocols, and scales
have been used to measure imagery processing. The only conceptual development and
measurement effort has been put forth by Ellen and Bone (1991).
Ellen and Bone (1991) proposed five dimensions of imagery processing (vividness
an d /o r clarity, quantity, ease, and links to one's past); however, they found four (vividness,
paleness, quantity/ease and links). Their attempt suffers from several criticisms and should only
be considered a preliminary effort in this regard.
There is clearly a need for conceptualization and scale development of this construct. A
process of scale development in accordance with Churchill (1979) is called for. Not only is an
acceptable scale necessary for the study proposed In this dissertation, but other researchers as
well will benefit from such a scale. Research in imagery has moved beyond the stimulusresponse paradigm prevalent in the 1970’s and requires further investigation into explanation, not
merely prediction.

AWARENESS AS A DEPENDENT VARIABLE
Rossiter and Percy (1983) list five types of communication effects in advertising:
awareness, beliefs, attitudes, intentions, and choice rules. The first type of communication
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effect, awareness, is reviewed in this section, and a substantial number of studies both in
psychology and marketing have analyzed this effect. Awareness is a communication effect of
special interest to advertisers. It allows the prospective buyer to Identify the product or brand to
enable purchase and varies on a continuum ranging from recognition to recall (Rossiter and
Percy 1983). In contrast with recognition, which involves 100 percent cue-target similarity, recall
may involve varying degrees of similarity between the cue and target responses. Thus,
aw areness is the class of communication effects that captures memory in the form of
recognition and recall.
The general findings in the literature indicate that stimuli presented via high imageryeliciting strategies are better remembered than presentations low in imagery-eliciting ability.
Several studies have found that concrete words, which are typically considered high-imagery
words, are better remembered than abstract words (see Table 2.1 for summary). Similarly, two
other imagery-eliciting strategies, pictures and instructions to imagine, have also been shown to
be superior in memory applications. While these two strategies have been studied
independently or in conjunction with concreteness of wording, the relative efficacy of each with
respect to memory applications has not been addressed (exceptions include Levin, Davidson,
Wolff and Citron 1973 and Rasco, Tennyson, and Boutwell 1975). Therefore, studies examining
aw areness (recall an d /o r recognition) as a dependent variable will be reviewed in this section.
First, studies manipulating pictures (i.e., presentation format) will be reviewed with respect to
general findings in psychology (i.e., cognitive psychology, educational psychology, and
education) followed by marketing applications. Then, studies manipulating the instructions given
to respondents will be reviewed in a similar manner.

Pictures as Independent Variables
The studies reviewed in this subsection include those that have tested the effects of
supplanting or supplementing verbal material with pictorial material. The dependent variable in
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the psychology studies has been aw areness in general and recall, recognition, or both in
particular. These studies will be reviewed under general findings In the order of th o se examining
recall, recognition, then both recall and recognition. The marketing applications reviewed have
all examined recall a s the aw areness dependent variable. All of th e studies reviewed in this
subsection are summarized in Table 2.7.
General Findings. While a few studies have found that w ords are better than pictures
(e.g., Milgram 1967) or equal to pictures in facilitating recall (e.g., R eese 1965), several studies
have found that pictures are recalled better than words (e.g., Erderlyi and Becker 1974; Lesgold,
Levin, Shimron, and Guttman 1975; Nelson and Brooks 1973; Rohwer, Lynch, Levin, and Suzuki
1967). The result of the two studies that have found no or opposite effects may be attributed to
the age of the subjects. However, two other studies (e.g., D'Agostino, O’Neill, and Paivio 1977;
Nelson, Reed, and Walling 1976) have also looked at the effect of pictures and words, and these
studies have found limiting conditions (i.e., beside age) which mitigate or reverse the picture
superiority effect. However, in general, it has been found that pictures alone or pictures in
conjunction with verbal information are superior to verbal information alone in facilitating recall.
Milgram (1967) studied the effect of using a verbal context or a visual com pound in
paired-associate learning by 4-, 7-, and 9-year old children. Children learned a paired-associate
picture list by verbal context, which involved reciting a sentence that interacted the two items
pictured, or by visual compound, which consisted of viewing a picture that com bined the items
in an interactive picture equivalent to the verbal context sentence. Though the verbal context
and visual com pound were superior with respect to recall over the control group, which simply
traced around the picture pairs, the verbal context group was superior overall. These results
along with posttest interviews with the children led Milgram (1967) to conclude that young
children preferentially utilize the verbal m ode of representation. Reese (1965) also found that
verbal com pounds and visual com pounds were equally effective, and both facilitate recall
performance over a unit-only response format. Thus, better performance cannot be attributed to

Table 2 .7
EMPIRICAL S T U D IE S INV E STIG A TIN G A W A R E N E S S A S A D E PE N D EN T VARIABLE
A N D P IC T U R E S A S A N IND EPENDENT VARIABLE

Source

Independent Variables

Relevant Results

General Findings:
Booher (1975)c
(education)

(n = 90 Navy enlisted personnel)
1) picture-word format (various combinations
of pictures and words)

Pictorial information is important for speed, but print
information is necessary for accuracy.
Comprehension of instructions in all three tasks was
most efficient in the pictorial-related print and
pictorial-redundant print conditions.

D'Agostino, O'Neill, &
Paivio (1977)*
(cognitive psychology)

(n = 72 undergraduates)
1) type of stimulus (abstract word; concrete
word; picture)
2) processing task (structural; phonemic;
semantic)
3) response judgment (yes; no)

Memory performance increased as a direct function
of the processing-task variable only under the
concrete word condition.
Pictures were superior to words after structural
processing and phonemic recall.

Davidson (1964)b
(educational
psychology)

(n = 60 2nd graders)
Used pictures as stimuli and manipulated:
1) condition (exposure; pairs named;
proposition; sentences; interactive
picture)

Facilitation as a result of introducing mediating links,
but effect w as same for minimum and maximum
cues.

Erdelyi & Becker
(1974)* (cognitive
psychology)

Study 2: (n = 48 undergraduates)
1) stimuli (pictures; words)
2) recall task (no interval; think)

Picture recall increased with retrieval attempts and
word recall remained roughly constant.

Holliday (1975)b
(education)

(n = 80 10th graders)
1) presentation (words; pictures/words)

Pictures plus word group performed better than
word-only group.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Source

Independent Variables

Relevant Results

Lesgold, Levin,
Shimron & Guttman
(1975)* (educational
psychology)

Studies 1-3: (n, = 2 4 1st graders; n2= 4 8
1st graders; n3= 3 6 1st graders)
1) task (illustrate; control)

Illustration facilitated recall only when subject given
correct pieces for illustration or when experimenter
provided the illustration.

Lippman & Shanahan
(1973)' (educational
psychology)

Study 1: (n = 80 3rd graders)
1) condition (accentuation; picture; word)
Study 2: (n = 2 4 0 kindergartners, 2nd, & 4th
graders)
1) condition (control; accentuation; picture;
verbal context; picture interaction)

Study 1: Subjects performed best on accentuated
items.
Study 2: Interaction resulted in best word-pair
learning.

McKelvie & Demers
(1979)e (cognitive
psychology)

(n = 70 high school students)
Used pictures, abstract words, and concrete
words and examined individual differences in
visual imagery vividness (low; high)

High visualizers were better on all 3 types of items in
short-term recall, but only concrete words and
pictures in long-term recall.
Both groups performed equally well on recognition
task.

Milgram (1967)'
(educational
psychology)

(n = 90 4, 7, & 9 year old children)
1) presentation (pictures; words)

No difference in recall for pictures or words.

Nelson & Brooks
(1973)* (cognitive
psychology)

(n = 96 undergraduates)
1) presentation (picture; picture-name; word)
2) phonetic similarity of words (low; high)

Pictures associated with faster acquisition.
Similarity among verbal stimuli interfered with
performance.

...................
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Source

Independent Variables

Relevant Results

Nelson, Reed, &
Walling (1976)c
(cognitive psychology)

(n = 2 5 6 undergraduates)
1) stimulus (picture; word)
2) schematic similarity (low; high)
3) conceptual similarity (low; high)
4) presentation rate (slow; fast)

High schematic similarity eliminated the pictorial
superiority effect at the slow rate and completely
reversed it at the fast rate.

Paivio & Csapo
(1969)c (cognitive
psychology)

Study 1: (n = 96 undergraduates)
1) stimulus (picture; concrete word;
abstract word)
2) presentation rate (slow; fast)
3) memory task (immediate memory span;
free recall)
Study 2: (n = 192 undergraduates)
Same as Study 1 with the addition of 2
memory tasks (serial learning; recognition
memory)

Memory for pictures w as inferior to words only in the
sequential learning tasks and at a fast rate.
Both pictures and concrete words were superior to
abstract words in serial learning at slow rate.
Pictures > concrete words > abstract words at slow
rate in both nonsequential tasks.

Reese (1965)'
(educational
psychology)

(n = 60 children ages 3-8 years)
1) content of response item (visual; verbal)
2) type of response item (interactive;
noninteractive)

Retention superior when seeing or hearing an
interaction between paired stimulus and response
elements.

Rigney & Lutz (1976)c
(educational
psychology)

(n = 4 0 undergraduates)
1) format of lesson (verbal; verbal/graphic)

Better recognition/recall for imagery group.
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Relevant Results

Rohwer & Harris
(1975)' (educational
psychology)

(n = 168 4th graders-low SES/high SES)
1) media condition (oral; print; picture;
all combinations)
2) response method (verification; shortanswer; free recall)
3) number of intervening sentences (0;1;3;5)

For low SES children, combination or oral and
pictures superior to single-media conditions.
Among high SES children, combinations of media
were of little benefit.

Rohwer, Lynch, Levin,
& Suzuki (1967)'
(educational
psychology)

(n = 96 3rd graders & 9 6 6th graders)
1) grade (3rd; 6th)
2) materials (printed; pictorial)
3) verbalization (conjunction; proposition;
verbal; control)

Learning w as more effective for pictorial materials.

Rohwer & Matz
(1975)b (educational
psychology)

(n = 6 4 4th graders)
1) presentation (print; picture)
2) population (high SES; tow SES)
3) test conditions (inspection; memory)
4) assertion set (1 ;2)

Pictures facilitate aural comprehension and learning
of noun pairs even testing conditions differ from
those used in noun-pair tasks.

Shepard (1967)b
(cognitive psychology)

Study 1: (n = 17 undergraduates)
1) 2 7 0 frequent nouns and adjectives
2) 2 7 0 rare nouns and adjectives
Study 2: (n = 17 undergraduates)
1) 6 1 2 sentences
Study 3: (n = 3 4 undergraduates)
1) 612 pictures
2) time delay (2 hours; 3 days; 1 week; 4
months)

Study 1: 92.5% correct recognition for rare words;
84.4% for frequent words.
Study 2; 88% correct recognition.
Study 3: immediate - 98.5% correct recognition
2 hour - 9 9 .7 % correct
3 day - 92% correct
1 week - 87% correct
4 month - 57.7%
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Source
Snowman &
Cunningham (1975)b
(educational
psychology)

Independent Variables

Relevant Results

(n = 63 undergraduates)
1) adjunct aid (experimenter-provided;
reader-generated; picture; both)
2) position (before; after)
3) scales (practiced; non-practiced)

Reader-generated pictures were as effective as
experimenter-provided questions over control group.

Childers & Houston
(1984)*

(n = 271 undergraduates)
1) stimulus (pictorial; verbal)
2) depth of processing (sensory; semantic)
3) level of meaning (low; high)
4) distinctiveness (color; black & white)

Pictorial ads were recalled better than verbal-only ads
when encoding was sensory.
A picture superiority effect is evident under both
levels of processing when memory is measured over
time.

Edeli & Staelin (1983)*

(n = 27 undergraduates)
1) structure of ad (verbal; pictorial
framed; pictoriai-unframed)
2) content (objective; subjective;
characterization)
3) product class (car, calculator; camera)

Superior recall for ads containing framed pictures
over both unframed pictures and verbal-only ads.

Gardner & Houston
(1986)*

(n = 6 4 undergraduates)
1) exposure time (short; long)
2) time of measure (immediate; delayed)
3) content of stimulus (varied favorability
of pictorial and verbal content)

Effect of pictures is longer lasting than the effects of
words.

Marketing Applications:

a
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Source

Independent Variables

Relevant Results

Houston, Childers, and
Heckler (1987)*

Studies 1 & 2: (n, = 112; n2= 1 16
undergraduates)
1) pictures (interactive; noninteractive)
2) verbal material (consistent; discrepant)

Superior memory for interactive discrepant ads.

Lutz & Lutz (1977)*

(n = 72 undergraduates)
1) stimulus type (words; interactive picture;
noninteractive picture)

Interactive pictures facilitate recall over
noninteractive pictures and words only.

'Recall as dependent measure
bRecognition as dependent measure
eBoth recall and recognition examined as dependent measures
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pictures per se, but rather to the interactive nature of the compound provided. Similar to
Milgram (1967), this study used young children (i.e., 3- to 8- year olds), which could have
influenced the results.
Apart from the above studies, several researchers have demonstrated the superior effect
of pictures alone or pictures in conjunction with words on recall memory. Erderiyi and Nelson
(1974) demonstrated a hypermnesic memory function for pictures but not for words in a sample
of undergraduate students, in other words, with pictures, performance improved with repeated
recall, but with words, a fiat, nonincremental function was obtained. In a study of first grade
children, Lesgold et al. (1975) found that those performing an illustration task (i.e., picture
condition) performed better on the recall task than control subjects that performed a simple
geometric filler task. However, this was only true when the correct pieces were provided to
develop the illustration or when the experimenter provided the illustration. Thus, a visual
mediation task was superior to no mediation task. Nelson and Brooks (1973) found that pictures
were associated with faster acquisition relative to their verbal representations in a sample of
undergraduate students. While phonetic similarity among the verbal stimuli interfered with
performance, label similarity within the picture condition did not. This led the authors to
conclude that easily recognized pictures can function as independent memory codes. Rowher
et al. (1967) also found that second and sixth grade students demonstrated better recall for
pictorial material than printed material. In sum, the studies reviewed illustrate the superiority of
pictures, either supplanting or supplementing verbal material, over purely verbal information on
recall memory.
While not disputing the picture superiority effect, two studies have identified conditions
under which this effect is mitigated or reversed. D’Agostino et al. (1977) looked at processing
task (i.e., structural, phonemic, or semantic) in addition to the type of stimulus (i.e., abstract
word, concrete word, or picture) and recall for a sample of undergraduate students. They found
that picture recall was superior to word recall, but only under structural and phonemic
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processing. For the sem antic processing condition, however, there were no differences between
recall for pictures and concrete words, but both were superior to abstract words. Nelson et al.
(1976) found that pictures that were highly similar (e.g., a knife, a bat, a screwdriver) did not
result in a picture superiority effect; indeed, at a fast rate of presentation, it completely reversed
this effect. Even though th ese limiting conditions have been identified, the superior recall effect
of pictures over words still holds in most instances.
Fewer studies have examined recognition a s the aw areness dependent variable, but, as
with recall, the results generally support the hypothesis that pictures facilitate memory. Lutz and
Lutz (1978) note that one of the earliest cited studies dem onstrating the picture superiority effect
is that of Shepard (1967). While not actually manipulating pictures versus words, Shepard
(1967) exposed subjects to 612 colored pictures of objects cut out from print advertisements
and found that subjects were able to achieve 98.5% correct recognition when shown 68 pairs of
pictures containing a previously seen picture and a novel one for an immediate test, 99.7% after
a two-hour delay, 92% after a three-day delay, 87% after a one-week delay, and 57.7% after a
four-month delay. Even though Shepard did not examine pictures versus w ords per se, he did
perform similar tests using words, sentences, and pictures, and the results indicate better
recognition in the picture tests. Similar to Shepard, Davidson (1964) did not actually manipulate
pictures, but he used pictures a s stimuli and manipulated mediation conditions. While mediation
conditions were equally effective, all recognition scores were very high, which could have been
due to using only pictures a s stimuli.
Other studies have manipulated pictures a s independent variables and examined the
effect on recognition. Holliday (1975) found that tenth grade students performed better on a
recognition task when pictures supplem ented verbal materials rather than verbal materia! alone.
On a sam ple of fourth grade students, it was found that pictures facilitated aural com prehension
and learning of noun pairs even when testing conditions were not the sam e a s learning
conditions (Rohwer and Matz 1975). Finally, Snowman and Cunningham (1975) found that
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reader-generated pictures facilitated recognition over no adjunct learning aid, but experimenterprovided questions w ere equally facilitative. Thus, regardless of being pictorial o r verbal, an
adjunct aid In general facilitated recognition in this study, (n sum, the studies analyzing the
effect of pictures on recognition are supportive of a picture superiority effect.
The remaining studies examining the im pact of pictures on memory have analyzed both
recognition and recall a s dependent variables. Rigney and Lutz (1976) varied the format of a
com puter-assisted chem istry lesson and found that the group exposed to a lesson com posed of
verbal and visual presentation performed better on recall and recognition task s than those
exposed to a verbal-only lesson. Booher (1975) also found that pictures supplem enting print
facilitated perform ance of Navy enlisted personnel in learning proceduralized instructions.
S om e limiting conditions have also been identified. For instance, Paivio and C sapo
(1969) examined presentation rate and type of memory task in addition to stimulus type. It w as
found that pictures were superior to concrete words, which were superior to abstract w ords at
the slow presentation rate in nonsequential learning tasks. They also found that pictures and
concrete w ords w ere superior to abstract words at the slower rate in a serial learning task.
Finally, memory for pictures w as actually inferior to w ords In sequential learning task s but only at
a fast presentation rate. This last finding could have been due to the nature of the sequential
learning task b ecau se subjects are unable to label a picture at the fast rate for this type of task.
Lippman and Shanahan (1973) found that interaction w as n ecessary for th e facilitation of wordpair learning. McKelvie and Demers (1979), while presenting all subjects with pictures, concrete
words, and abstract words, found that high visualizers performed better on all three types of
stimuli in short-term recall and concrete words and pictures in long-term recall. However, both
groups performed equally well on a recognition test. Thus, visual imagery ability influenced
recall perform ance. Finally, Rohwer and Harris (1975) varied media conditions a s either oral,
picture, print, and all com binations of the three for a group of low socioeconom ic status black
and high socioeconom ic status white fourth grad e students, it w as found that while
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combinations of media conditions were of little benefit for high SES white children, low SES
black children performed better in the condition that combined oral and picture presentations
over single-media conditions. Thus, it appears that som e type of ability variable may be playing
a role.
In summary, several studies have investigated the Impact of pictures on memory ~
recall, recognition, or both. While there are exceptions, the general findings indicate a superior
effect of pictures on memory.

Marketing Applications. In an attempt to understand the conditions leading to picture
superiority, several studies in marketing have been conducted. While the studies in the
psychology literature have concentrated on learning, marketing studies have applied Imagery
concepts in an advertising context. Ail of the studies in marketing have examined recall a s the
dependent measure, and the independent variables and results are summarized in Table 2.7.
Lutz and Lutz (1977) used advertisements taken from the Yellow P ages and com pared
the impact on brand nam e recall of interactive pictures, noninteractive pictures, and verbal
counterparts. Interactive pictures depicted the brand nam e and product class in a pictorial
format (e.g., Rocket M essenger Service illustrates a m essenger in flight with a rocket strapped to
his back), w hereas the noninteractive picture condition depicted the brand or product separately
(e.g., O’Bear Abrasive Saws simply included a picture of a bear holding a letter "O” on the left).
Thus, the noninteractive picture did not integrate the brand nam e with the product class. The
verbal-only condition consisted only of the brand nam e and product class with no
accom panying picture. In a test of brand nam e recall, only interactive pictures were superior to
the verbal-only condition. Thus, the pictures must be interactive in nature to facilitate recall
com pared to words only.
Childers and Houston (1984) also examined the effect of interactive pictures versus
verbal referents on immediate and delayed brand nam e recall. Furthermore, they examined the
effect of depth of processing - sensory versus semantic. They found a picture superiority effect
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for immediate recall only when the ads were processed at a sensory level. However, when
memory was measured over time, the picture superiority effect was evident at both levels of
processing.
Edell and Staelin (1983) manipulated framed pictures, unframed pictures, and verbal-only
ads, and they found differential effects on recall of brand items and elements of the
advertisements. A framed picture condition is one in which the verbal material is equivalent in
content to the picture, whereas the unframed picture condition consisted of a picture differing in
content from the verbal material. The verbal-only condition consisted only of a verbal message.
The authors reported superior recall for ads containing framed pictures over both the unframed
picture condition and the verbal-only condition.
Gardner and Houston (1986) investigated verbal and nonverbal elements in a withinm essage context. They examined the relative effects of pictures versus words in m essages for
restaurants under immediate and delayed recall conditions for different exposure times. Four
m essages were developed and consisted of a color photograph of the interior of a restaurant
and a set of verbal descriptors of the restaurant's food, service, portion size, and price level.
Two of the m essages had favorable pictures and unfavorable words, and two had unfavorable
pictures and favorable words. Recall measures were broken down as general recall, general
picture recall, general verbal recall, specific picture recall, and specific verbal recall. It was
found that the effects of pictures are longer lasting than the effects of words. It is important to
point out, however, the usefulness (or lack of usefulness) of this study. Why would an advertiser
include unfavorable information (verbal or pictorial) in an advertisement? It does not seem
reasonable that this would ever occur.
Houston et al. (1987) examined the effect of picture-word consistency on memory. They
empirically challenged the normative belief that the pictorial and verbal components of an ad
should convey the same meaning. They examined ads in which the semantic content of
pictorial material was consistent with or discrepant from the verbal copy. Thus, it appears that
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the manipulation is similar to framed and unframed pictorial ads studied by Edell and Staelin
(1983). Additionally, similar to Lutz and Lutz (1977), the authors also manipulated the interactive
nature of the pictures. Three studies were conducted showing superior recall for ad s in which
an interactive picture is discrepant from the verbal copy, which is inconsistent with what Edell
and Staeiin (1983) found for framed and unframed pictorial advertisements. However, this
superior effect diminished with reduced exposure time. Therefore, the authors conclude that the
discrepant verbal and visual information resulted in more elaborate processing and associative
linkages in memory. The fact that the effect diminished with reduced exposure time lends
further support for this explanation for subjects in this condition did not have enough time to
elaborate on the information provided.
Finally, in a more recent study, Unnava and Burnkrant (1991) examined effects of
pictures and verbal information. They found that verbal product attribute information in a print
advertisement enhances ad recall only when the verbal information is of low imagery value (i.e.,
abstract instead of concrete words). They argued that high imagery verbal information resulted
in self-generated images, which minimized the effect of externally provided pictures on recall of
verbal information. Thus, the picture superiority effect with respect to recall of verbal information
was only evident when the verbal copy in the m essage consisted of abstract rather than
concrete words and phrases. Compared to the condition with no picture but concrete copy,
there was no difference in recall between this group and the group receiving a picture along with
concrete copy.
In summary, the evidence from marketing applications lends support to a picture
superiority effect. In all of the studies from the marketing literature, pictures were superior in
terms of recall. While limiting conditions have been identified (i.e., interactive pictures, framed
pictures, and pictures discrepant from verbal copy), it can be concluded that pictures in general
facilitate recall (brand and ad) from print advertisements.
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Summary. Several studies from the psychology literature in general and the marketing
literature in particular support a picture superiority effect on memory. While som e of the studies
reviewed have simply manipulated presentation format of the stimuli a s either pictures o r words,
m ost have analyzed supplementing words with pictures.
Several conclusions can be drawn from this review. First, in general, pictures are
superior to w ords in facilitating aw areness (e.g., all studies in Table 2.7 except Milgram 1967 and
R eese 1965). Second, interactive pictures are more effective than both noninteractive pictures
or w ords in facilitating aw areness (e.g., Childers and Houston 1984; Lippman and Shanahan
1973; Lutz and Lutz 1977). Third, the superiority of pictures over w ords on aw areness
diminishes a s exposure time d ecreases (e.g., Gardner and Houston 1986; Houston et al. 1987;
Paivio and C sapo 1969). Fourth, imagery ability may m oderate the pictorial superiority effect
(e.g., McKelvie and Demers 1979; Rohwer and Harris 1975). Finally, type of processing
influences the pictorial superiority effect (e.g., Childers and Houston 1984; D’Agostino et al.
1977; Paivio and C sapo 1969).

Instructions to Imagine as an Independent Variable
Several studies, summarized in Table 2.8, in the psychology literature have examined the
Impact of giving subjects imagery instructions on aw areness. Overwhelming support has been
provided for the relative efficacy of imagery instructions over verbal instructions (e.g., Anderson
and Hidde 1971; Bower 1970; Bull and Wittrock 1973; Elliott 1973; Griffith and Johnston 1973;
Kerst and Levin 1973; Peterson and McGee 1974; Robbins, Bray, Irvin, and Wise 1974; Sheehan
1966; Slee 1978) or the relative efficacy of imagery instructions over no instructions at all (e.g.,
Kulhavy and Swenson 1975; Pressley 1976). Exceptions include Montague and Carter (1973),
Nappe and Wollen (1973), Wittrock and Goldberg (1975), and Wortman and Sparling (1974),
who did not find differences am ong instructions given to subjects. However, none of these
exceptions conclude that verbal instructions or no instructions at all are better than imagery

Table 2 . 8
EMPIRICAL S T U D IE S INV ESTIGATING A W A R E N E S S A S A DEPEN D EN T VARIABLE
A N D IN S T R U C T IO N S T O IMAGINE A S A N IND EPEN D EN T VARIABLE

Source

Independent Variables

Relevant Results

General Findings:
Anderson & Hidde
(1971)' (educational
psychology)

(n = 2 4 undergraduates)
1) instructions (imagery; pronunciability)

Imagery instruction group recalled greater than 3
times more sentences.
Sentences evoking vivid images were better recalled
than those evoking dim images, but the effect was
not strong.

Bower (1970)c
(cognitive psychology)

(n = 30 non-student adults)
11 instructions (rote repetition;
interactive-imagery; separation-imagery)

Recall highest for interactive imagery and lower and
equal for rote repetition and separation imagery
groups.
No differences in stimulus recognition among groups.

Bull & Wittrock
(1973)b (educational
psychology)

(n = 87 5th graders)
1) instructions (self-discovered imagery;
imagery-given; verbal)

Self-discovered imagery condition better than
imagery-given and verbal instruction conditions on 1week recognition of definition learned.

Elliott (1973)'
(cognitive psychology)

(n = 4 8 undergraduates)
1) instructions (imagery; rote repetition)
2) word imagery value (low; high)
3) interpolated task activity (visual; auditory)

Recall was superior for imagery instructions group.
Visual language task and auditory non-verbal task
interfered with imagery and rote repetition
conditions, respectfully.

Griffith & Johnston
(1973)' (cognitive
psychology)

(n = 64 undergraduates)
1) instructions (rote repetition; imagery)
2) item imagery value (low; high)
3) signal type (aural; visual)

Imagery instructions group superior on recall.
Processing capacity expended lower under imagery
instructions and with high imagery items.
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Kerst & Levin (1973)b
(educational
psychology)

<n = 119 4th & 5th graders)
1) instructions (imagery; sentence; none)
2) who provided strategy (experimenter;
subject)

Imagery and sentence instructions facilitated
recognition over no instruction group, which
persisted over 1 week.
Who provided strategy made no difference.

Kulhavy & Swenson
(1975)* (educational
psychology)

(n = 119 5th & 6th graders)
1) instructions (imagery; none)
2) position of first test (immediate; delayed)

Imagery instruction group recalled better in both
immediate and delayed test.
Imagery instructions group recalled more semantic
than verbal test items.

Montague & Carter
(1973)' (educational
psychology)

(n = 4 4 undergraduates)
1) instructions (imagery; none)
2) syntactic organization (ordered; random)
3) vividness of narrative (low; high)

Imagery instructions produced no differences.

Nappe & Wolten
(1973)* (cognitive
psychology)

(n = 3 2 undergraduates)
1) instruction of image type (common;
bizarre)

No difference on recall for common and bizarre
images. Bizarre images took longer to form.

Peterson & McGee
(1974)c (cognitive
psychology)

Study 1: (n = 64 undergraduates)
1) instructions (imagery; rote repetition)
2) imagery rating of nouns (low; high)
Studies 2 & 3: (n2= 6 4 ; n3 = 192
undergraduates)
1) instructions (imagery; rote repetition)
2) imagery rating of nouns (low; high)
3) number of dictionary meanings (low; high)

Overall, imagery instructions produced superior
recognition and recall.
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Pressley (1976)*
(educational
psychology)

(n = 86 3rd graders)
1) instructions (imagery; none)

Imagery group performed better.

Robbins, Bray, Irvin, &
Wise (1974)*
(cognitive psychology)

(n = 60 undergraduates)
1) instructions (interactive imagery;
separation imagery; rote repetition)
2) imagery ratings of nouns (HH; HL; LH; LL)

Interactive imagery instructions led to superior recall,
but only with high imagery cues.

Sheehan (1966)*
(cognitive psychology)

Study 1: (n = 85 undergraduates)
1) analysis (prior; no prior)
2) instructions (image; re-image; recall)
Study 2: (n = 30 undergraduates)
1) instructions (imagery; recall)

Study 1: Recall group had more original responses
and inversions than imagery groups.
Study 2: Imagery group had better recall.

Slee (1978)* (cognitive
psychology)

Study 1; (n = 40 undergraduates)
1) stimulus concreteness (concrete; abstract)
2) instructions (imagery; verbal)
3) imagery ability (low; high)
Study 2: (n = same 40 as Study 1)
1) instructions (imagery; none)
2 } imagery ability (low; high)

Study 1: Concrete stimulus, imagery instructions,
and high imagery ability groups had better recall.
Study 2: No significant main effects.

Wittrock & Goldberg
(1975)' (cognitive
psychology)

Studies 1 & 2: (n ,= 4 8 undergraduates;
n2= 4 8 6th graders)
1) instructions (imagery; story; sentence;
none)
2) imagery value of noun (low; high)
3) meaningfulness of word (high; low)

No effect for instructions.

•*1
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Source
Wortman & Sparling
(1974)' (cognitive
psychology)

Independent Variables
(n = 3 6 undergraduates)
1) instructions (bizarre image; common
image; verbal)
2) concreteness (concrete; abstract)

'Recall as dependent measure
bRecognition as dependent measure
cBoth recall and recognition examined as dependent measures

Relevant Results
No effect for instructions.
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instructions, only that no differences in performance were found am ong the types of instructions.
Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that imagery instructions facilitate m em ory performance.

In contrast with the general studies, no studies in marketing have exam ined th e im pact
of instructions to imagine on awareness. As will b e d iscussed later, however, marketing
applications have investigated the effects of imagery instructions on attitudes and intentions.
Thus, in this section, no marketing applications will be reviewed.
Since the general studies concentrate on learning rather than advertising applications,
the instructions have been provided by th e experimenter, not em bedded in the stimulus to be
learned. This is not unreasonable from a learning perspective since a teach er can instruct
students in using imagery a s a learning aid. From an advertiser’s point of view, however, this is
not reasonable. Thus, an advertisem ent utilizing instructions to imagine a s an imagery-eliciting
strategy would necessarily have to em bed the instructions within the m essag e itself. Therefore,
the results reviewed in this section will have to be interpolated to m essage-em bedded
instructions.
General Findings. Similar to the studies that have used pictures a s an independent
variable, studies manipulating instructions can be broken down into th o se investigating the
impact on recall, recognition, or both recall and recognition. The majority, however, have
examined recall as the aw areness dep en d en t variable. These studies will b e reviewed first
followed by th o se examining recognition or both recognition and recall, respectively. All studies
are sum m arized in Table 2.8.
Most of the recall studies have examined th e im pact of different types of instructions.
Anderson and Hidde (1971) manipulated imagery instructions or pronunciability instructions and
found that better recall of sen ten ces occurred in the imagery instruction group; indeed, the
imagery instruction group recalled greater than three tim es m ore sen ten ces than the
pronunciability group. The authors also found that sen ten ces evoking vivid im ages were better
recalled than those evoking dim im ages, but the effect w as not strong.

The most com mon manipulation involved imagery instructions versus rote repetition
instructions. Elliott (1973) instructed subjects to use imagery or rote repetition to learn 64 pairs
of nouns. Imagery value of the nouns and an interpolation task activity (either visual or auditory)
w ere also manipulated, and it w as found that recall w as superior under the imagery instruction
condition and for high imagery words. He also found that a visual language task and an
auditory nonverbal task interfered with imagery and rote repetition conditions, respectively, but a
visual pictorial task had only negligible interference. Griffith and Johnston (1973) also
manipulated imagery instructions versus rote repetition instructions a s well a s imagery value and
signal type (aural or visual) on learning of 23 pairs of nouns. Similar to Elliott (1973), it w as
found that the imagery instruction group, a s well a s the high imagery words, resulted in superior
recall. They also found that the processing capacity expended w as lower under imagery
instructions and with high imagery items. Robbins et al. (1974) also manipulated instructions as
either interactive imagery, separation imagery, or rote repetition and found that interactive
imagery instructions led to superior recall, but only with high Imagery cues. Thus, similar to
pictures, interaction may be a necessary condition for superior performance effects. Sheehan
(1966) instructed subjects to use either imagery or recall m ethods (i.e., rote repetition) to
facilitate recall of patterns of geometric forms. He also reported better perform ance in the group
given imagery instructions. Partial support for imagery instructions over verbal instructions is
provided by Siee (1978) for she found the imagery group to exhibit superior recall in o n e study
but no differences in the other study. Wittrock and Goldberg (1975) instructed subjects to form
an image, make up a story, make up a sentence, or no instructions and found no effect of
instructional set on recall. Similarly, Wortman and Sparling (1974) instructed subjects to form
bizarre images, com mon images, or to use verbal mediation, but they also failed to find an effect
on recall. While a few exceptions have been reported, in general, it has been found that
instructing individuals to form a mental image over instructing them to use som e type of verbal
mediation (i.e., rote repetition) is more effective on recall.
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Three studies have manipulated the effect of providing imagery instructions or no
instructions at all on recall with favorable results for imagery instructions In two of the studies.
Kulhavy and Swenson (1975) found that the imagery-instructed group performed better on both
an immediate and delayed recall test. Furthermore, it was found that the Imagery-Instructed
group recalled more semantic than verbal items. Pressley (1976) also found that third grade
children given instructions to form a mental image of prose they had read performed better on a
recall test of the passage. Montague and Carter (1973), on the other hand, did not find any
effect for the instructions to imagine group. However, the authors also manipulated the
syntactic ordering of a passage, with half of the subjects receiving the passage in syntactic
order and the other half receiving it in random order. While the researchers found that better
recall occurred in the group receiving the passage in order, this manipulation may have
influenced the instruction manipulation. Indeed, regardless of instruction, the subjects must
have had a very difficult time making sense out of a random ordering of several words.
Therefore, while only three studies have examined the impact of instructions to imagine versus
no instructions on recall, it can be concluded that instructions to imagine facilitate recall.

Finally, two studies did not actually manipulate instructions to imagine but included them
in their studies. Lippman (1974) instructed all subjects to form a mental image to help them
recall a list of enactive imagery pairs. The combination of enactive Imagery ratings for each
word in the pair was manipulated, and similar to Paivio (1969), the pair with the highest enactive
imagery combination was recalled best. Nappe and Wollen (1973) instructed subjects to
generate common or bizarre images as a retention aid. While no differences between the
groups were found, the authors did not examine whether these instructions are superior to no
mediating imagery instructions.
Only a few studies have investigated recognition a s a dependent variable, but results are
supportive of imagery instructions. Bull and Wittrock (1973) instructed fifth grade students to
form a mental image of a definition, trace the picture provided of the definition, or repeatedly
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write the definition for a list of 18 words. Children in the self-discovered imagery group
performed better on a one-week recognition test than the other two groups. Kerst and Levin
(1973) provide partial support for the superior effect of imagery instructions on recognition.
They instructed fifth and sixth grade students to form a mental image, form a sentence, or no
instructions in a paired-associate task. They also manipulated who provided the mediation aid,
either the experimenter or subject. It was found that both imagery and sentence instructions
facilitated recognition over the no instruction group, and the effect persisted over one week.
Furthermore, it did not matter who provided the image or sentence. Thus, it appears that for
young children, any mediation aid (imagery or verbal) facilitates recognition.
Peterson and McGee (1974) instructed subjects to form an image or use rote repetition
to facilitate recall and recognition of 36 nouns. The researchers also manipulated imagery rating
and number of definition meanings of the nouns. Again, the imagery group, a s well a s the high
imagery nouns, produced better recall and recognition, while the number of dictionary meanings
had no effect. Bower (1970) also found that imagery instructions were superior to rote repetition
instructions but only for recall, not recognition. Moreover, similar to Robbins et al. (1974), it was
found that interactive imagery was necessary.
Summary. The studies reviewed in this section include those that have manipulated the

instructional set given to subjects. Typically, researchers have given subjects instructions to
imagine or rote repetition instructions to facilitate recall, recognition, or both. Others have
simply manipulated instructions to imagine versus no instructions at all. The results provide
overwhelming support for the relative efficacy of instructions to imagine with only a few
exceptions. Thus, it can be concluded that instructing individuals to form a mental image o f a
word, sentence, o r passage results in better awareness.

It must be noted, however, that all studies reviewed in this subsection cam e from the
psychology literature for there have been no marketing applications examining the impact of
instructions to imagine on awareness. Furthermore, the studies reviewed have all examined
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experimenter-provided instructions, not instructions em bedded within a stimulus m essage.
Nevertheless, the dissertation included instructions to imagine a s an imagery-eliciting strategy,
and these instructions were em bedded within m essage stimuli. -It w as expected that the
instructions to imagine condition would result in better recall than the no instructions to imagine
condition.

Summary
The studies reviewed in this section have ail examined aw areness a s a dependent
variable. Awareness is a general class of memory variables and is com prised of recall and
recognition. While som e studies have examined both memory variables, the majority have
investigated the effect of an imagery-eliciting strategy on recall.
Studies that have manipulated the two imagery-eliciting variables of interest to the
dissertation research have been reviewed with respect to their impact on aw areness.
Specifically, studies manipulating presentation format (i.e., pictures versus words) and studies
manipulating instructions given to respondents have been independently reviewed. These two
imagery-eliciting strategies have been reviewed independently for they have not been com pared
in the sam e study before. Two exceptions exist, however. Levin et al. (1973) manipulated
pictures versus words a s well a s the instructions given, and Rasco et al. (1975) also manipulated
drawings versus no drawings and imagery strategy instructions versus no instructions. While
these two studies have already manipulated the two independent variables of interest in the
dissertation research, in both instances the instructions to imagine have been experimenterprovided external to the stimuli. Thus, it would still be of relevance and benefit to advertisers to
study the impact of m essage-em bedded instructions to imagine and pictures on aw areness.
Several conclusions can be drawn from the review of studies manipulating presentation
format (see Table 2.7 for a summary of studies). First, in general, pictures are superior to words
in facilitating aw areness (e.g., all studies in Table 2.7 except Milgram 1967 and Reese 1965).
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Second, interactive pictures are more effective than both noninteractive pictures or words in
facilitating aw areness (e.g., Childers and Houston 1984; Lippman and Shanahan 1973; Lutz and
Lutz 1977). Third, the superiority of pictures over words on aw areness diminishes a s exposure
time decreases (e.g., Gardner and Houston 1986; Houston et al. 1987; Paivio and C sapo 1969).
Fourth, imagery ability may m oderate the pictorial superiority effect (e.g., McKelvie and Demers
1979; Rohwer and Harris 1975). Finally, type of processing influences the pictorial superiority
effect (e.g., Childers and Houston 1984; D’Agostino et al. 1977; Paivio and C sapo 1969).
The main conclusion that can be drawn from the review of studies manipulating
instructions given to respondents is that imagery instructions facilitate aw areness (see Table 2.8
for a summary of studies). This w as supported regardless of whether the instructions
manipulation involved imagery versus verbal instructions (typically rote repetition) or imagery
versus no instructions. However, no marketing applications have investigated the impact of
imagery instructions on aw areness, which indicates a need to do so because aw areness is an
important communication effect.

BELIEFS AS DEPENDENT VARIABLES
The first type of communication effect, aw areness, has been reviewed, and it w as shown
that a substantial number of studies have analyzed this effect. The last four effects enum erated
by Rossiter and Percy (1983) are "preferential" for they allow consum ers to make a choice
between products as opposed to simply being aware of them. Three of th ese preferential
communication effects were studied in the dissertation: beliefs, attitudes, and intentions.
Rossiter and Percy (1983) point out, however, that while "it seem s highly probable that visual
content in advertisem ents can affect product beliefs, research evidence on this phenom enon is
virtually nonexistent" (p. 110). As will be seen in the next section, several imagery studies have
analyzed attitudes and a few intentions, but only a handful have investigated imagery and
product beliefs (e.g., Dickson et al. 1986; Edell and Staelin 1983; Mitchell 1986; Mitchell and
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Olson 1981). Also, Imagery studies that have exam ined beliefs have manipulated pictures a s the
imagery-eliciting strategy.
Mitchell and Olson (1981) manipulated th e presentation format of four print
advertisem ents for a hypothetical brand of facial tissues. (They also manipulated repetition but
w ere unable to show any effects.) One ad w as verbal-only stating that "Brand I facial tissues are
soft." The other three a d s contained only a picture along with the brand name. The pictorial
stimuli consisted of a fluffy kitten, a picture of a sunset, and an abstract painting. While the
kitten generated th e strongest softness belief, the sunset and ab stract painting resulted in
subjects believing that the tissue cam e in many colors, and th e abstract painting resulted in
beliefs that it w as less absorbent, did not tear a s easily, and w as m ore econom ical than the
other brands. Thus, visual com ponents in print ad s convey information that influences brand
beliefs.
Edell and Staelin (1983) m easured beliefs in their advertising study on framed pictures,
unframed pictures, and verbal-only copy. Brand attribute beliefs were unique to each subject
and the m easure w as b ased on attributes that were either a priori important to the individual in
evaluating a brand within the product class, listed by the subject during the elicitation task, or
one of the three attributes in the ad. Thus, the m easures of brand attribute beliefs consisted of
asking the subjects to indicate how likely it w as that each brand p o sse ssed th e attributes they
had indicated (7-point scale). It w as found that if the ad contained an unframed picture instead
of a framed picture or verbal-only m essage, the average subject w as not a s likely to give any
support or counterargum ent on an a priori important attribute. The authors concluded that
subjects forget or are distracted from their brand evaluation task when viewing unframed
pictorial advertisem ents.
Dickson et al. (1986) evaluated, attem pted to replicate, and improved upon a study
performed by Kisielius and Sternthal (1984, discussed in detail in next section). Using the stimuli
from Kisielius and Sternthal’s study, Dickson et al. included belief m easures in addition to

attitude m easures. The first factor manipulated the initial instruction in the experimental booklet,
which involved th e presence or ab sen ce of instructions to imagine. The second manipulation
involved verbal-only p h rases at the bottom of each p ag e of th e 13 pages, picture-words in which
th e picture w as presented above the verbal phrase (similar to Kisielius and Stemthal), or wordspicture in which the position of the picture and w ords w as reversed. Furthermore, th e verbal
phrase w as enlarged in th e last condition. Subjects responded to 11 general belief statem ents
ab o u t the brand of sham poo advertised and 16 very specific belief judgm ents from the
advertising copy but including three false product claims. It w as found that som e, but not all,
beliefs w ere influenced by the m essag e manipulation, and pictures enhanced beliefs about the
product.
Mitchell (1986) also examined beliefs generated a s a result of manipulating the type of
picture in a print advertisement. He m easured salient beliefs determ ined by pretests a s well a s
using a free elicitation procedure. There w ere no significant differences found on th e num ber of
product attribute beliefs by picture type or product.

Summary
Since beliefs have not been studied very extensively with respect to imagery processing,
it w as included in the dissertation a s an exploratory variable. While there is no strong theoretical
or empirical grounding for th e influence of imagery-eliciting strategies and imagery processing
on brand beliefs, it can be speculated that the two imagery-eliciting strategies will result in
differential beliefs about the brand advertised. Furthermore, one imagery-eliciting strategy may
result In a greater num ber of beliefs as well a s different brand belief strengths.

ATTITUDES AS DEPENDENT VARIABLES
In contrast with studies examining aw areness a s a dependent variable, studies
investigating th e effect of an imagery-eliciting strategy, either pictures or instructions to imagine,

on attitude have been less numerous. However, while only a few studies in psychology exist
(e.g., Gregory et al. 1982; Rigney and Lutz 1976), several studies in marketing have analyzed
attitude as a dependent variable. While the majority of studies in marketing have concentrated
on attitude toward the brand or object (e.g., Bone and Ellen 1990; Bums et al. 1991; Dickson et
al. 1986; Edell and Staelin 1983; Gardner and Houston 1986; Holbrook and Moore 1981; Kisielius
and Sternthal 1984; Mitchell 1986; Mitchell and Olson 1981; Oliver et al. 1989; Rossiter and
Percy 1978, 1980; Wright and Rip 1980), som e have also investigated attitude toward the act of
purchasing and using the product (e.g., Edell and Staelin 1983; Mitchell 1986; Mitchell and Olson
1981) and attitude toward the advertisement (e.g., Bone and Ellen 1990; Burns et al. 1991;
Mitchell 1986; Mitchell and Olson 1981). The marketing applications have been performed within
an advertising context (c.f., Holbrook and Moore 1981), which could be an explanation for the
emphasis on attitude as a dependent variable since this variable is one of the communication
effects listed by Rossiter and Percy (1983).
Similar to the studies on awareness, either pictures or instructions to imagine have been
the independent variables, but typically both have not been manipulated in the sam e study (c.f.,
Dickson et al. 1986; Kisielius and Sternthal 1984). Thus, studies manipulating pictures a s the
independent variable will be reviewed first followed by those manipulating instructions to
imagine. These studies are summarized in Tables 2.9 and 2.10.

Pictures as Independent Variables
Several marketing applications have investigated the impact of pictures on attitudes,
while only one study from the psychology literature has done so. While not merely examining
the impact of pictures versus words as in many of the studies examining memory a s the
dependent variable, several of the marketing applications have manipulated the valence of the
pictures (i.e., positive, neutral, or negative) used as stimuli. However, it will becom e obvious that
pictures, in general, generate more favorable attitudes than no pictures, and that favorably
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evaluated pictures generate the most positive attitudes. The general finding in psychology will
be reviewed followed by the findings from marketing, and all of the studies are summarized in
Table 2.9.
General Finding. Rigney and Lutz (1976) manipulated the format of a computer-assisted
chemistry lesson as verbal-only or verbal and graphics. As already discussed in the section on
memory, they found greater recall and recognition in the imagery group. Furthermore, they also
investigated the impact on attitude toward the treatment as well a s attitude toward the computerassisted lesson. Not only did the imagery group learn more, but they also generated more
positive attitudes. This group rated the lesson more fun than the group receiving the verbal
manipulation, but they did not rate the lesson as necessarily more important than the verbal-only
group. In sum, the imagery group liked the com puter-assisted lesson more than the verbal-only
group.
Marketing Applications. The studies in marketing can be grouped according to what
type of attitude has been analyzed. As mentioned in the introduction to this section, several
studies have investigated the effect of pictures on brand attitudes (or attitude toward the object),
attitude toward the act of purchasing and using the brand or object, and attitude toward the
advertisement. All three will be reviewed in turn.
Attitude Toward the Brand. Only two studies have analyzed the impact of verbal-only
information versus pictorial and verbal information on attitude toward the brand, and the results
conflict with each other. Kisielius and Sternthal (1984) performed a pilot study in which
presentation format w as manipulated a s verbal-only statem ents or pictures In conjunction with
each verbal statement. Thus, each statement appeared on a separate page and each w as or
w as not accom panied by a line drawing depicting the verbal statement. The results indicated
that the picture condition produced less favorable attitudes toward the brand of sham poo
advertised. They then performed a study in which instructions in the experimental booklet
included or did not include instructions to imagine a s well as the presentation format

T a b le 2 . 9
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Variables

Relevant Results

General Finding:
Rigney & Lutz (1976)

(n = 4 0 undergraduates)
Independent Variables:
1) format of lesson (verbal; verbal &
graphics)
Attitude Dependent Variables:
1) attitude toward format
2) attitude toward the computer-assisted
lesson

Imagery group had more positive attitudes.
Imagery lesson w as rated more fun, but not more
useful than verbal lesson.
Imagery group liked lesson more.

Dickson, Burnkrant,
Miniard, and Unnava
(1986)

In = 555 undergraduates)
Independent Variables:
1) instructions (imagery; none)
2) presentation format (verbal; picture top &
small verbal bottom; large verbal top &
picture bottom)
Attitude Dependent Variable:
1) brand attitude

Pictures had a significant positive effect on attitude.

Edell & Staelin (1983)

(n= 2 7 undergraduates)
Independent Variables:
1) structure of ad (verbal; pictorial-framed;
pictorial-unframed)
2) m essage content (objective; subjective;
characterization)

Pictorial-unframed ads elicited more positive
attitudes.

Marketing Applications:

S?
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Edell & Staelin (1983)
(continued)

3) product class (car, calculator, camera)
Attitude Dependent Variables:
1) brand attitude
2) attitude toward the act of purchasing

Gardner & Houston
(1986)

(n = 64 undergraduates)
Independent Variables:
1) exposure time (short; long)
2) time of measure (immediate; delayed)
3) content of stimuli (varied favorability
of pictorial & verbal content)
Attitude Dependent Variable:
1) store evaluation

Relative contributions of pictures with respect to
evaluation increased with delayed measure.
For immediate evaluation, pictures play a greater role
under limited processing than under more extensive
processing.
Verbal material contributed to store evaluation to a
greater extent than nonverbal material.

Holbrook & Moore
(1981)

(n = 59 graduate students)
Independent Variable:
1) presentation format (verbal; visual)
Dependent Variable:
1) judgements (feature interactions)

An additive strategy reduced the relative tendency
for pictures to produce more feature interactions.
Use of mental imagery reduced the relative
advantage of pictures over words in evoking feature
interactions.
Mental imaging produced a significant main effect of
pictures versus words on number of feature
interactions.

Kisielius & Sternthal
(1984)

Pilot studv: In= 4 3 underoraduates and
graduate students)
Independent Variable:
1) presentation (verbal; verbal/picture)

Pilot study: Picture condition produced less favorable
attitudes.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Kisielius & Sternthal
(1984) (continued)

Study 1: In = 90 undergraduates)
Independent Variables:
1) presentation (verbal: verbal/pictures)
2) instructions (imagery; none)
Study 2: (n = 58 undergraduates)
Independent Variables:
1) presentation (verbal; verbal/pictures)
2) speed of presentation (slow; fast)
Study 3: (n= 58 undergraduates)
Independent Variables:
1) presentation (verbal; verbal/pictures)
2) extra information (favorable; control)
Attitude Dependent Variable for all studies:
1) brand attitude (alpha = .59-.61)

Study 1: Absence of instructions and verbal
condition produced more favorable attitudes.
Study 2: When speed of presentation w as slow,
more favorable attitudes in verbal condition; when
fast, presentation format had no effect.
Study 3: Control condition had more favorable
attitudes in verbal condition; favorable
communication resulted in less favorable attitudes in
verbal condition.

Mitchell (1986)

(n = 69 undergraduates)
Independent Variables:
1) picture type (none; positive; neutral;
negative)
2) product (toothpaste; pen; cola; deodorant)
Attitude Dependent Variables:
1) brand attitude
2) attitude toward act of purchasing
3) attitude toward the ad

Ad with positively evaluated picture resulted in most
favorable brand attitude and attitude toward the act.
Different attitudes were created for products that
have the same product attribute beliefs.
Attitude toward the ad based on entire ad, not just
valenced pictures.
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Source

Variables

Relevant Results

Mitchell & Olson
(1981)

(n = 71 undergraduates)
Independent Variables:
1) ad content (verbal; kitten; sunset;
abstract painting)
2) repetition (2;4;6;8)
Attitude Dependent Variables:
1) brand attitude
2) attitude toward act of purchasing
3) attitude toward the ad

Kitten and sunset pictures included in the ad created
more positive brand attitudes than abstract painting
or verbal-only.
Kitten and sunset pictures resulted in more positive
attitude toward the act of purchasing than abstract
painting.
Attitude toward the ad influences brand attitude.

Rossiter & Percy
(1978, 1980)

(n = 88 non-student adults)
Independent Variables:
1) visual (strong; weak)
2) copy (concrete; abstract)
3) visual imagery ability (verbal; visual)
- 1978 study only.
Attitude Dependent Variable:
1) brand attitude

More positive brand attitude for ad with strong visual
component.
Strongest attitude elicited by combination of strong
visual and concrete copy.
Visualizers showed greatest degree of affective
learning overall • greater under strong visual and
abstract copy.

90
manipulation. While there was no effect found for the instruction manipulation, it was again
found that the verbal-only condition produced more favorable brand attitudes. A second study
manipulated speed of presentation a s well a s presentation format. Again, it was found that the
verbal-only condition resulted in a more favorable brand attitude, but only in the slow condition.
Finally, in a third study the researchers manipulated a priori extra communication given to
subjects a s either favorable or irrelevant In addition to the presentation format manipulation.
Again, in the control group, more favorabte attitudes resulted in the verbal-only condition, but in
the favorable communication group, a less favorabte attitude resulted in the verbal-only
condition.
To explain these results, Kisielius and Sternthal proposed the "availability-valence"
hypothesis. They felt that the verbal-picture condition resulted in more cognitive elaboration, but
the valence of the information w as less positive than the verbal-only condition, which was
assum ed to be very positive. Thus, less positive attitudes resulted in the verbal-picture
condition. Since presentation format had no effect at the fast presentation rate, it was believed
that further support for their hypothesis was attained because respondents are not able to
cognitively elaborate at the faster rate. Moreover, by providing favorable extra communication,
the verbal-only condition did not produce more positive attitudes, which further supported their
hypothesis.
This study has been criticized by other researchers. First, Edell and Staelin (1983) found
effects opposite to those of Kisielius and Sternthal (1984) and suggest that perhaps the stimuli in
Kisielius and Sternthal’s study did not consist of equivalent m essages. Second, Dickson et al.
(1986), using the actual stimuli provided by Kisielius and Sternthal, found opposite results. Thus,
in an attempt to evaluate, replicate, and expand on the Kisielius and Sternthal study, Dickson et
al. (1986) performed a study similar to Kisielius and Sternthal’s second study in which
instructions and presentation format were manipulated. Additionally, since Kisielius and
Sternthal's reported alphas ranged from only .59 to .61 for their attitude measure, additional
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attitude m easures were used. Contrary to Kisielius and Sternthal, Dickson et al. report a positive
effect on attitude in the picture-verbal condition. This effect w as found using a more reliable
m easure of brand attitude (alpha = .85). However, no difference in attitude w as found using
Kisielius and Sternthal's attitude measure.
Gardner and Houston (1986) manipulated the favorability of pictorial and verbal content
in a m essage describing restaurants. They found that brand attitudes for m essages with
favorable pictures and unfavorable verbal content increase in delayed m easures, but the
opposite w as found for m essages with unfavorable pictures and favorable verbal content. In the
immediate response condition, it w as found that unfavorable pictures com bined with favorable
words resulted in more positive brand attitudes under the long exposure condition, but the
pattern w as reversed for the favorable picture and unfavorable word combination. However, as
mentioned In the section on aw areness, it appears that the manipulations in this study hold little
relevance for advertisers since the inclusion of either an unfavorable picture or words is unlikely.
While not in an advertising context, Holbrook and Moore (1981) manipulated
presentation format, either visual or verbal, of several combinations of sw eater features. They
m easured respondents’ judgm ents of each combination and found a greater number of feature
interactions (i.e., greater judgments) for the picture condition. However, for those subjects using
mental imagery in either condition, it was found that the relative advantage of pictures over
words in evoking feature interactions was reduced. Thus, respondents using imagery
processing regardless of the presentation condition had a greater effect.
Rossiter and Percy (1978, 1980) manipulated the visual a s well a s the verbal
com ponents of a print advertisem ent for beer. The visual was either strong (i.e., a large picture)
or w eak (i.e., a small picture), and the verbal copy w as either concrete or abstract. While both
studies used the sam e data, the 1978 study also analyzed visual imagery ability a s a predictor
variable. It was found that a more positive brand attitude resulted from the ad s containing the
large picture. The strongest brand attitude was elicited by the combination of large picture and
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concrete copy, but for visualizers this was true for the larger picture and abstract copy
condition.
Attitude Toward the Brand and Act. Edell and Staelin (1983) examined the impact of
ads containing a framed picture, an unframed picture, or verbal-only copy on brand attitude and
attitude toward the act of purchasing the brand. While there was no difference between the
pictorial-framed and verbal-only ads, it was found that pictorial-unframed ad s resulted in more
positive brand attitudes and attitudes toward the act of purchasing the product. Thus, simply
adding a picture does not imply greater attitudes. In this case, a picture that did not merely
reflect the verbal copy was more effective.
Attitude Toward the Brand. Act, and Ad. Finally, Mitchell (1986) and Mitchell and Olson
(1981) examined the effect of pictures on attitude toward the brand, attitude toward the act of
purchasing and using the brand, and attitude toward the ad. In both studies, the type of picture
was manipulated. Ads contained either no picture, a positively-valenced photograph (i.e., a
kitten in Mitchell and Olson (1981) and a sunrise in Mitchell (1986)), a neutral photograph (i.e., a
sunset and an abstract painting in Mitchell and Olson (1981), an abstract photograph of an aerial
view of a field of crops in Mitchell (1986)) o r a negatively-valenced photograph in Mitchell (1986)
(i.e., a wildcat). While the ads containing pictures in Mitchell and Olson (1981) did not contain
verbal copy, all ads in Mitchell (1986) contained approximately 50 words of copy. In both
studies, it was found that the ad with the positive photograph resulted in the most favorable
brand attitudes and attitudes toward purchasing the brand. It was also found that attitude
toward the ad influenced attitude toward the brand and act. While the studies did not explicitly
study the impact of the manipulation or attitude toward the ad, Mitchell did conclude that
attitude toward the ad is based on the entire ad, not simply the valenced visual component.
Summary. With the exception of Kisielius and Sternthal (1984), studies manipulating
pictures as an independent variable have generally found that pictures result in more positive
attitudes (studies summarized in Table 2.9). Only one study in psychology has examined
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pictures and attitudes (e.g., Rigney and Lutz 1976), but several marketing studies have (e.g.,
Dickson et al. 1986; Edell and Staelin 1983; Gardner and Houston 1986; Holbrook and Moore
1981; Kisielius and Sternthal 1984; Mitchell 1986; Mitchell and Olson 1981; Rossiter and Percy
1978, 1980). Moreover, positively-valenced pictures (e.g., Mitchell 1986; Mitchell and Olson
1981) and unframed pictures (e.g., Edell and Staelin 1983) have resulted in more positive brand
attitudes and attitudes toward the act of purchasing and using a brand over neutral or
negatively-valenced pictures and pictorial-framed ads, respectively. Finally, white th e studies
m easuring attitude toward the ad have not explicitly exam ined th e im pact of pictures (e.g.,
Mitchell 1986; Mitchell and Olson 1981), it has been found that attitude tow ard the ad m ediates
brand attitudes and that th e entire ad, not only a valenced photograph, influences attitude
tow ard the ad.

Instructions to Imagine as an Independent Variable
There are not a s many studies examining the Impact of instructions to imagine on
attitudes a s there are for aw areness a s a dependent variable. Only one general study (e.g.,
Gregory et al. 1982) and five marketing applications (e.g., Bone and Ellen 1990; Burns et al.
1991; Dickson et al. 1986; Kisielius and Sternthal 1984; Wright and Rip 1980) have been
conducted with th ese independent and dependent variables. Moreover, Bone and Ellen (1990)
and Burns et al. (1991) did not actually manipulate instructions to imagine a s an independent
variable, but they did include instructions to imagine em bedded within the stimulus m essage.
The studies reviewed in this subsection are summarized in Table 2.10.
While the general finding supports the hypothesis that instructions to imagine result in
m ore positive attitudes, the results from marketing have been dismal. However, each study
manipulating instructions to imagine is subject to a flaw that may have influenced the results.
General Finding. Gregory et al. (1982) report results from four experiments, but the
fourth one holds relevance to this review. While this study w as published in th e social

T able 2 .1 0
EMPIRICAL STUDIES INVESTIGATING ATTITUDES A S DEPENDENT VARIABLES
AND INSTRUCTIONS TO IMAGINE A S AN INDEPENDENT VARIABLE

Source

Variables

Relevant Results

General Finding:
Gregory, Cialdini, &
Carpenter (1982)

Study 4: (n=49 non-student adults)
Independent Variable:
1) instructions (imagery embedded; none)
Attitude Dependent Variable:
1) attitude toward cable TV

Imagery group exhibited more positive attitude.

Marketing Applications:
Bone & Ellen (1990)

(n = 142 undergraduates)
Six radio ads all contained high imagery
wording and instructions to imagine; control
ad using low imagery words and no
instructions.
Independent Variables:
1) self-relatedness (self; other)
2) plausibility/distinctiveness
(plausible;indistinct; plausiblemoderately distinct; implausiblehighly distinct)
Attitude Dependent Variables:
1) brand attitude
2) attitude toward the ad

Dickson, Bumkrant,
Miniard, & Unnava
(1986)

(n=555 undergraduates)
Independent Variables:
1) presentation (verbal; verbal/picture)
2) instructions (imagery; none)
Attitude Dependent Variable:
1) brand attitude

The six high-imagery groups did not experience more
imagery than the low-imagery control, but the highimagery processing group (based on reported
imagery, not manipulation) exhibited greater brand
attitude and attitude toward the ad.

No effect for instructions to imagine.

£

T a b le 2 . 1 0 (C o n tin u e d )
EM PIRICAL S T U D IE S IN V ESTIG A TIN G A T T IT U D E S A S D EPEN D EN T V A RIABLES
A N D IN S T R U C T IO N S T O IM A GIN E A S AN IN D EPEN D EN T VARIABLE

Source

Variables

Relevant Results

Kisielius & Sternthal
(1984)

Study 1: (n = 90 undergraduates)
Independent Variables:
1) presentation (verbal; verbal/picture)
2) instructions (imagery; none)
Attitude Dependent Variable:
1) brand attitude

No effect for instructions to imagine.

Wright & Rip (1980)

(n = 144 10th graders in both studies)
Study 1: "describe and praise messages"
Study 2: "frame it my way messages"
In both studies, the high similarity condition
did or did not embed imagery instructions.
Attitude Dependent Variable:
1) brand attitude

No effect for instructions to imagine.
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psychology literature, It is actually a marketing application. The authors were interested in
whether or not scenarios could be used as a compliance technique. Thus, to study this, the
authors manipulated the instructions given to respondents for a scenario concerning cable
television. Two conditions were examined: an information-only (control) condition and an
"imagination" (experimental) condition. The imagery condition involved instructions to imagine
em bedded within the message. For example, statements such as, "Take a moment and imagine
how CATV will provide you w ith...," and "Take a moment and think of how...." The informationonly condition did not contain these two phrases at the beginning of these sentences.
The experimenter contacted each subject by going door-to-door and read the script to
them. A series of questions pertaining to how likely the subject felt that CATV would be as
popular as regular TV and how likely they thought CATV would be something they wanted as
well a s attitudes toward CATV were asked. Behavior measures were taken in addition to
likelihood and attitude measures. Not only were behavioral intentions with respect to requesting
more information and actually subscribing, but actual behavior was also measured from
company records 2 to 3 months after the interview contact.
The results indicate a favorable effect for the imagery condition. Subjects in this group
exhibited greater likelihoods, attitudes, behavioral intentions, and actual behavior. Thus, support
is provided for embedding imagery instructions within a m essage stimulus.
It would be remiss, however, not to point out one factor other than the instructions to
imagine that may have caused the results. In the information-only condition the m essage did
not target the respondent in the scenario, while the imagery condition did. Instead of saying
"You can plan...," (like in the imagery condition) the wording was "A person can plan..." or "you
will be able to spend your time...," versus “more time can be spent...." Thus, the imagery
condition was also self-related, while the information condition was not. It has been found that
self-related ness of a m essage influences responses such as likelihood (e.g., Anderson 1983),
attitudes, and intentions (e.g., Bone and Ellen 1990). Therefore, the m essages were not
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equivalent with respect to self-relatedness, and this could have actually been the causal factor
for the differences found.
Marketing Applications. While not actually manipulating imagery instructions to imagine,
Bone and Ellen (1990) and Burns et al. (1991) did incorporate them into the m essage stimulus.
Bone and Ellen (1990) manipulated self-relatedness and plausibility/distinctiveness in six highimagery radio ads. The high-imagery scenario ad s all consisted of concrete words, actionable
sentences, present tense, and began with the statement, "Imagine this." A low-imagery control
ad, on the other hand, consisted of abstract words, more complex sentence structure, passive
tense, and no instruction to imagine. It was found, however, that subjects in the six hlghimagery conditions did not report experiencing more imagery than the low-imagery control
group. Thus, subsequent analyses were based on reported imagery, not the manipulation
condition. It was found that the self-reported high-imagery processing group exhibited greater
brand attitude and attitude toward the advertisement.
Burns et al. (1991) manipulated concreteness of wording and brand nam e familiarity in
their experiment. Each ad stimulus contained instructions to imagine em bedded within the
m essage. It was found that concrete wording led to more positive attitudes toward the ad and
brand.
Studies manipulating instructions to Imagine have been few (e.g., Dickson et al. 1986;
Kisielius and Sternthal 1984; Wright and Rip 1980), and only Wright and Rip (1980) have
em bedded the instructions within the m essage. As discussed previously, Dickson et al. (1986)
simply attem pted to replicate and Improve upon Kisielius and SternthaPs (1984) second study in
which presentation format and instructions given to respondents differed. In both studies,
however, the instructions to imagine were not em bedded within the ad, but rather, they were
included a s part of the experimental instructions at the beginning of the booklet. The
experimenter did not read the instructions to the subjects a s many have done in the psychology
literature when manipulating instructions and studying the impact on aw areness. Thus, there is
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no way of knowing w hether or not the subjects actually read the instructions. This could have
been the reason why the instructions to imagine manipulation did not have a n effect on brand
attitudes.
Wright and Rip (1980), on the other hand, did manipulate instructions to imagine
em bedded within a m essag e stimulus. However, they also failed to achieve significant
differences on attitudes. But this lack of effect could be d u e to two factors. First, their
manipulation w as fairly weak in the second study, but it ap p ears to be ad eq u ate in the first
study. The first study w as com prised of "describe and praise" m essages. However, similar to
Gregory et al. (1982), the no imagery instruction m essage is not self-related while th e imagery
condition is, but this did not seem to have an impact (probably d u e to th e next factor to be
discussed). The seco n d study w as com prised of "frame it my way" m essag es in which subjects
w ere encouraged to use various attributes, such a s size, when evaluating a college. The
imagery manipulation in this study w as very weak, probably due to the type of m essage. A
second, and probably more important, factor contributing to the lack of effect concerns subjects’
ability to imagine the scenarios described. Subjects consisted of high school sophom ores, and
the context of the studies involved evaluating colleges b ased on information provided. As
Maclnnis and Price (1987) point out, th ese individuals may not have sufficient knowledge
structures to enable them to imagine anything. Indeed, very few high school sophom ores
p o sse ss enough familiarity with the stimulus studied by Wright and Rip (1980).
Summary. While the results of studies manipulating instructions to imagine on attitude
(summarized in Table 2.10) are not encouraging, strict experimental design m ay overcom e som e
of the factors that may have attributed to the lack of an effect. First, it is imperative that
m essag e stimuli be equivalent with regard to everything but th e instructions manipulation. For
example, it h as been pointed out that Gregory et al. (1982) and Wright and Rip (1980) did not do
this. Second, a manipulation check should be performed to ensure subjects realize the
presence of instructions to imagine. Dickson et al. (1986) and Kisielius and Sternthal (1984) did
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not perform this check, and there is no way of knowing whether or not subjects actually read
the instructions. Finally, it Is necessary that subjects possess adequate familiarity and
knowledge to imagine the experimental stimuli. This could have been the reason why Wright
and Rip (1980) did not find an effect for the Instruction manipulation.

Summary
Studies investigating the impact of pictures (summarized in Table 2.9) or instructions to
imagine (summarized in Table 2.10) on attitude have been reviewed in this section. Very few
studies from the psychology literature have been conducted (e.g., Gregory et al. 1982; Rigney
and Lutz 1976), but several marketing applications exist (e.g., Bone and Ellen 1990; Burns et al.
1991; Dickson et al. 1986; Edell and Staelin 1983; Gardner and Houston 1986; Holbrook and
Moore 1981; Kisielius and Sternthal 1984; Mitchell 1986; Mitchell and Olson 1981; Oliver et al.
1989; Rossiter and Percy 1978, 1980; Wright and Rip 1980). In marketing, attitude toward the
brand or object, attitude toward the act of purchasing and using the brand or object, and
attitude toward the advertisement have been examined as the attitude dependent variables.
In general, the results indicate that pictures or pictures in conjunction with words elicit
more favorable attitudes than words only (c.f., Kisielius and Sternthal 1984). Moreover,
positively-valenced pictures (e.g., Mitchell 1986; Mitchell and Oison 1981) and unframed pictures
(e.g., Edell and Staelin 1983) have resulted in more positive brand attitudes and attitudes toward
the act over neutral or negatively-valenced pictures or pictorial framed ads, respectively.
Mitchell (1986) also concludes that the entire ad influences attitude toward the ad.
Manipulating instructions to imagine, however, has produced dismal results with respect
to attitudes. One general study, Gregory et al. (1982), did find more favorable attitudes in the
condition that embedded instructions to imagine within a stimulus, but this study could have
been confounded by self-relatedness of the message, which was not intentionally manipulated.
In marketing, no study supports differences in attitudes as a result of manipulating instructions to
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imagine. However, these studies are riddled with problems such as weak manipulation (e.g.,
Dickson et al. 1986; Kisielius and Sternthal 1984; Wright and Rip 1980) and using stimuli that
respondents may not have been familiar enough with to use imagery (e.g., Wright and Rip 1980).
Thus, an attempt was made to mitigate these influences in the dissertation research.

BEHAVIORAL INTENTION AS A DEPENDENT VARIABLE
Considerably less research has examined the effect of imagery-eliciting strategies on
behavioral intentions. However, this is a third type of preferential communication effect
enumerated by Rossiter and Percy (1983) that may be influenced by nonverbal content in an
advertisement a s well as nonverbal processing by the recipient. A few studies in social
psychology (e.g., Anderson 1983; Gregory et al. 1982) and marketing (e.g., Bone and Ellen
1990; Burns et al. 1991; Edell and Staelin 1983; Mitchell 1986; Mitchell and Olson 1981; Rossiter
and Percy 1980) have included intention as a dependent variable, and these studies will be
reviewed in this section. Similar to previous sections, studies manipulating pictures a s an
independent variable will be reviewed followed by those manipulating instructions to imagine.

Pictures as Independent Variables

All studies manipulating pictures have been from the marketing literature. Thus, no
general findings can be reported.
Marketing Applications. The studies that have included intention m easures have also
investigated the effect of manipulating pictures on attitudes (e.g., Edell and Staelin 1983; Mitchell
1986; Mitchell and Olson 1981; Rossiter and Percy 1980). in all studies, the effects on intentions
were similar to the effects on attitudes, albeit slightly weaker. Since these studies have been
addressed in previous sections, only the impact on intentions will be highlighted.
Edell and Staelin (1983) found that unframed pictorial advertisements resulted in greater
purchase intentions than ads containing either framed pictures or no pictures at all. Mitchell
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(1986) and Mitchell and Olson (1981) found that print ads containing positively-valenced
photographs produced the greatest behavioral intentions. Finally, Rossiter and Percy (1980)
found that a strong visual component combined with concrete copy favorably Influenced
behavioral intentions.

Instructions to imagine as an Independent Variable
Four studies have investigated imagery instructions and behavioral intentions (e.g.,
Anderson 1983; Bone and Ellen 1990; Burns et al. 1991; Gregory et al. 1982), but only one has
actually manipulated instructions to imagine (e.g., Gregory et al. 1982).
General Findings. Recall that Gregory et al. (1982) manipulated the instructions to
imagine em bedded within a m essage concerning cable television. As with attitudes, the
imagery-instructed group reported significantly greater intentions to request additional
information and to subscribe to CATV. Moreover, in term s of actual behavior, this group
exhibited a greater actual subscription rate. However, recall that this study may have been
confounded by the inadvertent manipulation of self-relatedness in the m essage stimuli.
Anderson (1983), while not actually manipulating instructions to Imagine, asked subjects
to draw a cartoon of a behavior and manipulated who the main character was (i.e., self, close
friend, or disliked acquaintance). He found that subjects drawing themselves in the cartoon
exhibited greater intention changes to perform that behavior, while drawing others did not have
an effect. Thus, even though a subject produced imagery about the other characters, it did not
have an impact on one’s own behavioral intentions.
Marketing Applications. No studies in marketing have manipulated instructions to
imagine and studied behavioral intentions. However, recall that Bone and Ellen (1990) did use
six high-imagery ads and one low-imagery control ad, but they used reported use of imagery to
conduct their analyses. They found that the high-imagery processing group exhibited greater
behavioral intentions indirectly through attitude toward the ad. Furthermore, similar to Anderson
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(1983), self-related imagery produced a greater direct effect on behavioral intentions. Bum s et
al. (1991) included instructions to imagine in all experimental stimuli, but no effect w as found on
behavioral intentions for the other variables manipulated (i.e., co n creten ess of wording and
brand familiarity).

Summary
Not many imagery studies have included behavioral intention a s a dep en d en t variable.
However, o n es that have manipulated pictures have found similar effects to th o se found for
attitudes; that is, pictures, especially positively-valenced or unframed pictures, favorably
influence behavioral intentions (Edell and Staelin 1983; Mitchell 1986; Mitchell and Olson 1981;
Rossiter and Percy 1980). Only Gregory et al. (1982) studied the im pact of instructions to
imagine versus no instructions to imagine on behavioral intentions. Again, similar to their results
for attitudes, the instructions to imagine condition resulted in greater behavioral intentions a s
well a s actual behavior. However, it has been shown that the self-relatedness of th e Imagery
influences behavioral intentions (Anderson 1983; Bone and Ellen 1990).

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This chapter consists of eleven sections: (1) Introduction; (2) Definition of Mental
Imagery; (3) Overview of G aps in Imagery Research; (4) Brief History of Imagery Research; (5)
Imagery-Eliciting Strategies; (6) C onstructs and M easures of Individual Differences in Imagery
Processing; (7) Measuring Imagery Processing; (8) Awareness a s a D ependent Variable; (9)
Beliefs a s D ependent Variables; (10) Attitudes a s D ependent Variables; and (11) Behavioral
Intention a s a D ependent Variable. Each section is briefly summarized below.
While there are many types of imagery, thought (or memory) im agery is relevant to a
consum er context in general and an advertising context in particular. The definition used in the
dissertation research is th e sam e as that espoused by Maclnnis and Price (1987, p. 473):
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"Mental imagery is a process by which sensory information is represented in working memory,"
and ft is in the absence of genuine and perceptual counterparts (Richardson 1969). Therefore,
unlike discursive processing, which is symbolic or language-like Information processing, imagery
processing can be multisensory. Thus, imagery can involve images m ade up of sight, smell,
taste, sound, and feeling sensations.
Several gaps in imagery research are enumerated in the third section. Thus, a preview
of relevant constructs along with their m easures and empirical studies investigating them is
provided.

Holt (1964) provides a thorough history of imagery research, which is recapitulated in
the fourth section of this chapter. Basically, the history of imagery research has undergone
three distinct eras that have mirrored developments in psychology (Holt 1964): concentration on
introspection, banishment of mentalistic concepts, and “return of the ostracized." While the early
1960’s and 1970’s saw the greatest increase in imagery research in psychology, it has only been
during the last decade that imagery has enjoyed prominence in the marketing literature.
Since the dissertation research included two imagery-eliciting strategies, the fifth section
introduces and conceptualizes four imagery-eliciting strategies derived from the literature. They
are: (1) pictures: (2) concrete words; (3) instructions to imagine: and (4) guided imagery
(Alesandrini and Sheikh 1983; Lutz and Lutz 1978; Maclnnis and Price 1987). Several studies,
summarized in Table 2.1, have manipulated concreteness of wording or concreteness of wording
and one other imagery-eliciting strategy, and the results are unequivocal with regard to the
ability of concrete words to generate greater retention or attitudes over abstract words. Thus,
this imagery-eliciting strategy w as not manipulated in the dissertation research, and only
concrete copy was utilized in the experimental stimuli. Furthermore, guided imagery Is primarily
applied in clinical settings and requires considerable effort and training on the part of both the
researcher and the subject. For this reason, this type of imagery-eliciting strategy was not
utilized in the dissertation as it appears to hold little relevance for marketers. Pictures can range
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on a continuum from concrete to abstract, and concrete pictures can be interactive or
noninteractive. Thus, a hierarchy of pictures from most to least effective in terms of eliciting
imagery can be conceptualized a s concrete/interactive, concrete/noninteractive, abstract, and,
finally, no picture at all. Instructions to imagine involve prompting an individual to u se mental
imagery processing. Thus, this is the most direct way to encourage imagery processing.

The sixth section reviews constructs and m easures of individual differences in imagery
processing. The primary areas of interest in studies of individual differences include: (1)
imagery ability, (2) imagery content, and (3) processing style. Review of each individual
difference variable covered several scales that have been developed to m easure each
(summarized in Table 2.4) a s well as studies including that variable (summarized in Table 2.3).
Review of the studies analyzing individual differences in imagery ability and imagery content
does not allow strong conclusions to be drawn. Processing style, however, has been found to
be an effective predictor variable and moderator in several studies. Two scales from the
marketing literature (e.g., SOP: Childers et al. 1985; V/V Index: Holbrook et al. 1984) exist and
were utilized in the dissertation research to assess an individual's style of processing. This
variable w as treated as a moderating variable between imagery-eliciting strategies and
consequence variables and between imagery-eliciting strategies and dimensions of imagery
processing.
Measurement attem pts to assess imagery processing were reviewed in the seventh
section. These efforts are summarized in Tables 2.5 and 2.6. Attempts in psychology have been
nothing more than manipulation checks. However, in marketing, several attem pts have been
made to develop scales to m easure the presence and elaboration of imagery processing. The
scale developed by Ellen and Bone (1991) w as reviewed in detail, and it is obvious that the
authors did not follow the paradigm set forth by Churchill (1979) for developing a better
measure. Thus, there is a clear need for rigorous and systematic scale development in this
area - a need the dissertation attempted to fulfill.

The eighth section reviewed studies from both the psychology and marketing literatures
that have exam ined aw areness a s a dependent variable (summarized in Tables 2.7 and 2.8). Of
specific interest in this section w ere those studies that have manipulated either pictures or
instructions to imagine a s one of th e independent variables in th e study since th e se two
imagery-eliciting strategies w ere manipulated in th e dissertation research. Several conclusions
can be drawn from th e review of studies manipulating presentation format. First, in general,
pictures are superior to w ords in facilitating aw areness (e.g., ail studies in Table 2.7 except
Milgram 1967 and R eese 1965). Second, Interactive pictures are m ore effective than both
noninteractive pictures or w ords in facilitating aw areness (e.g., Childers and Houston 1984;
Lippman and Shanahan 1973; Lutz and Lutz 1977). Third, the superiority of pictures over w ords
on aw areness diminishes a s exposure time d ecre ase s (e.g., G ardner and Houston 1986;
Houston et al. 1987; Paivio and C sapo 1969). Fourth, imagery ability m ay m oderate the pictorial
superiority effect (e.g., McKelvie and Demers 1979; Rohwer and Harris 1975). Finally, type of
processing influences the pictorial superiority effect (e.g., Childers and Houston 1984;
D'Agostino et al. 1977; Paivio and C sapo 1969). While there are exceptions (e.g., M ontague and
Carter 1973; Wittrock and Goldberg 1975; Wortman and Spading 1974), the main conclusion
that can be drawn from the review of studies manipulating instructions to imagine is that imagery
instructions facilitate aw areness (e.g., Anderson and Hidde 1971; Bower 1970; Bull and Wittrock
1973; Elliott 1973; Griffith and John sto n 1973; Kerst and Levin 1973; Kulhavy and Sw enson 1975;
Peterson and McGee 1974; Pressley 1976; Robbins et al. 1974; S heehan 1966; Slee 1978).
However, none of these studies represent marketing applications for no studies in marketing
have analyzed the relationship between instructions to imagine and aw areness. In general, then,
pictures or pictures in conjunction with words are better facilitators of aw areness, and imagery
instructions versus no or verbal instructions facilitate aw areness. However, the relative efficacy
of th e se two strategies has neither been examined in th e sam e study nor in an advertising
context.
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Beliefs have not been very widely studied in imagery studies, and those including them
a s dependent variables have all been in marketing (e.g., Dickson et al. 1986; Edell and Staelin
1983; Kisielius and Sternthal 1984; Mitchell 1986; Mitchell and Olson 1981). Since this variable
has not been studied very extensively with respect to imagery processing, it was included in the
dissertation a s an exploratory variable. While there is no theoretical or empirical grounding for
the influence of imagery-eliciting strategies and imagery processing on brand beliefs, it can be
speculated that the two imagery-eliciting strategies will result in differential beliefs about the
brand advertised. Furthermore, one imagery-eliciting strategy may result in a greater number of
beliefs as well as different brand belief strengths.
The ninth section reviewed studies investigating attitudes as dependent variables
(summarized in Tables 2.9 and 2.10). With the exception of Kisielius and Sternthal (1984),
studies manipulating pictures as an independent variable have generally found that pictures
result in more positive attitudes toward the brand or object (e.g., Dickson et al. 1986; Edell and
Staelin 1983; Gardner and Houston 1986; Holbrook and Moore 1981; Mitchell 1986; Mitchell and
Olson 1981; Rigney and Lutz 1976; Rossiter and Percy 1978, 1980) and the advertisement (e.g.,
Mitchell 1986; Mitchell and Olson 1981). While Gregory et al. (1982) did find more favorable
attitudes in the imagery-instructed group, studies in marketing have not found this effect (e.g.,
Dickson et al. 1986; Kisielius and Sternthal 1984; Wright and Rip 1980). However, these studies
suffer from several problems that may have influenced the results.
The final section reviewed behavioral intention as a dependent variable. While not many
imagery studies have included this variable, the results have been similar to those for attitudes.
Dickson et al. (1986), Edell and Staelin (1983), Kisielius and Sternthal (1984), Mitchell (1986), and
Mitchell and Olson (1981) have all manipulated pictures a s the independent variable and found
favorable results for behavioral intentions. Finally, Gregory et al. (1982) found that the imageryinstructed group exhibited greater behavioral intentions a s well a s greater actual behavior.

CHAPTER THREE
CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT AND METHODOLOGY

INTRODUCTION
This chapter provides an overview of the dissertation research, it specifies procedures that
w ere followed to develop the scale to assess imagery processing and the experiment conducted
to examine two imagery-eliciting strategies a s well as provide a test toward nomological validity
of the imagery processing construct. First, a conceptual framework is given in which
antecedent, moderating, processing, and consequence variables are illustrated. Second,
constructs given in the framework are conceptualized. Third, specific hypotheses that the
dissertation research tested are stated. While some hypotheses are well-supported in the
literature, others are tentative, for they are based on proposed dimensions of imagery
processing. Finally, the methodology outlining the experimental stimuli development, the
experimental design, the experimental procedure, and the measurement of variables is given.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
A general conceptual framework of the dissertation study is presented in Figure 3.1. It
follows the general stimulus-organism-response framework proffered by Maclnnis and Price
(1987), in which antecedent variables (the imagery-eliciting strategies, namely, pictures and
instructions to imagine), a moderating variable (processing style), processing (imagery
processing), and consequences (memory, beliefs, attitudes, and intentions) are specified.
Most studies reviewed in Chapter Two have not examined the processing that has taken
place. Thus, antecedents were manipulated and consequences were measured, and sometimes
moderating variables were examined, which is represented by Path c in the Framework. The
proposed framework opens up the "black box" by attempting to m easure imagery processing,
which involves analyzing Paths a and b in the Framework. Therefore, the framework serves two
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Figure 3.1
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE DISSERTATION RESEARCH

ANTECEDENTS

CONSEQUENCES

Pictures

Memory
PROCESSING

Instructions to
Imagine

Imagery

Beliefs
Brand Attitude
Ad Attitude
Behavioral
Intentions

MODERATOR
Style of
Processing

109

purposes. One is to provide a test toward nomological validity of the imagery processing scale,
and the other is to examine mediating effects of imagery processing on relationships between
independent and consequence variables.

CONCEPTUALIZATION OF CONSTRUCTS
Dimensions o f Imagery Processing
As pointed out by Ellen and Bone (1991), a need for a scale measuring communicationevoked imagery processing exists. This construct is a function of both an individual’s ability and
the stimulus. Therefore, the scales discussed in Chapter Two concerning individual differences
in imagery processing ability and preferences, which are trait scales, are inadequate for this
purpose (Maclnnis 1986). Furthermore, scales that have been developed in marketing to
m easure communication-evoked imagery processing are also inadequate, for the construct is
most likely a multi-dimensional construct (Ellen and Bone 1991).
The dimensions proposed and empirically explored by Ellen and Bone (1991) provide a
basis from which to develop an adequate imagery processing scale. As noted earlier, they
proposed five dimensions (vividness, quantity, ease, clarity, and links) but empirically found four
(vividness, paleness, quantity/ease, and links). However, a three-factor solution resulted in the
vividness and paleness dimensions loading on the sam e factor; indeed, examination of the items
making up these dimensions reveals that they are essentially polar opposites. Even though the
three-factor solution was significantly poorer than the four-factor solution, this result could have
been due to the scale development process adopted by the authors. Therefore, in an attempt to
provide a more rigorous scale development process, the dissertation proposed three dimensions
based on extant literature and Ellen and Bone’s (1991) attempt: quality, quantity, and
elaboration.
Quality. Though it has typically been conceptualized as vividness, quality has been
espoused as a major dimension of imagery (Betts 1909; Cartwright et al. 1978; Ellen and Bone

110
1991; Maclnnis and Price 1987; Marks 1973). Initially, Ellen and Bone treated vividness and
clarity a s separate dim ensions based on a discussion by Morris and Ham pson (1983), in which it
w as stated that they may be related dimensions, but sufficient empirical or theoretical support
for treating them a s the sam e dimension is lacking. However, they both tap th e quality of
imagery evoked; indeed, Morris and Hampson (1983) point out that vividness is an indicant of
quality. According to W ebster’s Dictionary, vividness is defined a s "producing a strong o r clear
impression on the senses," and clarity is defined a s "the quality or state of being clear."
(Webster’s Dictionary 1987). Therefore, treating vividness and clarity a s separate dim ensions
appears inappropriate, for a vivid image is necessarily a clear Image, also. Childers et al. (1985,
p. 126) also define vividness a s "the clarity of the mental image an individual evokes." Moreover,
they both loaded on one factor In Ellen and Bone's three-factor solution.

Thus, itap p ears that

vividness and clarity are related to one single dimension: quality.
In the dissertation, quality was defined as the vividness and clarity of a mental image.
Quality w as proposed as one dimension of communication-evoked imagery processing, and
indicants of quality relate to vividness and clarity of evoked images.
Quantity. A second dimension proposed in the imagery processing

scale w as quantity.

This dimension refers to the number of separate images evoked by a communication
irrespective of the quality of imagery. Thus, one individual may form few or several vivid images,
while another may form few or several im ages that are much less vivid. Therefore, aside from
qualitative differences in evoked imagery, there may also be quantitative differences (Ellen and
Bone 1991; McGill and Anand 1989; Smith et al. 1984). In the dissertation research, quantity
was defined as the number of discrete mental images generated. Therefore, an individual may
experience several or few different scenarios irrespective of quality and th e next proposed
dimension, elaboration. The quantity dimension w as operationalized by examining whether few
or several different scenarios were imaged.
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This dimension is similar to the quantity /e a se dimension found by Ellen and Bone. Though
initially proposed as two separate dimensions, it was found that both loaded on the same factor.
This result is not surprising, however, for if it is relatively easy to generate images from a
communication, it follows that more images may be formed.
This dimension may have an important impact on consequence variables, especially
memory. If several images are formed, regardless of the quality of the imagery, then several
retrieval paths may become available at the time of recall, thus increasing the probability that
information will be remembered.
Elaboration. While the previous two proposed dimensions tap the presence of mental
imagery, the third proposed dimension attempted to tap the elaboration of that imagery, which
was defined as the activation of stored information in the production of mental images. This is
similar to Ellen and Bone's links dimension. This dimension may be the most important in terms
of effects on attitudes, for it may result in self-generated persuasion (Maclnnis and Jaworski
1989). Not only is this an important dimension of imagery processing (Paivio 1986), but it is an
important dimension of information processing in general (Greenwald and Leavitt 1984; Maclnnis
and Jaworski 1989).
Degree of elaboration is similar to depth of processing (Craik and Lockhart 1972; Maclnnis
and Jaworski 1989; Paivio 1986). Maclnnis and Jaworski (1989) proposed six levels of
processing with representative operations of feature analysis, basic categorization, meaning
analysis, information integration, role-taking, and constructive processes. However, elaboration
appears to be related primarily to constructive processes. Thus, the levels of elaboration
proposed by Paivio (1986) appear to be more adequate for the way elaboration was defined in
the dissertation.
The levels identified by Paivio (1986, p. 86) are representational, referential, and associative,
and they vary according to the degree of cognitive elaboration. Representational refers to the
mere reproduction of a nonverbal stimulus in working memory. At this level, verbal stimuli do
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not generate imagery processing and nonverbal stimuli generate imagery processing similar to
eidetic imagery (which is similar to perception). Thus, even though imagery processing is taking
place (i.e., one can see a ‘picture in their mind"), it is a t a low level of elaboration. Referential
implies the generation of metal Imagery from verbal stimuli. Thus, words generate Images in
one’s mind. This involves a higher level of elaboration. Finally, associative involves the highest
level of elaboration in which representations in working memory generate further representations.
Thus, a mental image may trigger more images from one’s memory or one’s Imagination.

Antecedents
The dissertation study manipulated two of the four imagery-eliciting strategies discussed in
Chapter Two: pictures and instructions to imagine. As noted earlier, pictures can be concrete
or abstract and interactive or noninteractive in nature. Thus, the picture manipulation included
concrete/interactive, concrete/noninteractive, abstract, and no picture conditions. Instructions
to imagine were either present or absent from the m essage copy in the print advertisement.
A picture is defined a s "any two-dimensional representation in which the stimulus array
contains at least one element that is not alphabetic, numeric, or arithmetic" (Lutz and Lutz 1978,
p. 611). A concrete picture is one of a person, place, or object that is easily identifiable;
whereas, an abstract picture is one that is not easily identifiable (Rossiter and Percy 1983). For
example, an advertisement containing a realistic picture of a product is more concrete than one
that contains a silhouette. An interactive picture is one in which a person an d /o r objects are
figurally integrated in such a manner as to be associated in som e mutual or reciprocal actions,
such as a product in use. In contrast, a nonlnteractive picture depicts items side by side
(Alesandrini and Sheikh 1983). Thus, a noninteractive picture might simply depict a product, but
there would be no indication of the product in use.
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Consequences
Rossiter and Percy (1983) enumerate several important advertising communication effects:
awareness, beliefs, attitudes, intentions, and choice rules. Awareness (or memory) is the basic
and minimal communication response, and it allows prospective buyers to identify products or
brands to enable purchase. This effect varies on a continuum ranging from recognition to recall
(Rossiter and Percy 1983). While recognition involves 100 percent cue-target similarity, recall
involves varying degrees of similarity between cue and target responses. Awareness is an
important consequence variable in imagery research as evidenced by the large number of
studies reviewed in Chapter Two that have analyzed this construct as a consequence variable.
Three of the remaining four communication effects enumerated by Rossiter and Percy
(1983) were included a s consequence variables in the dissertation research. Not only are
beliefs, attitudes, and intentions Important advertising effects, but they have also been included
a s consequence variables in imagery research. While several studies reviewed in Chapter Two
have analyzed effects of imagery-eliciting strategies on attitudes and intentions, very few have
included brand beliefs.
Beliefs were included as a dependent variable primarily as an exploratory variable, for few
studies have examined relationships between imagery-eliciting strategies and product attribute
beliefs. Moreover, the few studies examining beliefs (e.g., Dickson et al. 1986; Edell and Staelin
1983; Mitchell 1986; Mitchell and Olson 1981) do not lend strong theoretical or empirical support
for any effect of an imagery-eliciting strategy on brand beliefs. Some differences, however, in
brand beliefs have been found, perhaps because imagery-eliciting strategies may encourage
cognitive elaboration, verbal and/or visual. Thus, beliefs were included a s a consequence
variable to examine (1) whether or not imagery-eliciting strategies influence beliefs and (2) if so,
whether or not imagery processing mediates these relationships. If imagery processing does
not, then som e other form of processing may mediate relationships between imagery-eliciting
strategies and beliefs. Since beliefs represent the cognitive component of attitudes, it was felt
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that examining them with respect to imagery-eliciting strategies would offer further insight into
the effects of imagery-eliciting strategies on attitudes.
While Mitchell (1986) did not find significant differences am ong salient beliefs when
manipulating pictures a s an independent variable, others have found differences. For example,
Mitchell and Olson (1981) found different belief strengths am ong 15 salient beliefs for ad s
containing a picture of a kitten, a sunset, an abstract painting, or no picture. The authors
concluded that the ad content had substantial multiple effects on product attribute beliefs.
However, no clear, concise statement can be made regarding pictures and beliefs. Edell and
Staelin (1983) also found that subjects exposed to ad s containing an unframed picture were
more likely to report attributes that were derived from the ad itself instead of ones they reported
a priori as being important. The framed ad and verbal-only condition subjects reported more a
priori important attributes.
The above studies, however, have not examined pictures and instructions to imagine, which
are the two imagery-eliciting strategies of interest in the dissertation research. Although Dickson
et al. (1986) examined the relationship between both pictures and instructions to imagine and
brand beliefs, the instructions to imagine manipulation failed to produce a significant effect on
any dependent variables, including beliefs, but for those beliefs that were affected by the picture
manipulation, beliefs were enhanced.

Moderator
Style of processing (or processing preference) is an individual difference variable that has
been examined in several studies, especially in marketing. Childers et al. (1985. p. 130)
conceptualize processing style "as a preference and propensity to engage in a verba! a n d /o r
visual modality of processing." Thus, while an individual may po ssess a strong imagery or
verbal ability, h e/sh e may be indifferent as to style of processing preferred, in contrast to
imagery ability, style of processing has received more support as being effective a s a predictor
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variable (e.g., Childers et al. 1985; Gould 1990; Holbrook et al. 1984; Oliver et al. 1989; Rossiter
and Percy 1978) and a s a moderating variable (Burns et al. 1991); indeed, Betts (1909) found
that most, If not all, individuals p o sse ss som e Imagery ability and can imagine w hen asked to do
so. Therefore, processing preference may be a superior differentiating individual difference
variable.
Consequently, style of processing w as included a s a m oderator betw een imagery-eliciting
strategies and co n seq u en ce variables (Path c in Figure 3.1) and betw een imagery-eliciting
strategies and dim ensions of imagery processing (Path a in Figure 3.1). Specific relationships
are discussed in the next section.

HYPOTHESES
In this section, specific hypotheses are offered. Som e are well-supported by previous
empirical studies, while others are based on conceptual theory, assum ptions, and logic.
H ypotheses are presented in the following order: relationships betw een imagery-eliciting
strategies and co n seq u en ces (Path c in Figure 3.1), relationships between imagery-eliciting
strategies and dim ensions of imagery processing (Path a in Figure 3.1), and relationships
betw een dim ensions of imagery processing and co n seq u en ces (Path b in Figure 3.1). The first
section concerning imagery-eliciting strategies and co n seq u en ces is basically consistent with
previous studies that have examined overall input and output variables. However, no previous
studies have examined the continuum of pictures examined in th e present experiment.
H ypotheses regarding effects of imagery-eliciting strategies on proposed dim ensions of imagery
processing are given in the second section. Finally, relationships between dim ensions of
imagery processing and co n sequence variables are given in th e last section.
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Imagery-Eliciting Strategies and Consequences
Hypotheses In this section are similar to those that have been studied previously and are
represented by Path c in Figure 3.1. Main effects of each manipulated imagery-eliciting strategy
are hypothesized, followed by contrasts of individual cells in the picture condition.
Consequence variables are memory, attitude toward the brand, attitude toward the
advertisement, behavioral intentions, and brand attribute beliefs.
Pictures versus No Pictures. Hypotheses in this section concern overall effects of pictures
in a print advertisement. Effects of pictures versus no pictures are addressed. The hypotheses
follow the picture superiority effect, which holds that visual Information tends to be remembered
over verbal information. Paivio's (1986) dual code theory posits that not only d o pictures
activate a visual encoding process, but they also activate a verbal encoding process. Moreover,
visual codes are thought to be qualitatively superior to verbal codes. Thus, two retrieval paths
can be activated at the time of recall, which increases recall.
The majority of research has concentrated on effects of pictures versus w ords on memory.
In term s of memory (or awareness), the dependent variable m ost widely studied has been recall,
but several researchers have found that pictures are more effective than no pictures in
recognition tasks (e.g., Holliday 1975; Rasco et al. 1975; Rohwer and Matz 1975; Shepard 1967;
Snowman and Cunningham 1975). For recall, however, overwhelming support for the relative
efficacy of pictures over no pictures can be found in both psychology (e.g., Booher 1975;
D’Agostino et al. 1977; Erderlyi and Becker 1974; Lesgold et al. 1975; Levin et al. 1973; Lippman
and Shanahan 1973; Nelson and Brooks 1973; Nelson et al. 1976; Paivio and C sapo 1969;
Rigney and Lutz 1976; Rohwer et al. 1967) and marketing (e.g., Childers and Houston 1984;
Edell and Staelin 1984; Gardner and Houston 1986; Lutz and Lutz 1977). These results are
consistent with Paivio’s dual code theory.
Although not as much attention has been given to attitudes and intentions a s dependent
variables, several studies do provide evidence for the relative efficacy of pictures over no
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pictures. For example, Rigney and Lutz (1976) reported more positive attitudes by students
receiving a graphic version of a com puter-assisted chemistry lesson versus a similar verbal
version. In an advertising context, it has been found that including pictures in a print
advertisem ent can lead to more favorable brand attitudes (e.g., Dickson et al. 1986; Edell and
Staelin 1983; Gardner and Houston 1986; Holbrook and Moore 1981; Mitchell 1986; Mitchell and
Olson 1981; Rossiter and Percy 1978,1980), attitudes toward th e advertisem ent (e.g., Mitchell
1986; Mitchell and Olson 1981), and greater behavioral intentions (e.g., Mitchell 1986). These
results can be explained through Kisielius and Sternthal’s (1984, 1986) Availability-Valence (A-V)
Hypothesis, which states that cognitive elaboration may lead to less favorable attitudes. Kisielius
and Sternthal (1986) hypothesize that greater cognitive elaboration may lead to less favorable
attitudes because individuals may be elaborating with idiosyncratic information unrelated to the
m essage, which is more likely to be less favorable toward the advocacy than are m essage
associations. Thus, pictures may lead to more positive attitudes than no pictures, but only if the
valence of the available information is more favorable than the advocacy in the no picture
condition. Based on Paivlo's dual code theory and Kisielius and Sternthal’s A-V Hypothesis, the
following five hypotheses were tested:
H I:

As com pared to not including a picture in an advertisement, including a picture will
result in:
a. greater memory of ad information
b. stronger brand beliefs
c. more positive brand attitudes
d. more positive attitudes toward the advertisement
e. greater behavioral intentions

Thus, print a d s containing pictures versus those not containing pictures will result in greater
recall of brand information, stronger brand beliefs, more positive attitudes toward the ad and
brand, and greater behavioral intentions to purchase the product.
Comparisons o f Picture Conditions. The preceding hypotheses concern overall effects of
pictures versus no pictures on consequence variables. Effects of different picture conditions,
however, can b e further analyzed. Based on the review by Paivio (1969) and the study by Paivio
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and C sapo (1969), concrete pictures have been shown to be more effective than abstract
pictures, particularly for recall, which is consistent with the dual co d e hypothesis since an
abstract picture may be less likely than a concrete picture to activate both a visual and verbal
encoding p rocess b ecau se an abstract picture is less recognizable. Since an abstract picture
m ay be less likely to activate a verbal a s well a s a visual encoding process, th e opportunity for
tw o retrieval p ath s being activated is less than for concrete pictures, thus leading to poorer
recall. With resp ect to attitudes, abstract pictures will probably result in greater cognitive
elaboration with idiosyncratic information b ecau se respondents will not p o sse ss a s com plete of
a knowledge network w hen com pared to th o se given concrete pictures. Thus, abstract pictures
will result in less positive attitudes than concrete pictures b ecau se the valence of elaborated
information is likely to be less positive than for concrete pictures (Kisielius and Sternthal 1986).
The interactive nature of the picture is another important distinction. In term s of recall,
H ouston et al. (1987), Lippman and Shanahan (1973), Lutz and Lutz (1977), and R eese (1975)
found that interactive pictures were more effective than noninteractive pictures. T hese results
could be considered consistent with Paivio’s dual co d e theory b ecau se a m ore com plete
network may be activated from a concrete/interactive picture, which may lead to m ore verbal as
well a s visual representations. With respect to attitudes, concrete/noninteractive pictures may
generate m ore negatively-valenced cognitive elaboration than that generated from
concrete/interactive pictures b ecau se a concrete/interactive picture is congruent with a
com plete knowledge network, and a concrete/noninteractive picture is not. Thus, it is expected
that concrete/interactive pictures will result in m ore positive attitudes than
concrete/noninteractive pictures. Therefore, picture conditions of concrete/interactive,
concrete/noninteractive, abstract, and no picture fall on a continuum from least to most
negatively-valenced cognitive elaboration, respectively.
Based on the above discussion regarding concreteness and interactiveness of a picture,
the following hypotheses w ere tested:
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H2:

Greater
a.
b.
c.

memory for ad information will result when an advertisem ent contains:
a concrete/interactive picture versus a concrete/noninteractive picture
a concrete/interactive picture versus an abstract picture
a concrete/noninteractive picture versus an abstract picture

H3:

Stronger brand beliefs will result when an advertisem ent contains:
a. a concrete/interactive picture versus a concrete/noninteractive picture
b. a concrete/interactive picture versus an abstract picture
c. a concrete/noninteractive picture versus an ab stract picture

H4:

More positive brand attitudes will result when an advertisem ent contains:
a. a concrete/interactive picture versus a concrete/noninteractive picture
b. a concrete/interactive picture versus an abstract picture
c. a concrete/noninteractive picture versus an abstract picture

H5:

More positive attitudes toward the advertisem ent will result when an
advertisem ent contains:
a. a concrete/interactive picture versus a concrete/noninteractive picture
b. a concrete/interactive picture versus an abstract picture
c. a concrete/noninteractive picture versus an abstract picture

H6:

Greater
a.
b.
c.

behavioral intentions wili result when an advertisem ent contains:
a concrete/interactive picture versus a concrete/noninteractive picture
a concrete/interactive picture versus an abstract picture
a concrete/noninteractive picture versus an abstract picture

In other words, it is hypothesized that concrete/interactive pictures included in a print ad
will result in the greatest memory, the strongest brand beliefs, th e m ost positive attitudes, and
the greatest behavioral intentions followed by the concrete/noninteractive picture and abstract
picture conditions. Abstract pictures, on the other hand, should result in the poorest memory,
the w eakest brand beliefs, the least positive attitudes, and the lowest behavioral intentions. The
concrete/noninteractive picture condition, then, will fail between the other two conditions in
term s of memory, beliefs, attitudes, and intentions.
Instructions to Imagine. Conceptually, including instructions to imagine results in the
activation of the sensory a s well a s th e verbal co d e (Paivio 1986). Thus, instructions to imagine
should encourage m ore retrieval paths, which aids memory. While the majority of studies
examining the relative efficacy of instructions to imagine a s an imagery-eliciting strategy have
manipulated this variable externally from m essage stimuli, the dissertation research examined
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instructions to imagine as part of m essage stimuli since this is more realistic for advertisements,
particularly print advertisements. With the exception of Bull and Wittrock (1973), who studied
recognition as a dependent variable, the majority of studies examining instructions to imagine
have analyzed recall as the dependent variable, and all of these studies have been in the
psychology literature. Providing individuals with instructions to imagine, such a s instructions to
use mental imagery to aid memory, has resulted in greater recall than providing them with some
type of verbal instructions, such as instructions to use repetition to aid memory (e.g., Anderson
and Hidde 1971; Bower 1970; Elliott 1973; Griffith and Johnston 1973; Peterson and McGee
1974; Robbins et al. 1974; Sheehan 1966; Slee 1978) or no instructions at all (e.g., Kerst and
Levin 1973; Kulhavy and Swenson 1975; Pressley 1976).
Kisielius and Sternthal (1986) also explain the effect of instructions to imagine on attitudes
with the A-V Hypothesis. No instructions could lead to less positively-valenced cognitive
elaboration, which could result in less positive attitudes. Results of studies examining attitudes
have been more equivocal, however. Wright and Rip (1980) embedded instructions to imagine
in a m essage stimulus, but they were unable to find a significant effect on attitude from the
group not receiving instructions to imagine in the message. However, their manipulations were
fairly weak, and they also studied a product that could have been too unfamiliar to the subjects,
possibly precluding imagery processing. Kisielius and Sternthal (1984), and a follow-up study by
Dickson et al. (1986), were unable to find an effect for instructions to imagine. However, the
instructions to imagine were included in the experimental instructions, not the message stimulus,
and there is no way of determining whether or not subjects actually read the instructions
because no manipulation check was reported. Bone and Ellen (1990) used six high imagery ads
with instructions to imagine embedded within each and one no instruction, low imagery control
ad, and they found significant differences on the effect of attitudes toward the brand and ad as
well as for behavioral intentions. Gregory et al. (1982) embedded instructions to imagine within
a m essage that was delivered verbally to respondents and found more positive attitudes and
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greater intentions with respect to cable television. Moreover, subjects in the instructions to
imagine condition also exhibited greater actual subscription rates to cable TV than those not
receiving instructions to imagine. Gregory et al.’s (1982) study is consistent with the A-V
Hypothesis, and the dissertation research attempted to extend the study of effects of including
instructions to imagine in printed stimuli rather than verbal stimuli.
Based on Paivio’s dual code theory and Kisielius and Sternthal’s A-V Hypothesis, the
following hypotheses were tested:

H7:

As com pared to not including instructions to imagine in an advertisement, including
them will result in:
a. greater memory of ad information
b. stronger brand beliefs
c. more positive brand attitudes
d. more positive attitudes toward the advertisement
e. greater behavioral intentions

Moderating Variable. Although no formal theory considers the moderating role of an
individual’s style of processing on the above hypothesized relationships, logically it would seem
that a presentation format that is congruent with one’s processing style would result in enhanced
effects (Holbrook et al. 1984). A few studies lend support for including an individual difference
variable a s a moderator between imagery-eliciting strategies and consequence variables. It has
been found that vivid imagers or high visualizers tend to report better recall of experimental
stimuli (Marks 1973; McKelvie and Demers 1979; Sheehan 1966). However, these studies have
examined individual differences in imagery ability, not individual differences in processing
preferences.
Others, however, have found that individual differences in processing preferences have an
effect on

the dependent variables of interest in the dissertation. Childers et af.(1985) found that

verbally-oriented processors exhibited better recall of advertisements. Rossiter and Percy (1978)
showed greater attitudes toward the brand for visualizers over verbalizers. Oliver et al. (1989)
also found that an analyzing orientation decreased attitude toward the brand and behavioral
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Intentions, while an imaging orientation enhanced them. Burns et al. (1991) found that the
relationship between the independent variables of concreteness of wording and brand familiarity
and attitude toward the ad were moderated by an individual's style of processing.
While Burns et al. (1991) was the only study to examine style of processing a s a
moderating variable, it was hypothesized In the dissertation research that this individual
difference variable should influence the hypothesized relationships between imagery-eliciting
strategies and consequence variables. Thus, the following hypothesis w as tested:
H8:

Relationships given in Hypotheses 1a through 7e will be stronger a s individuals prefer
a visual style of processing.

Specifically, it was expected that a higher preference for a visual style of processing will result in
more positive relationships hypothesized in Hypotheses 1-7. Thus, the relationships will still be
a s hypothesized, but they will be greater for individuals exhibiting higher preferences for a visual
mode of processing. Style of processing was measured with the Style of Processing
Questionnaire (SOP: Childers et al. 1985), which is a continuous variable. In the spirit of the
original intent of the scale, processing preference was treated as a unidimensional construct in
which a high score represents a visual preference, and a low score represents a non-visual
preference.

Imagery-Eliciting Strategies and Imagery Processing
Since there is a dearth of literature in the area of imagery processing per se, the
hypotheses put forth in this section were exploratory and tentative in nature. As little theoretical
or empirical support exists for these hypotheses, logic played a prominent role.
A convenient framework for assessing anticipated effects of various pictures is provided in
Table 3.1. Pictures may be assessed with respect to: (1) cues; (2) cognitive effort; and (3)
encouragement. Cues refer to what is provided in the stimulus. Cognitive effort refers to how
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Table 3.1
ATTRIBUTES OF PICTURES
=3

-

Cue"

Cognitive
Effortb

Encouragement"

Picture vs. No Picture

Strong

Weak

Strong

Concrete vs. Abstract

Strong

Weak

Weak

Interactive vs. Noninteractive

Strong

Weak

Strong

Picture

"Relates to quality of Imagery processing: strong Implies higher quality of imagery processing
and weak implies lower quality of imagery processing.
bRelates to elaboration of imagery processing: strong implies greater elaboration of imagery
processing and weak implies less elaboration of imagery processing.
"Relates to quantity of imagery processing: strong implies greater quantity of imagery
processing and weak implies smaller quantity of imagery processing.
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much effort is necessary for an individual to form a mental image from the stimulus. Finally,
encouragement is an attribute of the stimulus that refers to how much it invites or evokes mental
imagery to take place. How these attributes relate to the dimensions of imagery processing is
discussed next.
First, the quality of the imagery evoked can be a function of cues provided by the stimulus.
For example, a stimulus that provides a strong cue such a s a clear picture should result in an
image of much higher quality than one that provides only a vague cue or no cue at all. Second,
elaboration is a function of the cognitive effort necessary. For example, a clear picture requires
little cognitive effort to form a mental image since one is already provided. Thus, little
elaboration may take place. Finally, a stimulus may also encourage the formation of mental
images, thus resulting in the possibility of a greater number of images. For example, one type
of picture, such a s an abstract picture, may encourage the formation of several images because
a sufficient image is not readily available from the stimulus, which another type of picture, such
a s a concrete picture, may actually stifle the number of images evoked because one is already
provided. In summary, the quality dimension is related to the cue provided, the elaboration
dimension is related to the cognitive effort implied by the stimulus, and the quantity dimension Is
related to the encouragement provided by the stimulus to form mental images. These stimulusbased attributes of cue, cognitive effort, and encouragement and their relationships with pictures
of interest are summarized in Table 3.1. Specific hypotheses regarding the relationships
between types of pictures and dimensions of imagery processing were then derived from this
table.
Pictures and Imagery Processing, The first set of hypotheses concerns the relationship of
including pictures versus not including pictures in a print advertisement in general. Then the
relationship of including concrete versus abstract pictures is addressed. Finally, interactive
versus noninteractive pictures are discussed.
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!n general, including a picture in a print advertisement is more likely to result in imagery
taking place than not including a picture. However, even though a picture is not present,
imagery processing may stili take place. In terms of the quality of that imagery, providing a
picture is a much stronger cue than not providing a picture. Thus, the ad with a picture should
result in higher quality mental imagery. In term s of cognitive effort, however, a provided picture
is a ready-made image for the viewer. Thus, the cognitive effort required or implied by the
stimulus is much lower than if a picture Is not provided. Thus, if an image is formed, the no
picture condition should result in greater elaboration. Finally, the encouragem ent provided by
the stimulus to form mental images is stronger for an ad that contains a picture over one that
does not; indeed, even if only one image is formed in the picture condition, that is greater than
the possibility of no image formation in the no picture condition. These relationships were
examined through the following hypotheses:
H9:

As com pared to not including a picture in an advertisement, including a picture will
result in:
a. higher quality of imagery processing
b. less elaboration of imagery processing
c. greater quantity of imagery processing

Concrete and abstract pictures both encourage imagery processing, but they may
differentially affect the dimensions of imagery processing. For example, a concrete picture
provides a more recognizable, and thus, stronger, cue than an abstract picture. Therefore, a
concrete picture may result in higher quality imagery processing than an abstract picture. On
the other hand, however, a concrete picture is weaker in term s of cognitive effort required to
form an image and encouragem ent to form several images. Thus, Image formation from an
abstract picture may require more cognitive effort. Similarly, an abstract picture may encourage
more images to be formed because a sufficient image is not provided by the stimulus a s it is for
a concrete picture, in sum, the following hypotheses were tested:
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H10: As com pared to Including an abstract picture in an advertisement, including a
concrete picture will result in:
a. higher quality of imagery processing
b. less elaboration of imagery processing
c. smaller quantity of imagery processing

Compared to noninteractive pictures, interactive pictures provide strong cues, but they
require less cognitive effort and may stifle further images. Providing an interactive picture, then,
may result in a lower level of elaboration of imagery processing than providing a noninteractive
picture because a degree of elaboration is already provided by the stimulus. The formation of
more images may be encouraged because of the active nature of the stimulus. Thus, the
following hypotheses were tested:
H11: As com pared to including a concrete/noninteractive picture in an advertisement,
including a concrete/interactive picture will result in:
a. higher quality of imagery processing
b. less elaboration of imagery processing
c. greater quantity of imagery processing
Instructions to Imagine and Imagery Processing. Instructions to imagine provide a
command to form a mental image. Thus, when com pared to not including instructions,
Including instructions to imagine should result in imagery processing that is higher in quality,
greater in elaboration, and greater in quantity. Quality may be enhanced because the command
provides direction on what and how to imagine. Instructions to imagine encourage the
formation of at least one image, which is greater than expected in the no instruction condition.
Finally, since instructions to imagine do not provide a ready-made image, elaboration of imagery
processing may be enhanced. Therefore, the following hypotheses were tested:
H12: As com pared to not including instructions to imagine in an advertisement, including
them will result in:
a. higher quality of imagery processing
b. greater elaboration of imagery processing
c. greater quantity of imagery processing
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Moderating Variable. Similar to the hypotheses regarding imagery-eliciting strategies and
consequence variables, it was expected that style of processing would moderate the
relationships proposed by the main effects. Thus, the following hypothesis was tested:

H13: Relationships given in Hypotheses 9a through 12c will be stronger as individuals
prefer a visual style of processing.

Imagery Processing and Consequences
The following sets of hypotheses concern relationships am ong dimensions of Imagery
processing and consequence variables, which is denoted by Path b in Figure 3.1. The rationale
for these hypotheses is based on the theoretical standpoint that imagery processing in general
results in greater memory and attitudes (Paivio 1986) as well as the empirical findings that were
discussed for relationships am ong independent variables and consequences. Thus, all
hypothesized relationships between dimensions of imagery processing and consequence
variables are positive:
H14: Quality of imagery processing is positively related to:
a. memory of ad information
b. brand beliefs
c. brand attitudes
d. attitudes toward the advertisement
e. behavioral intentions
H15: Elaboration of imagery processing is positively related to:
a. memory of ad information
b. brand beliefs
c. brand attitudes
d. attitudes toward the advertisement
e. behavioral intentions
H16: Quantity
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

of imagery processing is positively related to:
memory of ad information
brand beliefs
brand attitudes
attitudes toward the advertisement
behavioral intentions
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Mediating Effect o f Imagery Processing
The last hypothesis concerns the medlational function of imagery processing. According to
Baron and Kenny (1986, p. 1176), "a given variable may be said to function a s a mediator to the
extent that it accounts for the relation between the predictor and the criterions. Mediators
explain how external physical events take on internal psychological significance."
Thus, the following hypothesis was tested:

H17: Relationships given in Hypotheses 1a through 7e are mediated by the dimensions of
imagery processing in the directions specified in Hypotheses 14a through 16e,
respectively.
How this and the preceding hypotheses were tested is given in the Methodology section of this
chapter.

METHODOLOGY
This section details how the dissertation research was carried out. First, criteria that were
used to determine the experimental product and the procedure that was followed in developing
the experimental advertisements are outlined. Second, the experimental design is given. Third,
the experimental sample and sample size that was used is discussed. Fourth, an outline of the
experimental procedure is provided. Fifth, manipulation checks that were performed during the
final data collection are given. Finally, measurement of variables is discussed, with specific
details given concerning how the imagery processing scale was developed, evaluated, and
refined.

Experimental Stimuli Development
Product. Since the study used undergraduate students a s subjects, it was imperative that a
relevant experimental product be chosen. Use of undergraduate students a s opposed to "real
world" consum ers is acceptable because the dissertation research was concerned with a mental

process instead of practical applications, and thus a hom ogeneous sample would be more
appropriate to test the proposed hypotheses (Calder, Phillips, and Tybout 1981). Two criteria
w ere utilized when determining the experimental product through the use of focus groups and
pretesting. First, the product had to be one with which college students are familiar. For
example, Wright and Rip (1980) used colleges a s products to be evaluated by high school
sophom ores, and Oliver et al. (1989) used a high-tech com puter printer to be evaluated by
college undergraduates. Both of these studies may have failed to find results because subjects
may have been unfamiliar with the products studied, possibly precluding imagery processing.
Indeed, Maclnnis and Price (1987) point out that one must possess adequate knowledge
structures regarding a stimulus to be able to form images. Second, the product had to be one
that is reasonable for imagery processing to occur. For example, Oliver et al. (1989) may have
failed to find results also because the product used, a color com puter printer, is more functional
than experiential in nature, and it may be easier to imagine a product that is more experiential
than functional in nature.
With the above criteria in mind, it was decided that automobiles are products with which
college students are familiar, and they can be considered to satisfy more than purely functional
needs. Park, Jaworski, and Maclnnis (1986) differentiate functional, symbolic, and experiential
needs. Functional needs simply satisfy a consumption problem, which would be transportation
with respect to automobiles, Symbolic and experiential needs may also satisfy a functional
problem, but they may also satisfy ego-enhancement problems and desires for sensory pleasure
or variety-seeking, respectively. Thus, it was felt that a product that can satisfy functional,
symbolic, and experiential needs would be more likely to stimulate imagery processing than one
that merely satisfied functional needs. Data collected in a pretest during the 1991 Spring
sem ester at Louisiana State University confirmed this belief. Sixty-five respondents were given
an advertisement with copy similar to the advertisement used in the final experiment and were
asked som e questions. (The questionnaire can be found in Appendix A.) When asked if they
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had a car to use, 98.5% responded "yes," and 1.5% responded "no." Of the 98.5% who had a
car to use, 71.9% said that they owned the car, 21.9% said that their parents owned the car, and
6.2% responded that som ebody else beside them selves or their parents ow ned the car (e.g.,
girlfriend). Over 50% of the pretest respondents indicated that they w ere likely to purchase a
new car within th e next two years, and over 70% within th e next three years. Finally, for further
support that th e experimental product w as relevant to undergraduate students, respondents in
the pretest com pleted Zalchowsky's (1985) 20-item involvement scale with respect to
automobiles. Summed sco res on this scale have a possible range of 20 to 140, and the actual
range in th e pretest w as 105 to 140 with the m ean equal to 126. A small range and high mean
on the involvement scale, along with use and intent to purchase statistics, provides support for
the claim that autom obiles are relevant for undergraduate students for th e product to be used a s
the experimental stimulus.
The pretest data also provided support for the contention that college students d o not view
autom obiles a s purely functional products. That is, autom obiles may also satisfy symbolic and
experiential needs, which may encourage more imagery processing. Four 5-point Likert items
w ere used to investigate whether or not autom obiles were considered to serve purely functional
purposes (e.g., "Cars are for transportation only"). The five items w ere sum m ed giving a
possible range of 5 to 25, with a low score indicating merely a functional need being satisfied.
The actual range w as 15 to 25 with the m ean equal to 22, thus providing evidence that college
students d o not perceive autom obiles a s serving a purely functional purpose.
Since the purpose of the experiment w as to examine effects of imagery manipulations on
consequen ce variables such a s attitudes, a fictitious automobile nam e w as used to eliminate the
possibility of prior attitudes. In contrast to the first criterion of respondents possessing ad eq u ate
knowledge structures for the product class (i.e., automobiles), it w as desired to have a brand
that w as unfamiliar to respondents to avoid confounding effects of prior brand attitudes. Thus,
while respondents may have been unfamiliar with the actual model of automobile, sufficient
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knowledge concerning automobiles in general was present. In the pretest questionnaire,
respondents were given a list of 16 real and fictitious automobile models and were asked to rate
how familiar they were with each brand name (1 = not familiar at all to 5 = extremely familiar). The
name "Concept" was of interest, which had a mean of 1.31 and standard deviation of 0.789.
Models, such a s Mustang (M=4.23, SD=1.01), that one would expect respondents to be familiar
with did have higher ratings. As a result, the name "Concept" was used in the experimental
stimuli.
Advertisement. Pretest respondents also provided insight into the development of the
experimental advertisements. First, to determine the type of picture that would be appropriate
for the concrete/interactive picture condition, respondents were asked to describe an
appropriate picture for the advertisement (i.e., the pretest advertisement that only contained
copy, given in Appendix A). A majority of respondents indicated that a car being driven down a
curving road would be appropriate. Second, respondents were also asked what model car they
might realistically purchase next. Out of the 65 responses, fewer than 7 were American
automobiles, while most of the responses were automobiles made by Japanese manufacturers,
such as Acura, Honda, Nissan, and Toyota. Thus, a "generic" Japanese import was used in the
experimental stimuli.
The final experiment consisted of eight experimental advertisements (given in Appendix B).
The concrete/interactive picture condition consisted of a car being driven down a curving road.
The concrete/noninteractive picture condition included an identical picture of the car used in the
concrete/interactive picture condition without the background. The picture of the car was
simply cut out of the background and placed at the sam e angle a s the car pictured in the
concrete/interactive condition. The abstract picture condition was patterned after an actual
magazine advertisement in which close-up parts of the car were pictured in three separate
panels. Participants in a focus group indicated that the magazine advertisement was abstract,
and the picture was not very easily identifiable as a picture of a car. The abstract stimulus was
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developed by enlarging the sam e picture of the car used in the two concrete picture conditions
and cutting out pieces of it for each of the three panels. Thus, the three picture conditions used
the sam e car for each. The final picture condition, no picture at all, simply left the sp ace blank
except for the sentence, “The finished a d will have a picture here."
Copy for the experimental advertisem ents was identical for all cells except for the
instructions to imagine. The copy included the nam e of the car (The 1993 Concept) and seven
pieces of information concerning the car: sport bucket seats; 128 horsepow er engine;
aerodynam ic design; performance-engineered suspension; available in 2-door coupe and 4-door
sedan; 24 city/30 highway estimated mpg; and 1-800-CONCEPT, The difference between the
instructions to imagine condition and the no instruction condition w as five statem ents placed
throughout the copy: "Imagine the Concept in your mind...," "Imagine it...," "Hear it...," "Picture
it...," and “Feel it..." Rationale for this w as based on a study by Mowen (cited in Maclnnis and
Price 1987), in which Maclnnis and Price noted that the possible reason for no effects of
instructions to imagine could have been due to too many "imagine yourself' statem ents in the
copy, which do not appeal to specific senses. Also, care w as taken to not make the copy,
particularly the instructions to imagine condition, self-relevant since others have shown that selfrel'atedness of the imagery is more effective (Anderson 1983). This w as done by ensuring that
the instructions to imagine condition did not instruct respondents to imagine themselves in the
Concept, but rather, to imagine the Concept. Thus, respondents in the Instructions condition
were not given self-relevant instructions, which was consistent with the no instruction condition.
Manipulation Checks Performed During Stimuli Development Stage. Prior to the final
experimental data collection, individual interviews were conducted with five judges (e.g.,
business faculty, staff, and undergraduate students at USM) to check for picture interactiveness,
picture concreteness, whether or not they could recognize the specific model of the car in the
advertisement, and the presence or absence of instructions to imagine in the stimulus
advertisements.

133
Picture Interactiveness. To check for the interactiveness of the concrete pictures, each
judge was shown the advertisement with the concrete/interactive picture (i.e., product in use), or
the ad containing the picture of a car being driven down a road, and the ad with the picture of a
car only (i.e., product not in use), and asked whether or not h e/sh e thought the car was moving
(i.e., in use). Each judge stated that the ad with the picture of the car on the road was
"probabiy moving," and each judge stated that the ad with the car only was "probably not
moving," implying that the interactive picture condition was of a car In use while the
noninteractive picture condition was not.
Picture Concreteness. Next, the five judges were asked to order the advertisements with
the concrete/interactive picture, the concrete/noninteractive picture, and the abstract picture,
from most easily recognizable as a picture of a car to least easily recognizable a s a picture of a
car. Three of the five judges ranked them in the order of concrete/interactive,
concrete/noninteractive, and abstract, while the remaining two judges reversed the
concrete/interactive and the concrete/noninteractive pictures. Since the concern with the
manipulation was whether or not the concrete picture (i.e., interactive or noninteractive) was
more easily recognizable as a picture of a car than the abstract picture, this manipulation was
judged to be successful.
Instructions to Imagine. Each judge was given all eight advertisements and asked to
identify those he/sh e felt contained instructions to imagine and those they felt did not by placing
the ads in two separate piles - one with instructions and one without instructions. In all cases,
the judges correctly classified the advertisements, which indicates that the instructions to
imagine were readily apparent upon inspection.
Identity o f the Car. Finally, each judge was asked if h e/sh e knew the specific model of
automobile that was pictured in the advertisement because at this stage, an advertisement for a
Toyota MR2 was reproduced as it originally appeared, but the name and Toyota emblem was
disguised. Two of the five judges correctly said that the car was a Toyota MR2. As a result, the
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advertisem ents were revised to disguise the automobile by eliminating the spoiler and covering
up a vent on the side of the car, which were features the two judges said they used to identify
the car.
Checks o f the Revised Advertisements. The revised advertisements were then subjected to
all of the manipulation checks and procedures described above with five new judges (i.e.,
business faculty, staff, and undergraduate students). Every manipulation check w as judged to
be successful, and none of the judges could identify the specific model of automobile pictured in
the advertisements, not even a Toyota MR2 owner. Thus, it w as judged that the advertising
stimuli successfully manipulated the independent variables of concrete/interactive picture,
concrete/noninteractive picture, abstract picture, no picture, and instructions/no instructions to
imagine prior to final data collection. An example of the advertisement containing a
concrete/interactive picture and instructions to imagine is given in Figure 3.2.

Experimental Design
The experiment consisted of a 4 (pictures) X 2 (instructions to imagine) factorial between
subjects design. Pictures were broken down into concrete/interactive pictures,
concrete/noninteractive pictures, abstract pictures, and no pictures. Instructions to imagine
were either present in the advertising copy or absent from it. A diagram in which each
experimental cell is labeled is given in Figure 3.3.
Other variables included in the experiment were a moderating variable, consequence
variables, and mediating variables. An individual’s style of processing represented the
moderating variable. C onsequence variables included brand attribute beliefs, attitude toward the
advertisement, attitude toward the brand, behavioral intentions, and memory of ad Information.
The mediating variable was assessed through the dimensions of imagery processing.
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Figure 3.2

EXAMPLE ADVERTISEMENT: CONCRETE/INTERACTIVE PICTURE
WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO IMAGINE

THE 1993 CONCEPT
Imagine the Concept In your mind...
A car that fits your im age. O ne that's fun to
drive and to b e se e n in.
Im agine ft...
The Concept h as co n to u red sport bucket seats.
H ear it...
The engine fires u p and th e 128 horsepower
engine quivers.

Picture it..
The sporty, aerodynamic design cuts through
the wind like no other car in its class.

Peel ft..
The performance-engineered suspension glides
a cro ss the rolling planes or attacks curves and
climbs hills.

Available in 2-door co u p s and 4-d o o r sadan.
24 biy/30 highway •stm a to d mpg.
C&U 1-soO-CONCEPTIor a brochure and location ol your nearest dealer.

136
Figure 3.3
EXPERIMENTAL TREATMENTS

PICTURES
INSTRUCTIONS

Concrete/
Interactive

Concrete/
Noninteractive

Abstract

None

Instructions

1

2

3

4

No
Instructions

5

6

7

8

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

CONSEQUENCE VARIABLES

Pictures
1. Concrete/Interactive
2. Concrete/Noninteractive
3. Abstract
4. No Picture

Memory

Instructions to Imagine
1. Instructions Present
2. Instructions Absent

Attitude Toward the Ad

MODERATOR

MEDIATOR

Style of Processing

Imagery Processing
1. Quality
2. Quantity
3. Elaboration

Beliefs
Brand Attitude

Behavioral Intentions
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Subjects and Final Experiment Sample
Subjects in the final experiment were 273 undergraduate students enrolled in several large
sections of a Principles of Marketing course at the University of Southern Mississippi. A total of
22 subjects w as eliminated from analyses due to unusable questionnaires (8), subjects correctly
guessing the purpose of the study (6), subjects rating the advertisement a s "not believable at air
(2), or subjects identifying the car used in the advertisement (6). Thus, the final sample size for
the experiment w as 251: 34 for cell 1, 31 for cell 2, 30 for cell 3, 33 for cell 4, 31 for cell 5, 31
for cell 6, 31 for cell 7, and 30 for cell 8. The breakdown of the sample by class was: 0.8%
sophom ores, 61.9% juniors, 37.8% seniors, and 0.4% graduate students. Fifty-four percent of
the sample were male and forty-six percent were female.

Experimental Procedure
The final experiment was conducted in classroom settings in which each subject randomly
received an envelope with a full-page black and white advertisement enclosed in a plastic cover
and a questionnaire. Five dollars per section (3 five dollar prizes in large sections) were raffled
to motivate student participation. Students who did not want to participate in the study were
allowed to leave. Respondents were informed that the experimenter w as working with an
automobile manufacturer in developing a program targeted to college seniors. They were told
that the program w as a special financing program that would enable students to purchase a car
in their senior year, but this phase of the study was examining different ideas for advertisements
that would be included in a direct mail program directed at target audiences such as
themselves. They were instructed that the experimenter will ask them to remove the
advertisement from the envelope and to examine it for a few minutes until they were instructed
to replace it in the envelope. Respondents were also reminded that the ad s were merely in the
concept stag e and to keep in mind that the final advertisements will be full-color, glossy
advertisements such as those found in magazines. Furthermore, they were asked to examine

138

only their ad, since other students may have a different one. Monitoring the behavior of
respondents by the author and a graduate assistant revealed no problem s with respondents
looking at other respondents' ads.
Respondents examined the ad s for 1 1/2 minutes, which w as determ ined in the pretest to
be a sufficient am ount of time for the entire group to becom e familiar with th e advertisement.
After that time, respondents were instructed to put the a d s back Into th e envelope and to take
out the questionnaire. Thus, the problem of looking back at th e advertisem ent w as eliminated,
which w as important for th e memory protocol. (The questionnaire for the respondents that had
a picture in their advertisem ent is given in Appendix C, and th e questionnaire given to
respondents that were in the no picture condition is given in Appendix D.) R espondents were
allowed to com plete the questionnaire at their own pace. The first page of the questionnaire
consisted of the memory protocol. Next, the 23 imagery items followed. Attitude toward the
advertisement, attitude toward the car, intentions, beliefs, style of processing (SOP and V/V
Index), manipulation checks, and dem ographic variables were a sse sse d in that order.
Completion of the task by the entire group in each d ata collection w as done within thirty
minutes.

Manipulation Checks During Experimental Data Collection
Manipulation checks were also performed during the experimental d ata collection. As
during the stimuli developm ent stage, questions were included on th e questionnaire to check for
interactiveness of concrete pictures, concreteness of pictures, and presence or ab sen ce of
instructions to imagine. Additionally, respondents were asked how familiar they w ere with the
car advertised, how believable they thought the advertisem ent was, if they thought the car
advertised w as like one they have seen before, and if so, which one, and w hat they thought w as
the purpose of the study.
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Purpose o f the Study. The final question regarding the purpose of the study was screened
prior to any data being entered because correct guessing of the purpose of the study (i.e., trying
to manipulate imagery with pictures and words) would preclude that respondent from any data
analysis. It was felt that if a respondent was aware that the experiment was being conducted to
manipulate and then measure imagery processing, demand effects would result. Six of the
original 273 respondents correctly guessed the purpose and were thus discarded.
Picture Concreteness. Respondents that received advertisements with pictures (i.e., all
except those in cells 4 and 8) were asked, "When you first looked at the picture in the ad, how
easy was it to recognize it as a picture of a car?" (1 = extremely difficult to 7 = extremely easy).
Responses to this question were predicted with the picture condition (i.e., concrete/interactive,
concrete/noninteractive, and abstract) using the General Linear Models procedure in the
Statistical Analysis System (SAS 1982) (F= 122.13, df=2, p<0.001). Bonferroni paired
comparisons with alpha set at 0.05 indicated significant differences between the
concrete/interactive picture and the abstract picture, the concrete/noninteractive picture and the
abstract, but not between the concrete/interactive and the concrete/noninteractive pictures. No
significant difference between the two concrete picture conditions (i.e., interactive and
noninteractive) was expected and desired since they are both concrete pictures. The means for
the concrete pictures (6.57 for interactive and 6.51 for noninteractive) were significantly higher
than the mean for the abstract picture (3.87), which supports the concrete/abstract
manipulation. The significantly higher means for the concrete pictures indicates that the
concrete pictures were easier to identify as a picture of a car than was the abstract picture.
Picture Interactiveness. For the two concrete picture conditions, the interactive nature of
the picture was examined. The manipulation check was concerned with whether or not
respondents thought the car was in use (i.e., being driven). Respondents answered “probably
moving" or "probably not moving" to the question, "Which of the following best describes the car
in the ad?" Since this manipulation only concerns the concrete/interactive and
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concrete/noninteractive conditions, cross-tabulation of respondents' answers to this question
and picture condition one and two (i.e., cells 1 and 5 and 2 and 6, respectively) w as performed.
Over 80% in the interactive picture condition (i.e., moving, cells 1 and 5) correctly responded
that the car was "probably moving," and over 83% in the noninteractive picture condition (i.e.,
not moving, cells 2 and 6) correctly responded that the car w as "probably not moving" (xz =
52.55, d f= l, p =0.000). The significant x 2 lends support for the contention that observed
frequencies in responses were not simply due to chance, which indicates support for the
successful manipulation of the interactive/noninteractive nature of the concrete pictures.
Individual subjects in error were not dropped from further analyses for two reasons. First, the
manipulation check was concerned with the overall impression of whether or not the picture was
interactive in nature, which was supported. Second, respondents had to rely on recall of the
advertisement when answering the manipulation check questions, which would be expected to
result in some error. Thus, the fact that the observed frequencies are significantly better than
chance indicates support for the effectiveness of the manipulation. This support, coupled with
the manipulation checks performed during the stimuli development stage, indicates the
successful manipulation of picture interactiveness.
Instructions to Imagine. To check the instructions to imagine manipulation, respondents
answered "yes," "no," or "not sure" to the question, “Did the ad tell you to imagine or picture
anything in your mind?" Cross-tabulation of responses to this question and the instruction
condition was performed. Over 90% who were in the instruction condition responded "yes," less
than 2% responded "no," and less than 8% responded "not sure," and 62% who were in the no
instruction condition responded "no," 17% responded "yes," and 21 % responded "not sure" (x2 =
141, df=2, p = 0.000). Again, the significant x2 lends support for the contention that the
observed frequencies in the responses were not simply due to chance, which indicates the
successful manipulation of instructions to imagine. Subjects responding incorrectly to this
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question w ere not dropped from further analyses for the sam e reasons mentioned in the
previous section.
Other Checks. Other factors, such a s ad believability, familiarity with the car advertised,
identification of the specific model of car pictured, and car use/ow nership, w ere assessed . Ad
believability w as assesse d with the question, "How believable do you think the advertisement is?"
The m ean response w as 4.61 with a standard deviation equal to 1.29 (1 =not believable and all
to 7 = extremely believable). Two respondents stated that the ad w as "not believable at all" and
were discarded from further data analysis. Using ANOVA, believability w as tested with cell
assignm ents, and no significant differences by treatm ent group were evident (F7248 = 1.53,
p=0.16). Familiarity with the fictitious car w as checked with the question, "How familiar are you
with the automobile model advertised?" The mean response w as 2.71, SD=1.76, with 1 =not
familiar at all and 7 = extremely familiar. ANOVA w as used to test familiarity with the brand name
with cell assignm ents, and no significant differences by treatm ent group were evident
(F7 Z4B=0.69, p=0.68). Three subjects responded “extremely familiar" to this question, and upon
inspection of their questionnaires, it w as found that they also identified the car pictured a s a
Toyota MR2, which eliminated them from further study.
Another question asked, "Did the car in the picture look like a particular model of
automobile you’ve seen before?" Possible responses were "yes," "no," and "not sure." If yes, the
respondents were asked to indicate which model to check for those that identified the car
pictured a s a Toyota MR2. Even though the majority of the subjects responded "yes" to this
question, only six correctly identified the car and were deleted from further study, which included
the three that said they were extremely familiar with the car advertised above. While responses
varied, the majority of respondents indicated a Jap an ese import or a model similar to a
Jap an ese import a s a model similar to the one in the advertisement. These responses were
congruent with information revealed in the pretest in which the majority of the undergraduate
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college students sampled indicated a Japanese import as the most likely car they would
purchase.
Finally, as in the pretest, car use and ownership were assessed to ensure that the choice of
the experimental product w as appropriate for undergraduate college students. Similar to the
pretest sample, 94% of this sample of undergraduate college students use a car, and 65.8% of
them own their own car, 28.6% indicated that their parents owned the car, and 5.6% of those
that use a car said it was owned by som eone other than themselves or their parents. Thus, an
automobile w as a realistic product to use in an experiment with undergraduate college students
because it appears that they have sufficient knowledge about and experience with the product to
form mental imagery.

Measurement o f Moderating and Dependent Variables
In this section, properties of m easures used to a ssess moderating and consequence
variables are discussed. Because the development of the imagery processing scale w as a major
com ponent of the dissertation research, the methodology and results of the imagery processing
scale development are discussed in a separate section following this one. Variables such as
style of processing, memory, beliefs, attitude toward the advertisement, attitude toward the car,
and intentions, are discussed in this section, and properties of these m easures are summarized
in Table 3.2.
Style o f Processing. An individual’s style of processing w as assessed using two scales. A
20-item revision of Childers et al.’s (1985) Style of Processing Questionnaire (SOP) and Holbrook
et al.’s (1984) 10-item Visualization/Verbalization Index (V/V Index) were used. The SOP
Questionnaire has been widely used in marketing studies, but the V/V Index has not. As shown
in Table 3.2, the SOP is much more reliable ( a =0.72) than the V/V Index ( a =0.58). These two
m easures of style of processing were also used in the scale development of the imagery
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T a b le 3 . 2

SUMMARY OF MODERATING AND CONSEQUENCE MEASURES
Number of
Item s

M easure

Reliability*

M oderating Variables:
SOP

20

0 .7 2

V/V Index

10

0 .5 8

ab

8

0 .9 0

A ad

5

0 .8 9

Intentions

7

0 .9 5

7
5

0 .7 2
0.61

Consequence Variables:

Beliefs:
Specific
Inferred
Memory:
Car-specific
A d-specific

2 judges
2 judges

0 .9 6
0 .8 6

•Reliability w as a s s e s se d through coefficient alpha, ex cep t for th e m em ory variables, in which
th e correlation betw een th e tw o ju d g e s' sco res is reported.
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processing scale, and the reliabilities were similar (<*=0.71 for SOP and a= 0.59 for V/V Index).
Thus, only the SOP measure was used in further analysis.
Memory. Memory was assessed by having subjects write down everything they could
remember about the advertisement and the car advertised. Each written protocol w as analyzed
by two independent judges (the author and an MBA graduate assistant) with respect to specific
correct information recalled about the car advertised and Information recalled about the
advertisement (e.g., "the picture was of a car driving down a road"). To avoid bias, judges were
not aware of which experimental condition a respondent was assigned. There were two recall
measures: recall of car-specific information and recall of ad-specific information. There were
seven specific pieces of information concerning the car that were measured, which represented
the car-specific memory variable. Anything mentioned about the advertisement that was not carspecific information was coded as ad-specific memory. Since one might argue that the abstract
picture condition contained three pictures because of the three different panels used, any
mention of the picture in the ad was coded as one piece of ad-specific information for all
conditions. Correlation between the two judge’s scores for the car-specific information was 0.96,
and correlation between the two judge’s scores for ad-specific information was 0.86, which
indicates adequate agreement between the two judges performing the task.
Beliefs. In the final experiment, the strength of brand attribute beliefs was measured
through 12 Likert items of salient beliefs (1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree). The salient
beliefs included in the final questionnaire were determined from protocols collected during the
pretest data collection discussed previously in which respondents were asked to describe the
attributes they felt the car in the pretest advertisement possessed. From these protocols,
specific salient brand attributes were gleaned as well as inferred brand attributes (e.g., sleek
design) that were not expressly stated in the advertisement. Thus, two m easures of beliefs were
used: 7 items measuring specific car beliefs (i.e., 128 horsepower engine, bucket seats, sporty,
poor suspension, 35 city/45 highway estimated mpg, available in a 4-door sedan, and
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aerodynam ic; a =0.72) and 5 items m easuring inferred car beliefs (i.e., sleek design, nice interior,
w eak engine, fuel efficient, and reliable; a =0.61). Both m easures w ere used in further analyses,
but the low reliability of the inferred beliefs m easure could be considered suspect. However,
due to the exploratory nature of examining brand beliefs, th e analyses were still performed.
Attitude Toward the Advertisement Attitude toward th e ad w as m easured by a 5-item, 7point sem antic differential scale (boring/interesting, g o o d /b a d , unpleasant/pleasant, nice/awful,
favorable/unfavorable), which is consistent with previous operationalizations of Aad (e.g.,
Holbrook and Batra 1987; Mitchell 1986). Coefficient alpha for the 5 items w as 0.89, and
responden ts’ sco res on th ese items w ere sum m ed to represent the Aad m easure.
Attitude Toward the Brand. Attitude toward the brand (i.e., car) w as m easured by an 8item, 7-point sem antic differential scale (attractive/unattractive, desirable/undesirable, not for
m e/for me, uninteresting/interesting, appropriate/inappropriate, unreasonable/reasonable,
unappealing/appealing, a bad c a r/a good car), which is consistent with previous
operationalizations of AB (e.g., Mitchell 1986; Mittal 1990). Coefficient alpha for th e 8 items w as
0.90, and respondents’ sco res on th ese items were sum m ed to represent the Ag m easure.
Intentions. Intention w as m easured by summing subjects’ resp o n ses to 7 different
questions, each on a 7-point extremely unlikely to extremely likely scale (Burns et al. 1991,
1992). The m easure started with, "If you received a brochure containing the advertisem ent you
just saw, how likely is it that you would...: (1)...think about the offer? (2)...look into this plan?
(3)...call th e 800 number? (4)...apply for this plan? (5)...consider buying this car? (6)...go to a
dealer? (7)...buy this automobile?" Coefficient alpha for the 7 items w as 0.95.

Imagery Processing Scale Development
As previously mentioned, the central concern of the dissertation research w as the
developm ent of a scale to m easure imagery processing. Development of th e scale proceeded in
acco rd an ce with guidelines set forth by Churchill (1979), which are illustrated in Figure 3.4.
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Churchill’s suggested procedure has been adopted in many marketing applications. The
procedure involves defining the domain of the construct, generating a sample of items from
various sources, collecting data to purify the m easure through reliability assessm ent and factor
analysis, and finally, further collection of data to assess reliability and validity a s well a s develop
norms. Gerbing and Anderson {1988), building on Churchill’s paradigm, recommend the use of
confirmatory factor analysis to a sse ss unidimensionality of the scales. The paradigms suggested
by these researchers were applied in the development of the imagery processing scale.
Development of th e present scale began with a definition of the domain of each dimension
a s prescribed by Churchill (1979). Researchers familiar with mental imagery and experienced in
the field were consulted regarding the proposed dimensions. Next, a large pool of items was
generated from the literature, a focus group, and inputs from other researchers. Prior to any
data collection, items were evaluated for content validity using judging procedures consistent
with other scale development researchers in marketing (e.g., Bearden, Netemeyer, and Teel
1989; Shimp and Sharma 1987; Zaichkowsky 1985). Data were then collected from 145
respondents who viewed an advertisement and answered a questionnaire. Items were
evaluated, and a second round of data w as collected in a similar fashion from a new sample of
111 respondents. Finally, the imagery processing scale was administered in the final sam ple of
273 respondents participating in the final experiment, and the psychometric properties of the
m easures of the imagery processing dimensions were assessed again.

Scale Content
Before any data were collected, careful consideration was given to content validity of scale
items. First, experts (i.e., researchers that are familiar with mental imagery and have published
in the field) were consulted concerning the domain of the proposed dimensions. Pam Ellen
(Assistant Professor of Marketing, Georgia State University), Terry Childers (Professor of

Figure 3.4
CHURCHILL'S (1979) PARADIGM FOR SCALE DEVELOPMENT

Specify Domain
of Construct

Generate Sample of
Items

Collect Data

Purify Measure

Collect Data

Assess
Reliability

Assess
Validity

Develop Norms
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Marketing, University of Minnesota), and Linda Price (Associate Professor of Marketing,
University of Colorado) were consulted, and all agreed that the proposed dimensions were
reasonable. Second, a focus group was conducted to further explore whether mental imagery
and the proposed dimensions of mental imagery were reasonable from a typical consumer’s
point of view. Participants indicated that mental imagery existed, and they were able to describe
their mental imagery in terms of the proposed dimensions of quality, quantity, and elaboration.
An original pool of items, given in Table 3.3, was generated from the focus group, a
literature review, and inputs from other researchers. Eiien and Bone’s (1991) items were
included, but they were transformed to conform to the other items. Seven-point agree/disagree
scales were used because the measure was tapping respondent-based responses rather than
object-based responses (Green, Tull, and Albaum 1988). This resulted in 104 total items: 34 for
the quality dimension, 30 for the quantity dimension, and 40 for the elaboration dimension.
Similar to Bearden et al. (1989) and Shimp and Sharma (1987), two LSU Department of
Marketing faculty members and three LSU Marketing PhD students judged content validity of the
items. Each judge was given an information sheet (given in Appendix E) concerning the
proposed dimensions of imagery processing. They were also given verbal instructions to clarify
any confusion. Each of the 104 items was printed on its own strip of paper and randomized so
that the judge did not know what dimension the item was intended to represent. The judges
were asked to place an item in a pile that represented the dimension they thought it belonged to
or a "Not Applicable" pile. They were asked to first go through the items quickly and then go
through each pile to reassign items if necessary. When finished with the task, each judge was
asked to briefly explain the definition of each dimension (i.e., what they were using in their
judging) to ensure they understood the dimensions. No problems were indicated a s all judges
were consistent and appeared to understand the proposed dimensions. To be retained, items
had to receive consistent classifications by at least four of the five judges. A total of 77 items
remained after this analysis: 29 for quality, 19 for quantity, and 29 for elaboration.
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T a b l e 3 .3

ORIGINAL POOL OF SCALE ITEMS
QUALITY
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

I experienced very dim imagery.
I formed realistic imagery.
The imagery i experienced was crisp.
My imagery was very distinct.
Very dull images cam e to my mind.
I would describe the imagery I experienced as hazy.
I experienced very definite imagery.
I formed very specific imagery.
My imagery was explicit.
I imagined bizarre scenes.
My imagery was very full.
I formed graphic imagery.
I saw pictures in my head.
My imagery was fancy.
The imagery which occurred was brilliant.
The quality of my imagery was very deep.
I imagined extreme situations.
My imagery was ambiguous.
My imagery was poor.
I experienced subdued imagery.
I formed refined imagery.
Things were blurry in my mind.
My imagery was accurate.
The imagery which occurred was clear.
The imagery which occurred was fuzzy.
The imagery which occurred was detailed.
The imagery which occurred was weak.
The imagery which occurred was vivid.
The imagery which occurred was intense.
The imagery which occurred was lifelike.
The imagery which occurred was sharp.
The imagery which occurred was well-defined.
The imagery which occurred was vague.
The imagery which occurred was pale.
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Table 3.3 (continued)
ORIGINAL POOL OF SCALE ITEMS
QUANTITY
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Images cam e to mind to a very great extent.
I experienced lots of images.
All sorts of pictures, sounds, tastes, a n d /o r smells cam e to my mind.
It w as extremely difficult for me to create images.
Images were aroused very quickly.
I had no difficulty imagining the scene in my head.
I imagined several different scenarios.
I imagined all sorts of things.
I w as not able to imagine much.
I imagined quite a few things.
I thought of several things.
I thought of a lot of things that could go wrong with this product.
Nothing cam e to my mind.
Ican count the number of images I experienced on one hand.
Ican count the num ber of images I experienced on two hands.
Ididn’t imagine much.
I imagined so many things that it’s hard to count them.
One image kept leading to another.
Ireally only experienced one image.
It w as hard to imagine much from this ad.
Iw as am azed at how many images flashed into my head.
Iimagined all sorts of unrelated things.
Just one scen e cam e to my mind.
I probably imagined more from this ad than most people.
I imagined a considerable amount in my head.
The quantity of my imagery was large.
I imagined a number of things.
Many im ages cam e to my mind.
I saw several distinguishable scen es in my mind.
Numerous im ages w ere aroused from the ad.
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T a b l e 3 .3 ( c o n t i n u e d )

ORIGINAL POOL OF SCALE ITEMS
ELABORATION
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

The ad reminded me of other times in my life.
The ad brought back memories of events that happened to me in the past.
My imagery w as very elaborate.
I imagined more than what w as in the ad.
I formed mental im ages from the words in the ad.
I imagined what it would be like to use the product advertised.
I rem em bered things from my life that related to the ad.
Some of the things I imagined were not in the ad.
I saw the picture in the ad in my mind.
In my mind, I saw more than Just the picture given.
I thought of how it would feel to use the product.
I imagined the smell of the product.
The picture in
the ad was mirrored in my head.
Iprojected an image in my mind from the words in the ad.
Iprojected an image in my mind from the picture in the ad.
Iprojected an image in my head from other things that I know.
Things I imagined lacked factual reality.
Everything I imagined w as based on something I already know.
The picture in the ad w as reproduced in my head.
I fantasized about the product in the ad.
I used my imagination.
I imagined other people using the product.
Things I imagined were based on fantasy, not facts.
My im ages were extremely individual.
I let my imagination run wild.
I imagined improbable situations.
I let my mind wander.
I w as daydreaming.
I imagined the texture of the product.
I imagined what the product tasted like.
I sensed a feeling of motion.
I “heard" sounds in my head.
I felt like I w as there.
Experiences from my life flashed into my head.
I thought of others I’ve seen using a product similar to the one advertised.
I could really see myself using a product similar to the one in the ad.
I would probably spend more time looking at this ad than other ads.
This is the kind of ad that stays on my mind.
My imagery included m em bers of my family.
My imagery included one or m ore of my friends.
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Similar to Bearden et al. (1989) and Zaichkowsky (1985), further assessm ent of content
validity was conducted by giving four new judges (3 LSU Department of Marketing faculty
members and 1 LSU Marketing PhD student) the information sheet concerning the dimensions
and asking them to rate how representative an item was of the proposed dimension. The items
were grouped according to the dimensions on a questionnaire (given In Appendix F), and the
judges rated each item as "clearly representative," "somewhat representative," or "not
representative" of the dimension. To be retained, items had to be judged a s "clearly
representative" by three judges and at least "somewhat representative" by the fourth judge. A
total of 47 items remained after this analysis: 19 for quality, 11 for quantity, and 17 for
elaboration.

Evaluating the Measures
Participants of the focus group were also asked to analyze 20 magazine advertisements for
their imagery-eliciting ability. From the focus group discussion, three out of the 20
advertisements appeared to be capable of eliciting mental imagery. One was a Mazda Miata ad,
another was a Celestial Tea ad, and the third was an ad for a Minolta camera. Each
advertisement was able to elicit mental imagery through different means; the car ad was
nostalgic, the tea ad used pictures and words to stimulate imagery, and the cam era ad used an
impressive photograph. In addition to the focus group, faculty members were consulted
concerning the appropriateness and usefulness of the three ads. Since chances of eliciting and
measuring the three proposed dimensions were better if multiple stimuli were used instead of
one, it was decided that all three ads would be used in the data collection stages of the scale
development. The three ads (given in Appendix G) were then reproduced for use in both rounds
of data collection.
Initial Administration. Data were collected in undergraduate classrooms at Louisiana State
University during the 1991 Summer semester. To encourage respondents to participate in the
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study, one student in each class won $5.00 in a raffle. Students put their ID numbers on their
questionnaires, and a winner was drawn at random. However, before awarding the prize, the
questionnaire was inspected for completeness; otherwise, the student would not win the prize.
Respondents were made aware of this prior to completing the questionnaire, which helped to
encourage completeness when responding to the questionnaire.
To collect data, slides were made of each advertisement. Items were measured betweensubjects. That is, each respondent viewed only one ad, not all three. Respondents viewed the
ad for 1 1/2 minutes and then responded to the questionnaire (given in Appendix H) containing
the 47 imagery processing items. The ad was not projected while respondents completed the
questionnaire. After collecting data in two classrooms where an ad was projected on the
screen, it was evident that using a slide was inconvenient and unrealistic for respondents. Thus,
color copies of the ads were used in further data collection. Eighteen respondents viewed the
Mazda Miata ad from a slide, and twenty-three viewed the Celestial Tea ad from a slide. For the
remainder of the data collection, respondents viewed their own individual color copies of the
advertisements for 1 1 /2 minutes, after which they put the ad back into an envelope and
completed the questionnaire. To determine if the respondents viewing a slide could be pooled
with those viewing copies of the ad, comparisons of the correlation matrices for the slide ad and
the print ad for each product were performed using LISREL VI (Joreskog and Sorbom 1984). In
all cases the chi-square was not significant, which indicates that there was no difference
between the patterns of correlations for the two data sets. Thus, it was determined that all
respondents could be used in this analysis, which brought the sample size to 145 respondents
in the first round of data collection.
Item Reduction. Following Smith (1974), all 47 items were subjected to a principal
com ponents factor analysis with varimax rotation without specifying the number of factors to
retain. Eleven factors emerged with eigenvalues greater than one. Items with low (e.g., less
than .4) an d /o r split loadings were deleted, and the analysis was repeated. Again, items not
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exhibiting simple structure w ere deleted. Another factor analysis (restricting th e solution to three
factors) with varimax rotation also w as performed. Although four factors had eigenvalues
greater than one, examination of a scree plot supported keeping only three factors since it w as
level after th e third factor. The eigenvalues were: 12.19 for the quality dimension, 2.74 for the
quantity dimension, and 2.09 for the elaboration dimension. The eigenvalue of the fourth factor
w as 1.11. At this point, several additional items failed to exhibit simple structure on factors
representing th e three proposed dim ensions of imagery processing and w ere deleted. The
factor pattern Is given in Table 3.4. The procedure w as repeated using oblique rotation since
the dim ensions were considered to be independent but related dim ensions and resulted in the
retention of the sam e items.
Reliability. The reliability of the remaining items for each dim ension w as exam ined using
coefficient alpha. Results are given in Table 3.4. Coefficient alpha estim ates were 0.97, 0.88,
and 0.75 for quality, quantity, and elaboration, respectively. While item-to-total correlations
indicate that a few items could be dropped to increase coefficient alphas, it w as decided to
retain th ese items for the second round of data collection.
Second Administration. The reliability and validity of th e remaining 25 items were examined
with a new sam ple of 111 respondents, collected during the 1991 Sum m er sem ester at LSU.
Again, each respondent viewed an advertisement (sam e advertisem ents that w ere used in the
first administration) for 1 1 /2 minutes, put the ad back into an envelope, and responded to the
questionnaire. The questionnaire (given in Appendix I) consisted of a written protocol requesting
for any imagery processing that may have occurred, the 25 imagery items, the 20-item revised
SOP scale, and th e 10-item V/V Index. The written protocol of imagery processing w as included
to use a s a test of convergent validity of the proposed imagery processing scale. The style of
processing scales w ere included to use a s a test of discriminant validity of the proposed imagery
processing scale since style of processing and imagery processing should be related, but
different constructs (Ellen and Bone 1991).
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T a b l e 3 .4

EXPLORATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS RESULTS: INITIAL ADMINISTRATION
Dimension
and Item

Loading

Item-Total
Correlation

Quality (a = 0.97)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

The imagery which occurred was clear.
.74
My imagery was very distinct.
.78
The imagery which occurred was detailed.
.72
The imagery I experienced was crisp.
.74
I formed very specific imagery.
.86
The Imagery which occurred was weak.*
.85
I would describe the imagery I experienced as h azy * .82
Nothing cam e to my mind.*
.66
I experienced very definite imagery.
.85
My imagery w as explicit.
.78
The imagery which occurred was fuzzy.*
.81
The imagery which occurred was vague.*
.83
The imagery which occurred was vivid.
.82
The imagery which occurred was sharp.
.82
The imagery which occurred w as well-defined.
.78
Things were blurry in my mind.*
.78

.74
.79
.70
.80
.89
.84
.75
.66
.90
.82
.73
.80
.87
.86
.82
.75

Quantity (a = 0.88)
17.
18.
19.
20.

I really only experienced one image*
Just one scene cam e to my mind."
I imagined a number of things.
Many images cam e to my mind.

.89
.91
.70
.63

.76
.73
.78
.70

.68

.59

.71

.59

.45
.65
.72

.37
.45
.63

Elaboration (a = 0.75)
21. I fantasized about the product in the ad.
22. I imagined what it would be like to use
the product advertised.
23. I remembered things from my life
that related to the ad.
24. I imagined other people using the product.
25. I imagined the feel of the product.
"Denotes item is reversed scored.
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First, a confirmatory factor analysis (i.e., a three-factor correlated structure) w as performed
on the imagery processing scale using LISREL VI. Although item reliabilities ranged from .17 to
.85, two items exhibited problems upon examination of normalized residuals (Costner and
Schoenberg 1979). Item # 1 8 in Table 3.4 (“Ju st one scen e cam e to my mind") exhibited
normalized residuals ranging from 2.15 to 3.15 with nine other items, and item # 2 3 in Table 3.4
(“I rem em bered things from my life that related to the a d ”) exhibited normalized residuals ranging
from 2.07 to 2.56 with six other items. Hence, th ese two items were deleted.
A second confirmatory factor analysis w as performed on the remaining 23 Items (see Table
3.5). Although the overall chi-square statistic of 395.71 w as significant (df = 227, p<0.01), these
results represent a significant improvement over the chi-square value of 686.55 (df = 230)
obtained from a one-factor model (A x2 ~ 290.84, Adf = 3, p<0.001). Furthermore, the three
factor model w as better fitted than a series of two factor models, in which two dim ensions of
imagery processing w ere combined into one factor and the third dimension treated a s a single
factor. Thus, three two-factor models were estim ated (i.e., quality and quantity a s a nineteen
item factor with elaboration a s a single four item factor; quality and elaboration as a twenty item
factor with quantity a s a single three item factor; and quantity and elaboration a s a seven item
factor and quality a s a single sixteen item factor). Chi-square values associated with th ese two
factor m odels ranged from 527.52 to 563.11 (df=229), and the three factor model w as
significantly better than any of the two factor models. These results support modeling quality,
quantity, and elaboration of imagery processing a s separate dimensions.
Individual item f-values ranged from 4.49 to 12.61 (p<.01), offering support for the
convergent validity of the items in each dimension (Anderson and Gerbing 1988). Coefficient
alpha estim ates were 0.97, 0.84, and 0.83 for quality, quantity, and elaboration, respectively.
Similarly, LISREL estim ates of construct reliability were 0.97, 0.85, and 0.84, respectively. Finally,
coefficient beta estim ates were 0.85, 0.60, and 0.41, respectively. Coefficient beta is used to
indicate dimensionality within a set of items (John and Roedder 1981). The estimate for the first
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T a b l e 3 .5

RESULTS OF CONFIRMATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS: SECOND ADMINISTRATION
Dimension
and Item

ML
Loading

Quality
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Reliability
.97*

The imagery which occurred was clear.
.86
My imagery was very distinct.
.75
.74
The imagery which occurred was detailed.
The imagery I experienced was crisp.
.81
.84
I formed very specific imagery.
The imagery which occurred was weak.b
.89
I would describe the imagery
.74
I experienced as hazy.b
Nothing came to my mind.b
.80
.89
I experienced very definite imagery.
My imagery was explicit.
.88
.84
The imagery which occurred was fuzzyb
.87
The imagery which occurred was vague.b
.87
The imagery which occurred was vivid.
The imagery which occurred was sharp.
.82
The imagery which occurred was well-defined. .92
Things were blurry in my mind.b
.60

.55
.63
.80
.77
.70
.75
.75
.68
.84
.35

Quantity

.85“

17. I really only experienced one image.b
18. I imagined a number of things.
19. Many images came to my mind.

.64
.88
.89

Elaboration
20. I fantasized about the product in the ad.
21. I imagined what it would be like to use
the product advertised.
22. I imagined other people using the product.
23. I imagined the feel of the product.

“Denotes composite reliability.
bDenotes item is reversed scored.

Variance
Extracted
.674

.74
.57
.51.
.65
.70
.80

.660

.42
.77
.79
.84“

.81

.65

.89
.43
.84

.79
.18
.70

.580
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two dimensions exceeds the suggested level of 0.50, but it is slightly below this level for the
elaboration dimension items. Even though deleting Item #22 in Table 3.5 ("I imagined other
people using the product") would result in a higher reliability, variance extracted, and coefficient
beta, it was retained for the third round of data collection because it did not have unusual or
high normalized residuals, and it was felt that four indicators would be better that three (Costner
and Schoenberg 1979). If the item still exhibited problems in the final administration, it would be
dropped before use in hypothesis testing.
Discriminant Validity. The more conservative variance extracted estimates were 0.67, 0.66,
and 0.58, respectively, which are greater than the level of 0.50 suggested by Fornell and Larcker
(1981). Variance extracted measures the amount of variance captured by the construct (i.e.,
dimension) in relation to the variance due to random measurement error. One test of
discriminant validity involves comparison of the variance extracted estimates of the measures
with the square of the parameter estimate between the measures, and Fornell and Larcker
(1981) suggest evidence of discriminant validity if the variance extracted estimates are greater
than the square of the correlation between the constructs. The variance extracted estimates of
0.67, 0.66, and 0.58 all exceed the square of the correlations between the constructs (0Z21 =
.078; <S>\, = .314; ^ z32 = .152). Finally, the phi coefficients were significantly less than 1 (i.e., the
confidence interval, plus or minus two standard errors, did not contain a value of 1), which also
offers support for the discriminant validity between the dimensions (Anderson and Gerbing
1988).
Another method of addressing the discriminant validity of the proposed imagery processing
scale involved correlating the proposed communication-evoked imagery processing scale with
two scales that have been developed to measure an individual’s style of processing. The
revised Style of Processing scale (SOP: Childers et al. 1985) and the Visualization/Verbalization
index (V/V index: Holbrook et al. 1984) were correlated with respondents’ summed scores on
the proposed dimensions of imagery processing in an attempt to show that the measure of

communication-evoked imagery is not simply duplicating measures of processing preference,
which follows the analysis performed by Ellen and Bone (1991) in which an individual’s imagery
ability was correlated with imagery processing. While the SOP scale exhibited acceptable
reliability (a=0.71), the V/V Index did not (a=0.59). Furthermore, the SOP and V/V Index are
purportedly measuring the sam e construct, style of processing, but the correlation between the
two measures was 0.05. Hence, the V/V Index was eliminated from further analysis. As
expected, the dimensions of imagery processing were positively correlated with the measures of
processing style, but only slightly so. The correlational results are given In Table 3.6. With the
exception of the correlation between the elaboration dimension and the SOP, the correlations
am ong the imagery dimensions were stronger than the dimensions' correlations with the
preference measure, which is similar to what Ellen and Bone (1991) found. Thus, support is
given to the contention that the proposed imagery processing m easure is tapping something
different from one’s style of processing.
Convergent Validity. An investigation of convergent validity of proposed imagery
processing dimensions was conducted with written protocols provided by each respondent.
Respondents’ descriptions of imagery experienced while viewing the advertisement were content
analyzed independently by three judges (i.e., the author, a University of Southern Mississippi
Marketing faculty member, and a USM MBA graduate assistant). Judges were given a
description of the proposed dimensions and were asked to rate the written protocol describing
any imagery processing that may have occurred on a three point scale (low, average, or high)
with respect to each dimension. There was also a "not applicable" category for blank or
unusable responses, and eight of the descriptions did not contain enough information to be
rated for imagery processing because they were not completed or they consisted of information
that merely critiqued the advertisement. Interjudge reliability is given in Table 3.7. Exact
agreement among judges was achieved across 73 percent of the quality dimension ratings, 87
percent of the quantity dimension ratings, and 85 percent of the elaboration dimension ratings.

160
T a b l e 3 .6

CORRELATIONS AMONG IMAGERY PROCESSING DIMENSIONS
AND PROCESSING PREFERENCE: SCALE DEVELOPMENT STAGE

Quality

Quantity

Elaboration

Quality

0.97"

Quantity

0.23
(p=.0172)

0.84“

Elaboration

0.47
(p=.0001)

0.31
(p=.0011)

0.83a

SOP

0.20
(p=.0399)

0.05
(p=.5951)

0.27
(p=.0054)

aValues on the diagonals represent reliabilities.

SOP

0.71'

161

The index of reliability, lr, (Perreault and Leigh 1989) for th e quality, quantity, and elaboration
dim ensions w as .767, .901, and .876, respectively, which indicates ad eq u ate interjudge reliability
b ecau se th e possible range of the index of reliability is between zero and one. Since there w ere
no c a s e s w here all three of th e ju d g e's ratings w ere completely disparate (i.e., o n e judge rating
a dim ension low, another rating it average, and the third rating it high), disagreem ents were
resolved by taking the rating that w as given to a respondent by two of the three judges.
Using th e General Linear Model Procedure in SAS, judges' ratings w ere used to predict
responden ts’ sum m ed sco res on the three dim ensions of imagery processing a sse sse d with the
imagery processing scale (see Table 3.8). The first model revealed a significant effect of the
quality classification on the quality dimension (F298 = 5.17, p< .0 1 ) with th e m eans ranging from
68.7 for th e "low1' classification and 86.0 for the "high” classification, and a Bonferroni paired
com parison test revealed significant differences betw een the low and average m eans and the
low and high m eans at th e alp h a=0.05 level. The second model displayed a marginally
significant effect of the quantity classification on the quantity dim ension (F2i100 = 2 -85*P < 06).
Again, the m eans are in the expected order ranging from 11.1 for the “low” group and 14.4 for
the "high" group, and a Bonferroni paired com parison revealed a significant difference between
the low and high group at the atpha=0.1 level. The final model also revealed a significant effect
of the elaboration classification on the elaboration dimension (F298 = 4.50, p< .0 2 ). Similarly, the
m eans were in the expected order ranging from 13.1 for the "low” group to 18.8 for the "high"
group, and a Bonferroni paired com parison revealed a significant difference between the low
and high group at the alp h a=0.05 level. These results lend support for the consistency between
judges' classification of all three dim ensions based on open-ended respondent descriptions and
self-report scale values of these dim ensions.
Third Administration. The reliability and validity of the remaining 23 items were examined
with the d ata obtained from th e experimental sam ple of 251 respondents. Reliability,
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Table 3.7
RELIABILITY ESTIMATES OF JUDGED PROTOCOLS OF IMAGERY PROCESSING
Percentage
agreement

Dimension
Quality
Quantity
Elaboration

I, estimate
of reliability
.767
.901
.876

.728
.874
.845

Table 3.8
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE RESULTS EXAMINING CONVERGENT VALIDITY
Judges' rating

Mean scale value

n

Quality
Low
Average
High

68.7
82.2
86.0

34
47
20

Quantity
Low
Average
High

11.1
12.2
14.4

43
41
19

Elaboration
Low
Average
High

13.1
16.1
18.8

33
49
19

F

p<

5.17

.01

2.85

.06

4.50

.02
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dimensionality, and validity were assessed through coefficient alpha and confirmatory factor
analyses.
First, a confirmatory factor analysis (i.e., a three-factor correlated structure) w as performed
on the imagery processing scale using LISREL VI. The item, “I imagined other people using the
product," that w as marginal in the first and second rounds of data collection had a maximum
likelihood loading of 0.09, which gave it a reliability of 0.008, and a t-value of 1.24. Thus, this
item w as dropped and the confirmatory factor analysis w as repeated.
A second confirmatory factor analysis w as performed on the remaining 22 items (see Table
3.9). Although the overall chi-square statistic of 716.09 w as significant {d f = 206, p < 0.01), these
results represent a significant improvement over the chi-square value of 992.58 (df = 209)
obtained from a one-factor model (Ax2 = 276.49, Adf = 3, p<0.001). Similar to the previous
administration of the scale, the three factor model w as better fitted than a series of two factor
models. Chi-square values associated with all possible two factor m odels ranged from 826.42 to
911.28 (df=208), and the three factor model w as significantly better than any of the two factor
models. Individual item f-values ranged from 8.19 to 17.77 (p < .01), offering support for the
convergent validity of the items in each dimension (Anderson and Gerbing 1988). Coefficient
alpha estim ates were 0.96, 0.76, and 0.78 for quality, quantity, and elaboration, respectively.
Similarly, LISREL estim ates of com posite reliability were 0.96, 0.76, and 0.78, respectively.
Finally, coefficient beta estim ates were 0.82, 0.51, and 0.60, respectively. Coefficient beta is
used to indicate dimensionality within a set of items (John and Roedder 1981). The estimate for
all three dim ensions exceeded the suggested level of 0.50, indicating unidimensionatity of the
constructs.
Discriminant Validity. The more conservative variance extracted estim ates were 0.61, 0.53,
and 0.54, respectively, which are greater than the level of 0.50 suggested by Fornell and Larcker
(1981). Also, the variance extracted estim ates all exceed the square of the correlations between
the constructs, respectively ($221 = .130; $231 = .518; <j>222 = .325), which suggests evidence of
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T able 3.9
RESULTS OF CONFIRMATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS: FINAL EXPERIMENT
Dimension
and Item

ML
Loading

Quality
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

The imagery which occurred w as clear.
My imagery w as very distinct.
The imagery which occurred w as detailed.
The imagery I experienced w as crisp.
I formed very specific imagery.
The imagery which occurred w as weak.b
I would describe the imagery
i experienced a s hazy.b
Nothing cam e to my mind.b
i experienced very definite imagery.
My imagery w as explicit.
The imagery which occurred w as fuzzy.b
The imagery which occurred w as vague.6
The imagery which occurred w as vivid.
The imagery which occurred w as sharp.
The imagery which occurred w as well-defined.
Things w ere blurry in my mind.b

.96"
.75
.69
.81
.84
.82
.81

.56
.48
.66
.71
.67
.66

.80
.50
.89
.84
.80
.79
.75
.80
.84
.67

.64
.25
.80
.71
.64
.62
.56
.64
.71
.45

Quantity
17. 1 really only experienced one image.6
18. 1 imagined a num ber of things.
19. Many im ages cam e to my mind.

.77*
.58
.83
.74

Elaboration
20. 1 fantasized about th e product in th e ad.
21. 1 imagined what it would be like to use
the product advertised.
22. 1 imagined th e feel of th e product.
"Denotes com posite reliability.
bD enotes item is reversed scored.

Reliability

.37
.69
.55
.78"

.73

.53

.71
.77

.50
.59

Variance
Extracted
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discriminant validity (Fornell and Larcker 1981). Finally, the phi coefficients were significantly
less than 1 (i.e., the confidence interval, plus or minus two standard errors, did not contain a
value of 1), which also offers support for the discriminant validity between the dimensions
(Anderson and Gerbing 1988).
Another method of addressing the discriminant validity of the proposed imagery processing
scale involved correlating the proposed communication-evoked imagery processing scale with
two scales that have been developed to measure an individual’s style of processing. The
revised Style of Processing scale (SOP: Childers et ai. 1985) was also collected in the third
administration of the scale. Following Ellen and Bone (1991), the SOP was correlated with
respondents’ summed scores on the proposed dimensions of imagery processing in an attempt
to show that the measure of communication-evoked imagery is not simply duplicating measures
of processing preference. As expected, the dimensions of imagery processing were positively
correlated with the m easures of processing style, but only slightly so. The correlational results
are given in Table 3.10. The correlations among the imagery measures were stronger than the
m easures’ correlations with the preference measure. Thus, support is given to the contention
that the proposed imagery processing measure is tapping something different than one’s style of
processing.
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Table 3.10
CORRELATIONS AMONG IMAGERY PROCESSING DIMENSIONS
AND PROCESSING PREFERENCE: FINAL EXPERIMENT STAGE

Quality

Q uantity

Quality

0.96“

Q uantity

0.32
(p=.0001)

0.76*

Elaboration

0.63
(p=.0001)

0.43
(p=.0001)

SOP

0.11
(p=.0768)

0.06
(p=.3842)

“Values on the diagonals represent reliabilities.

Elaboration

SOP

0.78s

0.20
(p = .0020)

0.72s

CHAPTER FOUR
HYPOTHESIS TESTS AND RESULTS

INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, results of te sts of hypotheses given in C hapter 3 are reported in th e
following order: (1) relationships between imagery-eliciting strategies and co n seq u en ce
variables and th e m oderating role of style of processing (H ypotheses 1a-8); (2) relationships
betw een imagery-eliciting strategies and dim ensions of imagery processing and th e m oderating
role of style of processing (H ypotheses 9a-13); (3) relationships betw een dim ensions of imagery
processing and co n seq u en ce variables (H ypotheses 14a-16e); and (4) mediating effects of
imagery processing on relationships betw een imagery-eliciting strategies and co n sequence
variables (Hypothesis 17). Discussion of th e results is given in C hapter Five of the dissertation.
Analyses followed m oderator and mediational m odels given by Baron and Kenny (1986),
which are illustrated in Figure 4.1. While a general overview is given here, specifics regarding
how hypotheses were tested are given within each section. According to Baron and Kenny
(1986), if a postulated m oderator is a continuous variable, independent variables are
multlchotomous (i.e., C ase 3, p. 1175), and an expected linear relationship exists, then te sts for
m oderation are performed by adding the product of the m oderator and th e multichotomous
independent variables to a regression equation. A m oderator effect is indicated by a significant
product term . To test for mediation, the authors recom m end estimating th ree regression
equations: (1) regressing m ediators on independent variables (Path a); (2) regressing
co n seq u en ce variables on independent variables (Path c); and (3) regressing co n sequence
variables on both the independent variables and on the m ediator (Paths b and c). To establish
mediation, the following conditions must be met (p. 1177):
(1)

the Independent variables m ust affect th e m ediator in the first equation;
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F i g u r e 4 .1

MODERATOR AND MEDIATIONAL MODELS (BARON AND KENNY 1986)

Independent
Variable
Outcome Variables

Moderator
Independent
Variable
X

Moderator

(a)

Moderator Model

Mediator

Outcome
Variable

Independent
Variable
(b)

Mediational Model
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(2)
(3)

the independent variables must be shown to affect the dependent variable in the
second equation; and
the mediator must affect the dependent variable in the third equation.

if these conditions all hold in the predicted direction, then the effect of th e independent
variables on the dependent variable must be less in the third equation than in the second.
The authors also point out that since multicollinearity may be a problem In the third equation,
absolute size of the coefficients be examined a s well a s their significance.
Analyses of variance were used to determine if independent variables influenced
consequence variables and dimensions of imagery processing. Multiple regression w as used to
determine if dimensions of imagery processing influenced consequence variables. Finally,
multiple regression of consequence variables with manipulated independent variables along with
dim ensions of imagery processing that were influenced by the Independent variables included a s
covariates was performed to test the mediational role of dim ensions of imagery processing. A
cutoff of p < 0 .0 5 w as used to determine significance of tests. Although no hypotheses predicted
an interaction effect between pictures and instructions to imagine, interactions were tested, and
no significant interactions between pictures and instructions to imagine resulted for any variable
tested. Thus, they are not reported.

IMAGERY-ELICITING STRATEGIES AND CONSEQUENCE VARIABLES
H ypotheses la-7 e postulated effects of manipulated imagery-eliciting strategies on
consequence variables of memory, beliefs, attitude toward the brand, attitude toward the
advertisement, and intentions. These hypotheses were consistent with extant imagery studies in
that they examined relationships between stimulus and response variables without any
examination of imagery processing. While not all hypotheses were supported, many were, and
they are consistent with previous imagery studies. Furthermore, the hypotheses examined
expand the extant knowledge base of effects of different imagery-eliciting strategies by
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examining different picture conditions instead of simply pictures versus no pictures. Finally, the
dissertation also examined the effect of including instructions to imagine within m essage stimuli.
Since beliefs, attitudes, and intentions are related constructs in a hierarchy of effects, an
initial multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA option in the General Linear Model procedure in
SAS) w as conducted, and results are reported in Table 4.1. Correlations among specific beliefs,
inferred beliefs, Ag, A ^, and intentions ranged from 0.17 to 0.62, and ail were significant at the
p<0.05 level. Memory was analyzed separately from other consequence variables as the
relationship between memory and attitude is equivocal (Srull 1989} and beyond the scope of the
dissertation. Furthermore, only car-specific memory and ad-specific memory were significantly
correlated with car-specific beliefs and inferred beliefs, respectively. Correlations among the
memory variables and the other dependent variables ranged from 0.01 to 0.29, and only the two
exceptions noted above were significant. Because overall effects of pictures (Wilks' X = 0.84,
F=3.58, p <0.0001) and instructions to imagine (Wilks’ X = 0.92, F=5.20, p<0.0005) were
significant, separate analyses of variance were conducted. Individual models were estimated
with the General Linear Model procedure in SAS with Bonferroni paired comparisons (alpha set
to 0.1) when necessary. The General Linear Model procedure was used instead of the ANOVA
procedure to account for differences in sample sizes when comparing different combinations of
pictures. Means for effects of pictures and instructions to imagine on consequence variables
discussed in this section and dimensions of imagery processing discussed in the next section
are given in Table 4.2, but significant differences are reported in later sections and tables in this
chapter.
Results are reported in order of consequence variables of memory, beliefs, attitude toward
the brand, attitude toward the advertisement, and intentions, respectively. When analyzing
effects of different picture conditions, three different models were estimated: (1) one in which
cells 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, and 7 (i.e., pictures) and ceils 4 and 8 (i.e., no pictures) were collapsed to
examine effects of pictures versus no pictures (Hypothesis 1a-1e), (2) one in which cells 1, 2, 5,

Table 4.1
E F F E C T S O F PIC TU R ES AND IN STRU CTIO N S T O IMAGINE
O N BELIEFS. A * Aad, AND INTENTIONS

ANOVA F-VALUES
Source

MANOVA
Wilks' X F-Value

Specific
Beliefs

Inferred
Beliefs

ab

a ad

Intentions

Pictures

.84

3.58*

.57

.64

5.17*

4.78*

1.72

Instructions
to Imagine

.92

5.20*

.16

4.01*

4.49*

20.21*

1.50

* p<.05

Table 4.2
MEANS FOR EFFECTS OF PICTURES AND INSTRUCTIONS TO IMAGINE
ON MEMORY. BELIEFS. ATTITUDES, INTENTIONS,
AND DIMENSIONS OF IMAGERY PROCESSING
T reatm ents

V a ria b le s

C o n c re te /
I n t e r a c t iv e

P ic tu r e s
C o n c re te /
N o n in te ra c tiv e
C oncrete

A b stra c t

No
P ic tu r e

I n s tr u c tio n s to Im aqine
P re s e n t
Absent

Consequences:*
Memory:
Car

2 .5 7

2 .2 2

2 .4 0

2 .3 6

2 .3 8

2.40

2 .3 7

Ad

2.01

1.79

1.91

2 .1 6

1.49

1.89

1.84

S p e c ific

4 2 .4 6

42.23

42.35

41.56

4 1 .3 7

42.05

4 1 .7 7

In f e rre d

27.86

27.10

27.49

26.93

27.09

27.77

26.72

43.25

42.06

4 2 .6 7

39.64

38.46

41.87

39.83

A*o

24.60

22.95

23.81

21.16

22.25

24.24

21.25

In te n tio n s

26.03

23.08

24.58

26.57

26.56

26.34

24.76

Q u a lity

73.60

76.92

75.22

65.64

6 5 .9 0

74.51

66.44

E la b o ra tio n

12.83

13.19

13.01

13.15

12.37

13.52

12.21

Q u an tity

12.38

11.92

12.15

12.25

11.32

12.54

11.37

Bet i e f s :

Mental Im agery:'

'R e fe r to C hapter 3 f o r d e s c r ip ti o n s o f s c a l e s u sed to m easure each v a r i a b le .

-vl

to
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and 6 (i.e., concrete pictures), cells 3 and 7 (i.e., abstract pictures), and cells 4 and 7 (no
pictures) were collapsed to examine effects of concrete versus abstract versus no pictures
(testing no specified hypothesis, but used for understanding), and (3) paired com parisons of all
four picture conditions were examined (Hypotheses 2a-7c).

Memory
As discussed in Chapter 3, memory was assessed through a written protocol in which
respondents were asked to write down everything they could recall about the brand advertised
and the advertisement itself. Two judges coded protocols by counting pieces of information
recalled about the brand and pieces of information recalled about the advertisement. These
values represent dependent variables of car-specific memory and ad-specific memory,
respectively. Thus, memory was divided into two dependent measures.
Car-specific memory was predicted with pictures and instructions to imagine (Model
F4250=0.47, p < 0.76). Main effects of pictures (F3250=0.62, p<0.60) and instructions to imagine
(F1,25 o= 0.01, p<0.91) were not significant. Similarly, ad-specific memory w as predicted with
pictures and instructions to imagine (Model F4250=2.68, p<0.03). The main effect of pictures
w as significant (F3 250 =3.53, p<0.02), but the main effect of instructions to imagine was not
(F-j.Z5o =0.11, p<0.74). Since Hypothesis 7a predicted that inctuding instructions to imagine
within the advertisement would lead to greater recall of brand and ad information, this
hypothesis was not supported. Hypotheses 1a and 2a-2c predicted a significant effect of
pictures on memory of car-specific and ad-specific information, and there was a significant
picture main effect for ad-specific information recalled. Thus, further analysis of effects of
different picture conditions was performed, and results are summarized in Table 4.3.
Pictures versus No Pictures (H1a). Hypothesis 1a stated, “As com pared to not including a
picture in an advertisement, including a picture will result in greater memory of ad information."
Although this hypothesis was not supported for car-specific memory (F1250= 0 .0 0 , p < 0.97), it
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Table 4.3
E F F E C T S O F P IC T U R E C O N D IT IO N S O N M E M O R Y

Picture condition compared

n

Mean8

Model lb
Picture
No Picture

188
63

2.39
2.38

Model 2C
Concrete
Abstract
No Picture

127
61
63

2.40
2.36
2.38

65
62
61
63

2. 57
2.22
1.36
2.38

F

Car-Specific Memory:

Model 3d
Concrete/Interactive
Concrete/Noninteractive
Abstract
No Picture

.00

.02

.62

Ad-Specific Memory:
Model lb
Picture
No Picture

188
63

1.99a
1. 49a

Model 2C
Concrete
Abstract
No Picture

127
61
63

1.91
2. 16a
1. 49a

65
62
61
63

2 .01
1.79
2 .16a
1. 49a

Model 3d
Concrete/Interactive
Concrete/Noninteractive
Abstract
No Picture

7 .73e

4 .79e

3 .53e

“Means within each model marked with matching capital letter superscripts represent significant
contrasts (p<-05) a s indicated by Bonferroni paired com parisons.
bModel 1 tested pictures (cells 1, 2, 3, 5, 6,and 7) versus no pictures (cells 4 and 8).
cMode! 2 tested concrete pictures (cells 1, 2, 5, and 6) versus abstract pictures (cells 3 and 7)
versus no pictures (cells 4 and 8).
dModel 3 tested concrete/interactive pictures (cells 1 and 5) versus concrete/noninteractive
pictures (cells 2 and 6) versus abstract pictures (cells 3 and 7) versus no pictures (cells 4 and
8).
®p<.05
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was supported for ad-specific memory (F-, 250=7.73, p < 0.006), with mean number of ad-specific
responses equal to 1.99 in the picture condition and 1.49 in the no picture condition. Thus,
including pictures in the advertisement resulted in greater recall of ad-specific information but
not car-specific information when compared to not including pictures in the advertisement.
These results indicate partial support for Hypothesis 1a.
Comparisons o f Picture Conditions (H2a-2c). Hypothesis 2 predicted effects of different
picture conditions on memory of ad and brand information:
H2:

Greater
a.
b.
c.

memory for ad information will result when an advertisement contains:
a concrete/interactive picture versus a concrete/non interactive picture
a concrete/interactive picture versus an abstract picture
a concrete/noninteractive picture versus an abstract picture

The test of Hypothesis 2 involved contrasts of different picture conditions for car-specific and adspecific memory. Thus, concrete/interactive picture conditions were compared to
concrete/noninteractive pictures and abstract pictures, respectively, and concrete/noninteractive
pictures were compared to abstract pictures. Again, only the dependent variable of ad-specific
memory was examined further because the main effect of pictures was insignificant for carspecific memory. For ad-specific memory, Bonferroni paired comparisons revealed no
significant differences at the p<0.05 level between concrete/interactive pictures (M=2.01) and
concrete/noninteractive pictures (M=1.79), between concrete/interactive pictures and abstract
pictures (M=2.16), or between concrete/noninteractive pictures and abstract pictures. Thus,
Hypothesis 2 was not supported. Abstract pictures, however, did result in greater ad-specific
memory than no pictures (M = 1.49).
Although Hypotheses 2a-2c were tested and not supported, further analysis was performed
to understand what levels of pictures were significantly different to cause the significant picture
main effect on ad-specific memory. As can be seen from Table 4.3, when pictures were broken
down into concrete (i.e., interactive and noninteractive combined), abstract, and no picture
conditions, abstract pictures (M=2.16) resulted in greater recall of ad-specific information than
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no pictures (M = 1.49). However, there was neither a significant difference between abstract and
concrete pictures nor between concrete and no pictures for ad-specific memory.
Instructions to Imagine (H7a). Hypothesis 7a stated, “As com pared to not including
instructions to imagine in an advertisement, including them will result in greater memory of ad
information." Since there was no significant main effect for Instructions to imagine for either carspecific memory or ad-specific memory, Hypothesis 7a was not supported.

Beliefs
As discussed in Chapter 3, two types of beliefs were measured and analyzed: specific
beliefs and inferred beliefs. Specific beliefs were tested with pictures and instructions to imagine
(Model F4249=0.47, p < 0.76). Main effects of pictures (F3249=0.57, p<0.64) and instructions to
imagine (F, 249=0.16, p<0.69) were not significant. Similarly, inferred beliefs were tested with
pictures and instructions to imagine (Model F4250 = 1.50, p<0.20). While the main effect of
pictures was not significant (F3 250=0.64, p < 0.59), the main effect of instructions to imagine was
significant (F1i250=4.01, p <0.046). Since the main effect of pictures w as not significant for either
specific or inferred beliefs, further analysis was not necessary. However, for com pleteness, the
analyses were performed and results summarized in Table 4.4.
Pictures versus No Pictures (H1b). Hypothesis 1b stated, "As com pared to not including a
picture in an advertisement, including a picture will result in stronger brand beliefs." Since there
w as no main effect of pictures on either specific or inferred beliefs, Hypothesis 1b w as not
supported.
Comparisons o f Picture Conditions (H3a-3c). Hypothesis 3 predicted effects of different
picture conditions on brand beliefs:
H3:Stronger brand beliefs will result when an advertisement contains:
a.
a concrete/interactive picture versus a concrete/noninteractive picture
b. a concrete/interactive picture versus an abstract picture
c. a concrete/noninteractive picture versus an abstract picture
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Table 4.4
E F F E C T S O F P IC T U R E C O N D IT IO N S O N B E L IE F S

Picture condition compared

n

Mean

Model l*
Picture
No Picture

188
62

42.09
41.37

Model 2b
Concrete
Abstract
No Picture

127
61
62

42.35
41.56
41.37

65
62
61
62

42.46
42.23
41.56
41. 37

Model 1*
Picture
No Picture

188
63

27.31
27.09

Model 2b
Concrete
Abstract
No Picture

127
61
63

27.49
26.93
27.09

65
62
61
63

27.86
27. 10
26.93
27.09

F

Specific Beliefs:
H

CO
•

Model 3C
Concrete/Interactive
Concrete/Noninteractive
Abstract
No Picture

.83

.57

inferred Beliefs:

Model 3C
Concrete/Interactive
Concrete/Noninteractive
Abstract
No Picture

.13

.44

.64

“Model 1 tested pictures (cells 1, 2, 3, 5, 6,and 7) versus
no pictures (cells 4 and 8).
bModel 2 tested concrete pictures (cells l, 2, 5, and 6)
versus abstract pictures (cells 3 and 7) versus no pictures
(cells 4 and 8).
‘Model 3 tested concrete/interactive pictures (cells 1 and
5) versus concrete/noninteractive pictures (cells 2 and 6)
versus abstract pictures (cells 3 and 7) versus no pictures
(cells 4 and 8).
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As with the test of Hypothesis 2, the test of Hypothesis 3 involved contrasts of different picture
conditions for brand beliefs. Thus, concrete/interactive pictures were com pared to
concrete/noninteractive pictures and abstract pictures, respectively, and concrete/noninteractive
pictures were com pared to abstract pictures. For specific beliefs, Bonferroni paired
com parisons revealed no significant differences at the p<0.05 level between concrete/interactive
pictures (M=42.46) and concrete/noninteractive pictures (M=42.23), between
concrete/interactive pictures and abstract pictures (M=41.56), or between
concrete/noninteractive pictures and abstract pictures. Similarly, for inferred beliefs, no
significant differences em erged between concrete/interactive pictures (M=27.86) and
concrete/noninteractive pictures (M=27.10), between concrete/interactive pictures and abstract
pictures (M=26.93), or between concrete/noninteractive pictures and abstract pictures. Results
of the contrasts were not unexpected due to the insignificant picture main effect. Thus,
Hypothesis 3 was not supported.
Instructions to Imagine (H7b). Hypothesis 7b stated, "As com pared to not including
instructions to imagine in an advertisement, including them will result in stronger brand beliefs."
Since there was a significant main effect for instructions to imagine for inferred beliefs
( M i n s t r u c t i o n 5=

27.77 and Mnolnstructions= 26.72, p <0.046), Hypothesis 7b w as supported.

Attitude Toward the Brand
Attitude toward the brand (AB) was tested with pictures and instructions to imagine (Model
F4,249=4.99. p<0.001). Main effects of pictures (F3 249 = 5.17, p<0.002) and instructions to
imagine (F^>249=4.49, p<0.04) were significant. Hypotheses 1c and 4a-4c predicted a significant
effect of pictures on Ae, and there w as a significant picture main effect for AB. Thus, further
analyses of the effects of different picture conditions were performed, and results are
summarized in Table 4.5.
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Table 4.5
E F F E C T S O F P IC T U R E C O N D IT IO N S O N Ae

Picture condition compared

n

Mean8

Model lb
Picture
No Picture

187
63

41. 68*
38. 46a

Model 2C
Concrete
Abstract
No Picture

126
61
63

42.67ab
39.64a
38.46 B

64
62
61
63

43.2 5ab
42.06 c
39.64 B
38.4 6ac

Model 3d
Concrete/Interactive
Concrete/Noninteractive
Abstract
No Picture

F
8.02®

7 .26e

5.17e

aMeans within each model marked with matching capital letter
superscripts represent significant contrasts (p<.05) as
indicated by Bonferroni paired comparisons.
‘’Model 1 tested pictures (cells 1, 2, 3, 5, 6,and 7) versus
no pictures (cells 4 and 8).
cModel 2 tested concrete pictures (cells 1, 2 , 5, and 6)
versus abstract pictures (cells 3 and 7) versus no pictures
cells 4 and 8).
lodel 3 tested concrete/interactive pictures (cells 1 and
5) versus concrete/noninteractive pictures (cells 2 and 6)
versus abstract pictures (cells 3 and 7) versus no pictures
(cells 4 and 8).
ep < .05

4
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Pictures versus No Pictures (H1c). Hypothesis 1c stated, "As com pared to not including a
picture in an advertisement, including a picture will result in more positive brand attitudes.” This
hypothesis w as supported (F1249=8.02, pcO.005), with the m ean Ag equal to 41.68 In the picture
condition and 38.46 in the no picture condition. Thus, Hypothesis 1c w as supported.
Comparisons o f Picture Conditions (H4a-4c). Hypothesis 4 predicted effects of different
picture conditions on A^
H4:

More positive brand attitudes will result when an advertisement contains:
a.
a concrete/interactive picture versus a concrete/noninteractive picture
b. a concrete/interactive picture versus an abstract picture
c. a concrete/noninteractive picture versus an abstract picture

Bonferroni paired com parisons revealed no significant differences at the p<0.05 level between
concrete/interactive pictures (M=43.25) and concrete/noninteractive pictures (M =42.06) or
between concrete/noninteractive pictures and abstract pictures (M=39.64), but a significant
difference w as found between concrete/interactive pictures and abstract pictures. Although not
specifically hypothesized, concrete/interactive pictures resulted in a significantly greater AB than
no pictures (M=38.46). Thus, Hypothesis 4a and 4c were not supported, but Hypothesis 4b was
supported.
Further analysis w as performed to analyze effects of concrete, abstract, and no pictures on
Ae.

Ascan be seen from Table 4.5, when pictures were broken down into concrete (i.e.,

interactive and noninteractive combined), abstract, and no picture conditions (Model 2 in Table
4.5), concrete pictures (M=42.67) resulted in a more positive AB than both abstract pictures
(M=39.64) and no pictures (M=38.46).
instructions to Imagine (H7c). Hypothesis 7c stated, "As com pared to not including
instructions to imagine in an advertisement, including them will result in m ore positive brand
attitudes." Because the mean Aa score in the instructions condition (M=41.87) w as significantly
different than (p<0.04) in the no instruction condition (M=39.83), Hypothesis 7c w as supported.
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Attitude Toward the Advertisement
Attitude toward the advertisement (Aad) was tested with pictures and instructions to imagine
(Model F424g=8.74, p<0.0001). Main effects of pictures (F3249=4.78, p<0.003) and instructions
to imagine (F1249 = 20.21, p < 0.0001) were significant. H ypotheses Id and 5a-5c predicted a
significant effect of pictures on Aad, and there w as a significant picture main effect for Aad. Thus,
further analysis of effects of different levels of pictures w as performed, and results are
summarized in Table 4.6.
Pictures versus No Pictures (H1d). Hypothesis id stated, "As com pared to not including a
picture in an advertisement, including a picture will result in more positive attitudes toward the
advertisement." No significant difference between the two conditions w as evident (F1249 =0.74,
p<0.39), with the mean Aad equal to 22.95 in the picture condition and 22.25 in the no picture
condition. Thus, Hypothesis 1d was not supported.
Comparisons of Picture Conditions (H5a-5c). Hypothesis 5 predicted effects of different
picture conditions on Aad:
H5:

More positive attitudes toward the advertisem ent will result when an advertisement
contains:
a. a concrete/interactive picture versus a concrete/noninteractive picture
b. a concrete/interactive picture versus an abstract picture
c. a concrete/noninteractive picture versus an abstract picture

Bonferroni paired com parisons revealed no significant differences at the p<0.05 level between
concrete/interactive pictures (M=24.64) and concrete/noninteractive pictures (M=22.95) or
between concrete/noninteractive pictures and abstract pictures (M=21.16). However, there was
a significant difference between concrete/interactive pictures and abstract pictures. Thus,
H ypotheses 5a and 5c were not supported, but 5b w as supported. Furthermore,
concrete/interactive pictures resulted in a more positive Aa0 than no pictures.
Further analysis w as performed to analyze effects of concrete, abstract, and no pictures on
Aad. As can be seen from Table 4.6, when pictures were broken down into concrete (i.e.,
interactive and noninteractive combined), abstract, and no picture conditions, concrete pictures
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Table 4.6
E F F E C T S O F P IC T U R E C O N D IT IO N S O N

n

Mean8

Model lb
Picture
No Picture

187
63

22.95
22.25

Model 2C
Concrete
Abstract
No Picture

126
61
63

23.81*
21.16*
22.25

Picture condition compared

Model 3d
Concrete/Interactive
Concrete/Noninteractive
Abstract
No Picture

F
.74

5.26e

4.78e
64
62
61
63

24 .64ab
22 .95
21.16*
22.25 B

aMeans within each model marked with matching capital letter
superscripts represent significant contrasts (p<.05) as
indicated by Bonferroni paired comparisons.
bModel 1 tested pictures (cells 1, 2, 3 , 5, 6,and 7) versus
no pictures (cells 4 and 8).
cModel 2 tested concrete pictures (cells 1 , 2, 5, and 6)
versus abstract pictures (cells 3 and 7) versus no pictures
(cells 4 and 8).
“Model 3 tested concrete/interactive pictures (cells 1 and
5) versus concrete/noninteractive pictures (cells 2 and 6)
versus abstract pictures (cells 3 and 7) versus no pictures
(cells 4 and 8).
ep < .05
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(M=23.81) resulted in a more positive Aad than abstract pictures (M=21.16) but not for the no
picture condition (M=22.25).
Instructions to Imagine (H7d). Hypothesis 76 stated, "As com pared to not including
instructions to imagine in an advertisement, including them will result in more positive attitudes
toward the advertisement." The mean Aad score in the instructions condition (M=24.24) w as
significantly different than (p<0.0001) in the no Instruction condition (M=21.25). Thus,
Hypothesis 7d w as supported.

Intentions
Intentions were tested with pictures and instructions to imagine (Model F4 2A9 = 1.67,
p<0.16). Main effects of pictures (F3249 = 1.72, p<0.16) and instructions to imagine (F1249 = 1.50,
p < 0.22) were not significant. Since the main effect of pictures was not significant for intentions,
further analyses w as not necessary. However, for com pleteness, the analyses w ere performed
and the results summarized in Table 4.7.
Pictures versus No Pictures (H1e). Hypothesis 1e stated, "As com pared to not including a
picture in an advertisement, including one will result in greater behavioral intentions."
Since there was no main effect of pictures on intentions, Hypothesis 1e w as not supported.
Comparisons o f Picture Conditions (H6a-6c). Hypothesis 6 predicted the effects of different
levels of pictures on intentions:
H5:

Greater behavioral intentions will result when an advertisement contains:
a. a concrete/interactive picture versus a concrete/noninteractive picture
b. a concrete/interactive picture versus an abstract picture
c. a concrete/noninteractive picture versus an abstract picture

Bonferroni paired com parisons revealed no significant differences at the p<0.05 level between
concrete/interactive pictures (M=26.03) and concrete/noninteractive pictures (M=22.08),
between concrete/interactive pictures and abstract pictures (M=26.57), or between
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Table 4.7
E F F E C T S O F P IC T U R E C O N D IT IO N S O N IN T E N T IO N S

Picture condition compared

n

Mean

Model la
Picture
No Picture

187
63

26.56
25.23

Model 2b
Concrete
Abstract
No Picture

126
61
63

24 .58
26.57
26.56

64
62
61
63

26. 03
22 .08
26.57
26.56

Model 3C
Concrete/Interactive
Concrete/Noninteractive
Abstract
No Picture

F
.82

1.22

1.72

aModel 1 tested pictures (cells 1, 2, 3, 5, 6,and 7) versus
no pictures (cells 4 and 8).
'’Model 2 tested concrete pictures (cells l, 2, 5, and 6)
versus abstract pictures (cells 3 and 7) versus no pictures
(cells 4 and 8).
cModel 3 tested concrete/interactive pictures (cells 1 and
5) versus concrete/noninteractive pictures (cells 2 and 6)
versus abstract pictures (cells 3 and 7) versus no pictures
(cells 4 and 8).
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concrete/noninteractive pictures and abstract pictures, which w as not unexpected due to the
insignificant picture main effect. Thus, Hypothesis 5 was not supported.
Instructions to Imagine (H7e). Hypothesis 7e stated, "As com pared to not including
instructions to imagine in an advertisement, including them will result in greater behavioral
intentions." Since there w as not a significant main effect for instructions to imagine on intentions
( ^ in s tr u c tio n ^

26.34 and Mnolnsmjctlons= 24.76, p<0.16), Hypothesis 7e w as not supported.

Moderating Role o f Style o f Processing (H8)
Hypothesis 8 stated that an individual’s style of processing would m oderate relationships
between imagery-eliciting strategies and consequence variables:
H8:

Relationships given in Hypotheses 1a through 7e will be stronger a s individuals
prefer a visual style of processing.

Style of processing’s moderating role between manipulated imagery-eliciting strategies and
consequence variables w as assesse d by re-analyzing H ypotheses 1a-7e with style of processing
included. According to Baron and Kenny (1986), a significant interaction between
multichotomous independent variables and continuous moderating variables indicates a
moderating relationship. Analyses were performed for each consequence variable, and results
are reported in Table 4.8. As can be seen from Table 4.8, no significant interactions between
pictures and style of processing and between instructions to imagine and style of processing
em erged for any consequence variable. However, style of processing exhibited a significant
main effect on Aad.
Further analyses were performed in which the 20-item SOP scale w as broken down into its
10-item visual and 10-item verbal com ponents. Each subscale w as dichotomized into high and
low based on a median split. The above analyses were performed again with two style of
processing variables: visual (high and low) and verbal (high and low). A significant interaction
between an independent variable and the proposed m oderator would indicate a moderating

Table 4.8
T E S T S F O R M ODERATING RO LE O F STYLE O F P R O C E S S IN G
O N RELA TIO N SH IPS BETW EEN IMAGERY-EUCITING STRA TEG IES
AND C O N S E Q U E N C E VARIABLES

Source

Car-specific
Memory

Ad-specific
Memory

F-Values
Specific
Beliefs

Inferred
Beliefs

^AD

Inten
tions

Picture

.63

3 .36a

.75

1.02

5.46a

4.94a

1.83

Instructions

.11

.84

.02

2.51

4.38a

18.58a

1.65

SOPb

2.83

.01

1.94

2.94

1.44

6.29a

3.11

SOP*Picture

1.03

1. 67

.56

.33

.09

.97

.49

.24

.06

.00

1.70

.73

.16

.05

SOP*Instructions

ap<.05
bSOP=Style of processing
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relationship. Similar to th e previous analyses in which style of processing w as analyzed a s a
continuous variable, no significant interactions em erged. Thus, when style of processing w as
analyzed a s a continuous variable or a s two categorical variables, Hypothesis 8 w as not
supported.

Summary
In this section, effects of manipulated imagery-eliciting strategies of different picture
conditions and instructions to imagine on con seq u en ce variables of memory, beliefs, attitude
tow ard the brand, attitude toward the advertisement, and intentions w ere examined. While not
all hypotheses tested were supported, several were, especially for AB and Aad. It w as found that
pictures and instructions to imagine included in a print advertisem ent did significantly affect AB
and Aad. Including pictures in an advertisem ent resulted in greater ad-specific memory than not
including pictures, but further analysis revealed only abstract pictures to be better than no
pictures. For A0, including a picture resulted in more positive attitudes than not including a
picture in an advertisement. When analyzed further, it w as found that concrete pictures resulted
in a m ore positive AB than abstract and no pictures, respectively. However, when concrete
pictures w ere separated into concrete/interactive and concrete/noninteractive pictures, both
concrete/interactive pictures and concrete/noninteractive w ere significantly greater than no
pictures, which is consistent with the result that concrete pictures (i.e., interactive and
noninteractive com bined) resulted in a more positive AB than no pictures. Abstract pictures
resulted in the lowest Aad ratings, but th e se were only significantly lower than
concrete/interactive pictures. Including instructions to imagine in an advertisem ent resulted in
greater inferred beliefs, and m ore positive attitudes (i.e., Ae and Aad). With respect to
relationships between imagery-eliciting strategies and con seq u en ce variables, a m oderating roie
of style of processing w as not supported, but style of processing did exhibit a significant main
effect on Aad.
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IM A G E R Y -E L IC IT IN G S T R A T E G IE S A N D IM A G E R Y P R O C E S S I N G

Hypotheses 9a-12c postulated effects of manipulated imagery-eliciting strategies on quality,
elaboration, and quantity dimensions of imagery processing. While not all hypotheses were
supported, several were, and they expand the extant knowledge base concerning relationships
between imagery-eliciting strategies and imagery processing.
Since quality, quantity, and elaboration are related dimensions of imagery processing, an
initial multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA option in the General Linear Model procedure in
SAS) w as conducted, and results are reported in Table 4.9. Since overall effects of pictures
(Wilks’ X = 0.92, F=2.44, p<0.01) and instructions to imagine (Wilks’ X = 0.96, F=3.69, p<0.01)
were significant, separate analyses of variance were conducted. Individual models were
estimated with the General Linear Model procedure in SAS with Bonferroni paired com parisons
when necessary. The General Linear Model procedure was used instead of the ANOVA
procedure to account for differences in sample sizes when comparing different combinations of
pictures. Means for the effects of pictures and instructions to imagine on dimensions of imagery
processing were given in Table 4.2.
Results are reported in order of quality, elaboration, and quantity dimensions of imagery
processing, respectively. Similar to analyses conducted in the previous section, when analyzing
effects of different picture conditions, three different models were estimated: (1) one in which
cells 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, and 7 (i.e., pictures) and ceils 4 and 8 (i.e., no pictures) were collapsed to
examine effects of pictures versus no pictures (Hypothesis 9a-9c), (2) one in which cells 1, 2, 5,
and 6 (i.e., concrete pictures), cells 3 and 7 (i.e., abstract pictures), and cells 4 and 7 (no
pictures) were collapsed to examine effects of concrete versus abstract versus no pictures
(Hypotheses 10a-10c), and (3) paired com parisons of all four picture conditions were examined
(Hypotheses Ha-11c).
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Table 4.9
EFFECTS OF PICTURES AND INSTRUCTIONS TO IMAGINE
ON QUALITY, QUANTITY, AND ELABORATION

S ources

MANOVA
Wilks’ X
F-Value

Quality

ANOVA F-Values________
Quantity
Elaboration

Pictures

0.92

2.44“

4.56*

0.80

0.47

Instructions
to imagine

0.96

3.69“

9.39*

4.70“

5.19“

“p<.05
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Quality
Quality was tested with pictures and instructions to imagine {Model F4250=5.77, p<0.0002).
Main effects of pictures (F3250=4.56, p < 0.004) and instructions to imagine (F1250=9.39,
p <0.002) were significant. Hypotheses 9a, 10a, and 11a predicted a significant effect of pictures
on quality, and there w as a significant picture main effect for quality. Thus, further analysis of
effects of different picture conditions was performed, and results are summarized in Table 4.10.
Pictures versus No Pictures (H9a). Hypothesis 9a stated, "As com pared to not including a
picture in an advertisement, including one will result in higher quality of imagery processing."
This hypothesis was supported (F1 249 =3.93, p<0.048), with the mean quality score equal to
72.11 in the picture condition and 65.90 in the no picture condition. Since including pictures in
the advertisement resulted in higher quality imagery processing when com pared to not including
pictures in the advertisement, Hypothesis 9a was supported.
Comparisons o f Picture Conditions (HlOa and H11a). Hypotheses 10 and 11 predicted
effects of different picture conditions on dimensions of imagery processing. Hypothesis 10
concerned concrete and abstract pictures, and Hypothesis 11 concerned concrete/interactive
pictures and concrete/noninteractive pictures.
Hypothesis 10a stated, "As compared to including an abstract picture in an advertisement,
including a concrete picture will result in higher quality of imagery processing." Bonferroni
paired com parisons revealed a significant difference between concrete pictures (M=75.22) and
abstract pictures (M = 65.64) on quality of imagery processing. Thus, Hypothesis 10a was
supported.
Hypothesis 11a stated, "As com pared to including a concrete/noninteractive picture in an
advertisement, including a concrete/interactive picture will result in higher quality of imagery
processing." Bonferroni paired comparisons did not reveal a significant difference between
concrete/interactive pictures (M=73.60) and concrete/noninteractive pictures (M=76.92). Thus,
Hypothesis 11a was not supported.
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T able 4.10
E F F E C T S O F P IC T U R E C O N D IT IO N S
O N Q U A LITY O F IM A G E R Y P R O C E S S IN G

Picture condition compared

n

Mean8

Model lb
Picture
No Picture

188
63

72.11
65.90

Model 2C
Concrete
Abstract
No Picture

127
61
63

75.22AB
65.64 a
65.90 B

65
62
61
63

73.60
76. 92ab
65.64a
65.90 B

Model 3d
Concrete/Interactive
Concrete/Noninteractive
Abstract
No Picture

F
3 .93e

6.23e

4 .56e

0Means within each model marked with matching capital letter
superscripts represent significant contrasts (p<.05) as
indicated by Bonferroni paired comparisons.
‘’Model 1 tested pictures (cells 1, 2, 3, 5, 6,and 7) versus
no pictures (cells 4 and 8).
cModel 2 tested concrete pictures (cells 1, 2, 5, and 6)
versus abstract pictures (cells 3 and 7) versus no pictures
cells 4 and 8).
lodel 3 tested concrete/interactive pictures (cells l and
5) versus concrete/noninteractive pictures (cells 2 and 6)
versus abstract pictures (cells 3 and 7) versus no pictures
(cells 4 and 8).
ep<. 05

4
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Instructions to Imagine (H12a). Hypothesis 12a stated, "As compared to not including
instructions to imagine in an advertisement, including them will result in higher quality of imagery
processing." The mean quality score in the instructions condition (M=74.51) was significantly
different than (p<0.002) in the no instruction condition (M=66.44). Thus, Hypothesis 12a was
supported.

Elaboration
Elaboration was tested with pictures and instructions to imagine (Model F4250 = 1.62,
p<0.17). While the main effect of pictures (F3j 50= 0 . 47 , p<0.70) was not significant, the main
effect of instructions to imagine was (Fn2S0=5.19, p<0.02). Since the main effect of pictures was
not significant for elaboration, further analysis was not necessary. However, for completeness,
the analyses were performed, and results are summarized in Table 4.11.
Pictures versus No Pictures (H9b). Hypothesis 9b stated, "As compared to not including a
picture in an advertisement, including one will result in less elaboration of imagery processing."
Since there was no main effect for pictures on elaboration of imagery processing when
comparing pictures (M= 13.05) to no pictures (M = 12.36), Hypothesis 9b was not supported.
Comparisons o f Picture Conditions (H10b and HUb). Hypothesis 10b stated, "As
compared to including an abstract picture in an advertisement, including a concrete picture will
result in less elaboration of imagery processing." Bonferroni paired comparisons revealed no
significant differences between concrete pictures (M = 13.01) and abstract pictures (M=12.36),
which would be expected because of the overall insignificant picture main effect. Thus,
Hypothesis 10b was not supported. Hypothesis 11b stated, "As compared to including an
concrete/noninteractive picture in an advertisement, including a concrete/interactive picture will
result in less elaboration of imagery processing." Again, no significant difference between
concrete/interactive pictures (M = 12.83) and concrete/noninteractive pictures (M= 13.19) was
evident. Thus, Hypothesis 11 b was not supported.
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T able 4.11
E F F E C T S O F P IC T U R E C O N D IT IO N S
O N E L A B O R A T IO N O F IM A G E R Y P R O C E S S I N G

Picture condition compared

n

Mean

1.04

Model 1*
Picture
No Picture

188
63

13.05
12. 36

Model 2b
Concrete
Abstract
No Picture

127
61
63

13.01
13. 15
12 .36

65
62
61
63

12.83
13. 19
13 .15
12.36

Model 3C
Concrete/Interactive
Concrete/Noninteractive
Abstract
No Picture

F

.54

.47

'Model 1 tested pictures (cells 1, 2 i 3 » 5 f 6,and 7) versus
no pictures (cells 4 and 8).
hModel 2 tested concrete pictures (cells 1, 2, 5, and 6)
versus abstract pictures (cells 3 and 7) versus no pictures
(cells 4 and 8).
'Model 3 tested concrete/interactive pictures (cells 1 and
5) versus concrete/noninteractive pictures (cells 2 and 6)
versus abstract pictures (cells 3 and 7) versus no pictures
(cells 4 and 8).
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Instructions to imagine (Hl2b). Hypothesis 12b stated, "As compared to not including
instructions to imagine in an advertisement, including them will result In greater elaboration of
imagery processing." The mean elaboration score In the instructions condition (M=13.52) was
significantly different than (p<0.02) in the no instruction condition (M =12.21). Thus, Hypothesis
12b was supported.

Quantity
Quantity was tested with pictures and instructions to imagine (Model F4249 = 1.75, p<0.14).
While the main effect of pictures (F324g=0.80, p<0.50) was not significant, the main effect of
instructions to imagine was (F1i249 =4.70, p<0.03). Since the main effect of pictures was not
significant for quantity, further analysis was not necessary. However, for completeness, analyses
were performed, and results are summarized in Table 4.12.
Pictures versus No Pictures (H9c). Hypothesis 9c stated, "As compared to not including a
picture in an advertisement, including one will result in greater quantity of imagery processing."
There was no significant difference between pictures (M = 12.18) and no pictures (M = 11.32).
Thus, Hypothesis 9c was not supported.
Comparisons of Picture Conditions (H10c and H11c). Hypothesis 10c stated, “As
compared to including an abstract picture in an advertisement, including a concrete picture will
result in a smaller quantity of imagery processing." Since there was no significant main effect for
pictures on quantity, Hypothesis 10c was not supported. Hypothesis 11c stated, "As compared
to including a concrete/noninteractive picture in an advertisement, including a
concrete/interactive picture will result in a greater quantity of imagery processing." Hypothesis
11c was not supported due to an insignificant main effect of pictures on quantity of imagery
processing.
instructions to Imagine {H12c). Hypothesis 12c stated, “As compared to not including
instructions to imagine in an advertisement, including them will result in greater quantity of
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Table 4.12
E F F E C T S O F P IC T U R E C O N D IT IO N S
O N Q U A N TITY O F IM A G ER Y P R O C E S S IN G

n

Mean

Model 1*
Picture
No Picture

187
63

12.18
11.32

Model 2b
Concrete
Abstract
No Picture

126
61
63

12.15
12.25
11.32

64
62
61
63

12.38
11.92
12.25
11. 32

Picture condition compared

Model 3C
Concrete/Interactive
Concrete/Noninteractive
Abstract
No Picture

F
1.91

.96

.80

‘Model 1 tested pictures (cells 1, 2 / 3 / 5 t 6,and 7) versus
no pictures (cells 4 and 8).
hModel 2 tested concrete pictures (cells 1, 2, 5, and 6)
versus abstract pictures (cells 3 and 7) versus no pictures
(cells 4 and 8).
cModel 3 tested concrete/interactive pictures (cells 1 and
5) versus concrete/noninteractive pictures (cells 2 and 6)
versus abstract pictures (cells 3 and 7) versus no pictures
(cells 4 and 8).
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imagery processing." The m ean quantity score in the instructions condition (M = 12.54) w as
significantly different than (p<0.03) in th e no instruction condition (M = 11.37). Thus, Hypothesis
12c w as supported.

M oderating Role o f Style o f Processing (H13)
Hypothesis 13 stated that an individual's style of processing would m oderate relationships
betw een imagery-eliciting strategies and dim ensions of imagery processing:
H13:

Relationships given in H ypotheses 9a through 12c will be stronger a s individuals
prefer a visual style of processing.

Style of processing’s moderating role between manipulated imagery-eliciting strategies and
dim ensions of imagery processing w as a sse sse d by re-analyzing H ypotheses 9a-12c with style
of processing included. According to Baron and Kenny (1986), a significant interaction between
multichotomous independent variables and continuous m oderating variables indicates a
m oderating relationship. Analyses were performed for each dimension of imagery processing,
and results are reported in Table 4.13. As can be seen from Table 4.13, no significant
interactions betw een pictures and style of processing and betw een instructions to imagine and
style of processing em erged for any dimension of imagery processing, but style of processing
did exhibit a significant main effect on elaboration of imagery processing.
Further analyses w ere performed in which the 20-item SOP scale w as broken down into its
10-item visual and 10-item verbal com ponents. Each subscale w as dichotom ized into high and
low based on a m edian split. The above analyses w ere performed again with two style of
processing variables: visual (high and low) and verbal (high and low). A significant interaction
betw een an independent variable and the proposed m oderator would indicate a moderating
relationship. Similar to the previous analyses in which style of processing w as analyzed a s a
continuous variable, no significant interactions em erged. Thus, w hen style of processing w as
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T able 4.13
TESTS FOR MODERATING ROLE OF STYLE OF PROCESSING
ON RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN IMAGERY-ELICITING STRATEGIES
AND DIMENSIONS OF IMAGERY PROCESSING

Source

IS

SOPb

O
CM
«

Instructions

a
O
VO
•

Picture

Quality

2.21

F-Values
Elaboration
.54

Quantity
.69

4.22°

3.55

9. 58 b

.63

SOP*Picture

.16

1.25

.19

SOP*Instructions

.02

1.05

1. 38

ap < .05
bSOP=Style of processing
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analyzed a s a continuous variable or a s two categorical variables, Hypothesis 13 w as not
supported.

Summary
In this section, effects of m anipulated imagery-eliciting strategies of different picture
conditions and instructions to imagine on imagery processing dim ensions of quality, elaboration,
and quantity w ere examined. While not all hypotheses tested were supported, several were,
especially for quality. It w as found that pictures and instructions to imagine included in a print
advertisem ent did significantly affect quality of imagery processing. Including pictures in an
advertisem ent, specifically concrete pictures, tended to result in higher quality imagery when
com pared to abstract and no pictures. Including instructions to imagine within m essage stimuli
also resulted in higher quality imagery, greater quantity of imagery, and greater elaboration of
imagery than not including instructions to imagine. The moderating role of style of processing
w as not supported.

IMAGERY PROCESSING AND CONSEQUENCE VARIABLES
H ypotheses 14a-16e predicted relationships between dim ensions of imagery processing
and co n seq u en ce variables of memory, beliefs, AB, Aad, and intentions. Each hypothesis
predicted that relationships between dim ensions of imagery processing and con seq u en ce
variables would be positive. Each co nsequence variable w as regressed on the three dim ensions
of im agery processing (i.e., quality, quantity, and elaboration). Therefore, seven separate
multiple regressions were performed, and results are sum m arized in Table 4.14. Results are
reported in order of consequence variables of memory, beliefs, Ae, Aad, and intentions,
respectively.
Models w ere estim ated with the regression procedure in SAS. Since the three dim ensions
of imagery processing are separate, but related constructs, diagnostics were performed to
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T able 4.14
EFFECTS OF DIMENSIONS OF IMAGERY PROCESSING
ON MEMORY, BELIEFS, ATTITUDES, AND INTENTIONS

Cons equence
Variable
Memory:
Car

Ad

Beliefs:
Specific

Inferred

ab

■^AD

Intentions

ap < . 05

Independent
Variable

Standardized
Estimate

R2

F

Quality
Elaboration
Quantity

.10
-.04
.08

.02

1.37

Quality
Elaboration
Quantity

.15
-.14
.08

.02

1.74

Quality
Elaboration
Quantity

.35a
-.06
.03

.10

9.53

Quality
Elaboration
Quantity

.30a
.12
-.04

.13

12.68

Quality
Elaboration
Quantity

.30a
.39°
-.02

.37

48. 19

Quality
Elaboration
Quantity

.42a
.20a
.02

.33

39.40

Quality
Elaboration
Quantity

.03
.46a
.02

.24

26.00
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ensure no problems with multicollinearity among the three dimensions. Neter, Wasserman, and
Kutner (1985) recommend assessing variance inflation factors (VIF) as one formal method of
detecting multicollinearity. These factors measure how much the variances of estimated
regression coefficients are inflated compared to when Independent variables are not linearly
related. The VIF of an independent variable is equal to one when that Independent variable is
not linearly related to other independent variables. The authors recommend, "examining the
largest VIF among the independent variables as an indicator of the severity of multicollinearity,
and a VIF in excess of 10 is often taken as an indicator that multicollinearity may be unduly
influencing the least squares estimates" (p. 392). Variance inflation factors were estimated for
independent variables of quality, quantity, and elaboration, and they were 1.65, 1.22, and 1.82,
respectively. Thus, the VIF's are within acceptable levels recommended by Neter et al. (1985),
and multicollinearity was not considered a problem. Furthermore, rigorous evaluation of
dimensionality that was performed during the scale development stage of the dimensions
mitigated multicollinearity.

Memory
Car-specific memory and ad-specific memory were regressed on the three dimensions of
imagery processing, respectively. For car-specific memory, the overall model was not significant
(Model F3 248 = 1.37, p < 0.25). Similarly, the overall model was not significant for ad-specific
memory (Model F3248 = 1.74, p<0.16). Results are summarized in Table 4.14.
Quality (H14a). Hypothesis 14a stated, "Quality of imagery processing is positively related
to memory of ad information." For either car-specific memory or ad-specific memory,
standardized regression coefficients for quality were not significant (£=0.10, p<0.20 and £=0.15,
p<0.06, respectively). Thus, Hypothesis 14a was not supported.
Elaboration (H15a). Hypothesis 15a stated, “Elaboration of imagery processing is positively
related to memory of ad information." For either car-specific or ad-specific memory,
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standardized regression coefficients for elaboration were not significant (0=-O.O4, p < 0.68 and
0=-O.14, p < 0 . 1 0 0 0 , respectively). Thus, Hypothesis 15a was not supported.
Quantity (H16a). Hypothesis 16a stated, "Quality of imagery processing is positively related
to memory of ad information." For either car-specific or ad-specific memory, standardized
regression coefficients were not significant (0=0.08, p < 0.26 and 0=0.08, p<0.26, respectively).
Thus, Hypothesis 16a was not supported.

Beliefs
Specific beliefs and inferred beliefs were regressed on the three dimensions of imagery
processing, respectively. For specific beliefs, the overall model was significant (Model
F3 2 4 a =9.53, p < 0 .0 0 0 1 ). Similarly, the overall model w as significant for inferred beliefs (Model
F3 248 = 1 2 .6 8 , p <0.0001). Results are summarized in Table 4.14.
Quality (Hl4b). Hypothesis 14b stated, "Quality of imagery processing is positively related
to brand beliefs." For both specific and inferred beliefs, standardized regression coefficients for
quality were significant and positive (0=0.35, p<0.0001 and 0=0.30, p<0.0001, respectively),
indicating a positive relationship between quality of imagery processing and both specific and
inferred beliefs. Thus, Hypothesis 14b was supported.
Elaboration (H1Sb). Hypothesis 15b stated, "Elaboration of imagery processing is positively
related to brand beliefs." For either specific or inferred beliefs, standardized regression
coefficients for elaboration were not significant (0=-O.O6, p<0.48 and 0=0.12, p<0.14,
respectively). Thus, Hypothesis 15b was not supported.
Quantity (H16b). Hypothesis 16b stated, "Quantity of imagery processing is positively
related to brand beliefs." For either specific or inferred beliefs, standardized regression
coefficients were not significant (0=0.03, p<0.63 and 0=-O.O4, p < 0.56, respectively). Thus,
Hypothesis 16b was not supported.
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Attitude Toward the Brand
Aq w as regressed on the three dimensions of imagery processing. The overall model w as
significant (Model F324e=48.19, p < 0 .0 0 0 1 ) with an R2 of .37, and results are summarized in
Table 4.14.
Quality (H14c). Hypothesis 14c stated, "Quality of imagery processing is positively related
to brand attitudes." The standardized regression coefficient for quality w as significant and
positive (/3=0.30, p<0.0001), indicating a positive relationship between quality of imagery
processing and A0. Thus, Hypothesis 14c w as supported.
Elaboration (H15c). Hypothesis 15c stated. “Elaboration of imagery processing is positively
related to brand attitudes." The standardized regression coefficient for elaboration was
significant and positive (/5=0.39, p<0.0001), indicating a positive relationship between
elaboration of imagery processing and AB. Thus, Hypothesis 15c w as supported.
Quantity (H16c). Hypothesis 16c stated, “Quantity of imagery processing is positively
related to brand attitudes." The standardized regression coefficient was not significant 05=-0 .0 2 ,
p < 0.68). Thus, Hypothesis 16c w as not supported.

Attitude Toward the Advertisement
Aad w as regressed on the three dimensions of imagery processing. The overall model w as
significant (Model F3 248 =39.40, p<0.0001) with an R2 of 0.33, and results are summarized in
Table 4.14.
Quality (H l4d). Hypothesis I4d stated, "Quality of imagery processing is positively related
to attitude toward the advertisement." The standardized regression coefficient for quality w as
significant and positive (/?=0.42, p<0.0001), indicating a positive relationship between quality of
imagery processing and Aad. Thus, Hypothesis I4d w as supported.
Elaboration (H15d). Hypothesis 15d stated, “Elaboration of imagery processing is positively
related to attitude toward the advertisement." The standardized regression coefficient for
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elaboration w as significant and positive (/9=0.20, p < 0 .0 1 ), indicating a positive relationship
between quality of imagery processing and Aad. Thus, Hypothesis 15d w as supported.
Quantity (H l6d). Hypothesis 16d stated, "Quantity of imagery processing is positively
related to attitude toward the advertisement."

The standardized regression coefficient w as not

significant 03=0.02, p < 0.76). Thus, Hypothesis 16d w as not supported.

Intentions
Intentions were regressed on the three dimensions of imagery processing. The overall
model w as significant (Model F3 24e= 26.00, p < 0.0001) with an R2 equal to 0.24, and results are
summarized in Table 4.14.
Quality (Hl4e). Hypothesis 14e stated, "Quality of imagery processing is positively related
to behavioral intentions." The standardized regression coefficient for quality w as not significant
03=0.03, p < 0.67). Thus, Hypothesis 14e was not supported.
Elaboration (H15e). Hypothesis 15e stated, "Elaboration of imagery processing is positively
related behavioral intentions." The standardized regression coefficient for elaboration was
significant and positive 05=0.46, p<0.0001), indicating a positive relationship between
elaboration of imagery processing and intentions. Thus, Hypothesis 15e w as supported.
Quantity (H16e). Hypothesis 16e stated, "Quantity of imagery processing is positively
related to behavioral intentions." The standardized regression coefficient was not significant
03=0.02, p < 0.76). Thus, Hypothesis 16e w as not supported.

Summary
In this section, effects of quality, elaboration, and quantity of imagery processing on
memory, beliefs, AB, Aad, and intentions were examined. While not all hypotheses tested were
supported, several were, especially for quality of imagery processing on beliefs and attitudes and
elaboration of imagery processing on attitudes and intentions. The significant relationships were
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all positive. Only quantity of imagery processing did not have any effect on consequence
variables, and thus was not considered in the next set of analyses in which the mediating role of
imagery processing dimensions between imagery-eliciting strategies and consequence variables
w as assessed.

MEDIATING ROLE OF IMAGERY PROCESSING
According to Baron and Kenny (1986), a variable can only be considered a mediating
variable if that variable as well as independent variables significantly influence a dependent
variable, and the independent variables must significantly influence the mediating variable (i.e.,
paths a, b, and c In Figure 4.1 must be significant). If these relationships hold, then dependent
variables are regressed on independent variables with mediating variables included as
covariates. If previously significant Independent variables become insignificant and mediating
variables are significant, then the covariate is acting as a mediating variable. If independent
variables are still significant but not as significant as previously, a reduced parameter estimate
indicates partial mediation by the covariate (Baron and Kenny 1986).
Hypothesis 17 stated, "Relationships given in Hypotheses 1 a through 7e are mediated by
the dimensions of imagery processing in the directions specified in Hypotheses 14a through 16e,
respectively." Since paths a, b, and c in Figure 4.1 must all be significant before a test for
mediation can be performed, not every independent variable, consequence variable, or imagery
processing dimension was included in a test for mediation. Thus, Table 4.15 highlights the
variables that could be included in tests for mediation. Only variables that were significantly
influenced by a manipulated independent variable(s) and dimension(s) of imagery processing
could be tested. Furthermore, to be included, a dimension must have been influenced by an
independent variable, also. The mediating effect of imagery processing is discussed in order of
consequence variables of memory, beliefs, AB, Aad, and intentions.

VARIABLES EXHIBITING SIGNIFICANT MAIN EFFECTS ON
CONSEQUENCE VARIABLES AND DIMENSIONS OF IMAGERY PROCESSING
Independent
V a ria b le s

C a r - s p e c if ic
Memory

Consequence V a ria b le s__________________________________________________
A d -sp ec if ic
S p e c if ic
I n f e rre d
B e lie f s
B e lie f s
I n te n tio n s
Memory
A
A.

Dim ensions o f
Imaoerv P ro cessin g
Q u a lity
E la b o ra tio n
Q u a n tity

P ic tu r e s

No

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

No

Ho

I n s tr u c tio n s
to Im agine

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Q u a lity

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

E la b o ra tio n

No

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Q u a n tity

No

No

No

No

No

No

No
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Furthermore, since there w ere no significant differences found betw een concrete/interactive
pictures and concrete/noninteractive pictures, th ese picture conditions were collapsed into
"concrete" pictures, and since there w ere no significant differences betw een abstract and no
picture conditions for the co nsequence variables examined in this section, th ese w ere collapsed
into an "other" category. The regression analyses were performed with a (1 /0 ) dum m y variable
representing picture conditions exam ined in th e specific test and a (1 / 0 ) dum m y variable
representing the instructions to imagine variable. The dimension(s) of imagery processing
included in the analyses w as a continuous variable, thus, no special treatm ent w as required
when performing the regression analysis.
With respect to path a (i.e., effects of pictures and instructions to imagine on dim ensions of
imagery processing), both manipulated imagery-eliciting strategies significantly influenced quality
of imagery processing, but only instructions to imagine significantly influenced all three
dim ensions of imagery processing. Since the te sts for mediation used regression analysis and
pictures were analyzed differently from previous analyses, effects of manipulated imageryeliciting strategies w ere analyzed with regression analysis to obtain standardized beta
coefficients. For quality of imagery processing, standardized beta coefficients for both pictures
and instructions to imagine w ere significant (/3=0.22, p<0.001 and /3=0.17, p<0.01,
respectively). For elaboration of imagery processing, the beta coefficient for instructions to
imagine w as significant 05=0.13, p< 0.04) but not for pictures (/?=0.04, p<0.57). Quantity of
imagery processing w as significantly influenced by instructions to imagine 03=0.1 S, p<0.05) but
not pictures 03=0.04, p<0.60). These results are consistent with earlier analyses and
conclusions in which main effects of pictures w ere significant for quality of imagery processing
but not the other two dim ensions and main effects of instructions to imagine w ere significant for
all three dimensions.
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Quantity of imagery processing did not significantly influence any consequence variable,
which means path b in Figure 4.1 for this dimensions was not significant. Therefore, only quality
and elaboration dimensions of imagery processing were included in mediation tests given below.

Memory
As can be seen from Table 4.15, no variable influenced car-specific memory. Thus, no
tests of mediating effects of quality, quantity, or elaboration dimensions of imagery processing
were performed for car-specific memory.
Although pictures affected ad-specific memory, no dimension of imagery processing
affected ad-specific memory. Thus, no tests of mediating effects of quality, elaboration, or
quantity of imagery processing were performed with respect to the relationship between
imagery-eliciting strategies and ad-specific memory.

Beliefs
As can be seen from Table 4.15, only quality of imagery processing influenced specific
beliefs. Since no manipulated independent variable influenced specific beliefs, no tests of
mediating effects of quality, quantity, or elaboration dimensions of imagery processing were
performed.
Inferred beliefs were significantly influenced by instructions to imagine and quality of
imagery processing. Since instructions to imagine significantly influenced quality of imagery
processing, a test for the mediating effect of quality was performed, and results are reported in
Table 4.16. Initially, inferred beliefs were regressed on dummy-coded instructions to imagine
(Model F-, 243=4.27, p<0.04). The standardized regression coefficient for instructions to imagine
was significant (/3=0.13, p<0.04). When inferred beliefs were regressed on instructions to
imagine and quality of imagery processing (Model F2249 = 18.43, p<0.0001), the standardized
regression coefficient for instructions to imagine was no longer significant (/?=0.07, p<0.28), but
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Table 4.16
TEST FOR MEDIATING ROLE OF QUALITY OF IMAGERY PROCESSING
ON RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INSTRUCTIONS TO IMAGINE
AND INFERRED BEUEFS

Source

Standardized
Beta

Significance
Level

Model 1*
Instructions

.13

.0398

Model 2b
Instructions
Quality

.07
.34

.2775
.0001

R2

F

.02

4 .27c

.13

18.43°

‘Model 1 examined the effect of the independent variable
without the mediator.
bModel 2 examined the effect of including the mediating
variable(s).
cp < .05
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the standardized regression coefficient for quality was significant 09=0.34, p < 0.0001). Quality of
imagery processing did mediate the relationship between instructions to imagine and inferred
beliefs since quality was significant, and a previously significant instructions to imagine effect
becam e insignificant. Thus, Hypothesis 17 was supported with respect to quality of imagery
processing’s mediating role on the relationship between instructions to imagine and inferred
beliefs.

Attitude Toward the Brand
As can be seen from Table 4.15, pictures, instructions to imagine, quality, and elaboration
influenced Ae. Since both pictures and instructions to imagine significantly influenced quality of
imagery processing, a test for the mediating effect of quality was performed, and results are
reported in Table 4.17. Elaboration of imagery processing was not included in this analysis
because only instructions to imagine significantly influenced elaboration, which would preclude
this variable from being included in a test for mediation between both independent variables and
Ab. initially, ABwas regressed on dummy-coded picture conditions and instructions to imagine
(Model F2

2 4 9

=9.23, p <0.0001). Pictures were coded one for concrete (i.e., interactive and

noninteractive combined) and zero for other (i.e., abstract and no picture combined) because
only concrete pictures were significantly different than abstract and no pictures, and there was
no significant difference between concrete/interactive and concrete/noninteractive pictures for
quality of imagery processing. The same was true for Aad. Standardized regression coefficients
for pictures and instructions to imagine were significant (£=0.23, p < 0 .0 002 and £=0.13, p < 0 .04,
respectively). When Ae was regressed on pictures, instructions to imagine, and quality of
imagery processing (Model F3 249 = 34.89, p < 0 .0 0 0 1 ), the standardized regression coefficient for
pictures remained significant (£=0.12, p<0.03), but the standardized regression coefficient for
instructions to imagine was not significant (/9=0.04, p < 0.52). The standardized regression
coefficient for quality was significant (£=0.50, p < 0 .0 0 0 1 ). Quality of imagery processing did
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T able 4.17
TEST FOR MEDIATING ROLE OF QUALITY OF IMAGERY PROCESSING ON
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PICTURES/INSTRUCTIONS TO IMAGINE AND Ag

Source

Standardized
Beta

Signif icance
Level

Model 1*
Pictures
Instructions

.23
.13

.0002
.0359

Model 2b
Pictures
Instructions
Quality

.12
.04
.50

.0301
.5160
.0001

R2

F

.06

9 .23e

.29 34 .89c

■Model 1 examined the effect of the independent variable
without the mediator.
bModel 2 examined the effect of including the mediating
variable(s).
cp<. 05
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mediate relationships between pictures and instructions to imagine with Aq since quality w as
significant, and previously significant manipulated independent variables did becom e insignificant
or at least less significant. Thus, Hypothesis 17 w as supported with respect to quality of
imagery processing’s mediating role on relationships between imagery-eliciting strategies and Ag.
Since instructions to imagine did influence elaboration of imagery processing, and
elaboration influenced AB, another test for mediation was performed for quality and elaboration
between the instructions to imagine relationship and AB, and results are reported in Table 4.18.
Initially, AB w as regressed on dummy-coded instructions to imagine (Model F1 Z4g=4.23, p<0.04).
The standardized regression coefficient for instructions to imagine w as significant 09=0.13,
p < 0 .0 4). When AB w as regressed on instructions to imagine along with quality and elaboration
of imagery processing (Model F3 Z4g = 48.33, p < 0 .0 0 0 1 ), the standardized regression coefficient
for instructions to imagine was no longer significant (/9=0.02, p<0.71), and the standardized
regression coefficients for quality and elaboration were significant (/9=0.29, p < 0.0001 and
0=0.38, p < 0.0001, respectively). Quality and elaboration of imagery processing did m ediate the
relationship between instructions to imagine and AB since quality and elaboration were
significant, and the previously significant instructions to imagine effect becam e insignificant.
Thus, Hypothesis 17 w as supported with respect to quality and elaboration of imagery
processing's mediating role on the relationship between instructions to imagine and A0.

Attitude Toward the Advertisement
As can be seen from Table 4.15, pictures, instructions to imagine, quality, and elaboration
influenced Aad. Since both pictures and instructions to imagine significantly influenced quality of
imagery processing, a test for the mediating effect of quality was performed, and results are
reported in Table 4.19. Elaboration of imagery processing was not included in this analysis
because only instructions to imagine significantly influenced elaboration, which would preclude it
from being included in a test for mediation between both independent variables and Aad.
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Table 4.18
T E S T F O R M EDIATING R O L E O F QUALITY A N D ELA B O R A T IO N
O F IM AGERY P R O C E S S IN G O N R E L A T IO N SH IP
B E T W E E N IN S T R U C T IO N S T O IM AGINE A N D AB

Standardized
Beta

Source

Significance
Level

Model la
Instructions

.13

.0408

Model 2b
Instructions
Quality
Elaboration

.02
.29
.38

.7097
.0001
.0001

R2

F

.01

4 .23c

.36 48 .33c

aModel 1 examined the effect of the independent variable
without the mediator.
bModel 2 examined the effect of including the mediating
variable(s).
cp < .05

Table 4.19
TEST FOR MEDIATING ROLE OF QUALITY OF IMAGERY PROCESSING
BETWEEN PICTURES/INSTRUCTIONS TO IMAGINE AND Aad
Standardized
Beta

Significance
Level

.19
.27

.0018
.0001

Model 2b
Pictures
Instructions
Quality

.08
.18
.50

.1335
.0009
.0001

F
15.21°

.33

41.52°

•

Model la
Pictures
Instructions

R2
o

Source

aModel 1 examined the effect of the independent variable
without the mediator.
bModel 2 examined the effect of including the mediating
variable(s).
°p<.05
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Initially, Aad was regressed on dummy-coded picture conditions and instructions to imagine
(Model F2,249 = 15.21, p <0.0001). Pictures were coded one for concrete (i.e., interactive and
noninteractive combined) and zero for other (i.e., abstract and no picture combined) because
only concrete pictures were significantly different than abstract and no pictures, and there was
no significant difference between abstract and no pictures for quality of imagery processing.
Similarly, for Aad, there was no significant difference between concrete/interactive and
concrete/noninteractive pictures, but concrete/interactive pictures were significantly different
that abstract and no pictures. Thus, concrete pictures were pooled in this analysis.
Standardized regression coefficients for pictures and instructions to imagine were significant
09=0.19, p < 0.002 and £=0.27, p < 0.0001, respectively). When Aao was regressed on pictures,
instructions to imagine, and quality of imagery processing (Model F3 2 4 9 =41.52, p<0.0001), the
standardized regression coefficient for pictures becam e insignificant (£=0.08, p<0.13), but the
standardized regression coefficient for instructions to imagine was still significant (£=0.18,
p < 0.0009). However, the effect of instructions to imagine becam e less significant, and the
regression coefficient did decrease. The standardized regression coefficient for quality was
significant (£=0.50, p<0.0001). Quality of imagery processing partially mediated relationships
between pictures and instructions to imagine with Aad since quality was significant, and
previously significant manipulated independent variables did becom e insignificant or at least less
significant. Thus, Hypothesis 17 was supported with respect to quality of imagery processing’s
mediating role on relationships between imagery-eliciting strategies and Aad.
Since instructions to imagine did influence elaboration of imagery processing, and
elaboration influenced Aad, another test for mediation was performed for quality and elaboration
between the instructions to imagine relationship and Aad, and results are reported in Table 4.20.
Initially, AADwas regressed on dummy-coded instructions to imagine (Model F1 2 4 9 = 19.71,
p<0.0001). The standardized regression coefficient for instructions to imagine was significant
(£=0.27, p<0.0001). When Aad was regressed on instructions to imagine along with quality and
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T able 4.20
T E S T F O R M E D IA T IN G R O L E O F Q U A L IT Y A N D E L A B O R A T IO N
O F IM A G E R Y P R O C E S S I N G O N R E L A T IO N S H IP
B E T W E E N IN S T R U C T IO N S T O IM A G IN E A N D A ^

Source

Standardized
Beta

Significance
Level

Model 1*
Instructions

.27

.0001

Model 2b
Instructions
Quality
Elaboration

.17
.40
.19

.0014
.0001
.0040

R2

F

.07

19.71c

.34

44.59°

‘Model 1 examined the effect of the independent variable
without the mediator.
bModel 2 examined the effect of including the mediating
variable(s).
cp < .05
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elaboration of imagery processing (Model F3 2 4 9 =44.59, p < 0 .0 0 0 1 ), the standardized regression
coefficient for instructions to imagine was still significant 05=0.17, p<0.00l), and the
standardized regression coefficients for quality and elaboration were significant 09=0.40,
p<0.0001 and 9=0.19, p<0.004, respectively). Quality and elaboration of imagery processing
partially mediated the relationship between instructions to imagine and Aad since quality and
elaboration were significant, and the previously significant instructions to imagine effect becam e
less significant. Thus, Hypothesis 17 was supported with respect to quality and elaboration of
imagery processing's mediating role on the relationship between instructions to imagine and Aad.
Although not hypothesized in the dissertation research, style of processing did exhibit a
significant main effect on Aad (9=0.26, p<0.0001) and elaboration of imagery processing
(9=0.19, p<0.003). Thus, a mediating test for elaboration between instructions to imagine with
style of processing and Aad was performed. Instructions to imagine were included in this test
because this imagery-eliciting strategy significantly influenced both Aad and elaboration of
imagery processing, also. Results are reported in Table 4.21, and it can be seen that
elaboration of imagery processing partially mediated the effect of instructions to imagine on Aad,
but it completely mediated the previously significant effect of style of processing on Aa0.

Intentions
As can be seen from Table 4.15, only elaboration of imagery processing influenced
intentions. Since no manipulated independent variable influenced intentions, tests of mediating
effects of quality, quantity, or elaboration dimensions of imagery processing were not performed.

Summary
In this section, tests for mediating effects of quality and elaboration of imagery processing
on relationships between imagery-eliciting strategies and consequence variables were
performed, which tested Hypothesis 17. Only quality and elaboration of imagery processing
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Table 4.21
T E S T F O R M ED IA TING R O L E O F ELA B O RA TIO N O F IM AGERY P R O C E S S IN G
O N R E L A T IO N S H IP S B E T W E E N
IN S T R U C T IO N S T O IM A G IN E /ST Y L E O F P R O C E S S IN G A N D A ^

Source

Standardized
Beta

Significance
Level

Model l*
Instructions
SOPb

.26
.17

.0001
.0058

Model 2C
Instructions
SOP
Elaboration

.20
.09
.42

.0004
.1078
.0001

R2

F

.09

13 .04d

.26

28.54d

■Model 1 examined the effect of the independent variable
without the mediator.
bSOP=Style of Processing
cModel 2 examined the effect of including the mediating
variable(s).
dp < .05
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were included because quantity of imagery processing did not influence any consequence
variable, which precluded that dimension from being tested a s a mediating variable.
In all cases in which a dimension(s) of imagery processing w as tested for hypothesized
mediational effects, the results support a mediating role for imagery processing because the
significant effects of imagery-eliciting strategies either diminished in significance or becam e
insignificant when imagery processing, specifically quality and elaboration of imagery
processing, w as included in the analysis. Furthermore, the dimension(s) of imagery processing
w as a significant variable in the tests. Thus, Hypothesis 17 was supported due to complete, or
at least partial, mediation on the part of quality and elaboration of imagery processing on
relationships between imagery-eliciting strategies and consequence variables of inferred beliefs,
Ab, and Aao.

SUMMARY
In this chapter, hypotheses put forth in Chapter 3 were tested. While not all were
supported, several were, and a summary is given in Table 4.22. The manipulated imageryeliciting strategies did influence several consequence variables. The independent variables of
pictures did significantly influence ad-specific memory, but not in the hypothesized direction. AB
and Aad were also significantly influenced by pictures in the hypothesized direction, but concrete
pictures prevailed over other picture conditions. Instructions to imagine impacted inferred
beliefs, Ab, and Aad in the hypothesized direction. The only consequence variables not being
influenced by either imagery-eliciting strategy were car-specific memory and Intentions.
Imagery manipulations also influenced dimensions of imagery processing, especially quality.
While not all hypotheses concerning the relationship between picture conditions and dimensions
of imagery processing were supported, it was generally found that concrete pictures generated
higher quality of imagery processing. In contrast, the hypothesized relationships between
instructions to imagine and all three dimensions of imagery processing were supported. That is,
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Table 4.22
SUMMARY OF HYPOTHESES TESTED
Hypothesis

Dependent
Variable

1 a-e.

Pictures > No pictures*

a.

2 a.

Interactive > Noninteractive

2 b.

Interactive > Abstract

2 c.

Noninteractive > Abstract

3a.

Interactive > Noninteractive

3b.

Interactive > Abstract

3c.

Noninteractive > Abstract

4a.
4b.
4c.

Results

Car-specific memory
Ad-specific memory
b. Specific beliefs
Inferred beliefs
c. Ag
d.
e. Intentions

Not supported
Supported
Not supported
Not supported
Supported
Not supported
Not supported

Car-specific memory
Ad-specific memory
Car-specific memory
Ad-specific memory
Car-specific memory
Ad-specific memory

Not supported
Not supported
Not supported
Not supported
Not supported
Not supported

Specific beliefs
Inferred beliefs
Specific beliefs
Inferred beliefs
Specific beliefs
Inferred beliefs

Not supported
Not supported
Not supported
Not supported
Not supported
Not supported

Interactive > Noninteractive
Interactive > Abstract
Noninteractive > Abstract

Aa
Ag

Not supported
Supported
Not supported

5a.
5b.
5c.

Interactive > Noninteractive
Interactive > Abstract
Noninteractive > Abstract

Aao
Aao
Aad

Not supported
Supported
Not supported

6 a.

Interactive > Noninteractive
Interactive > Abstract
Noninteractive > Abstract

Intentions
Intentions
Intentions

Not supported
Not supported
Not supported

6 b.

6C.

7a-e. Instructions > No instructions

8.

Style of processing moderates 1a-7e

Ag

a.

Car-specific memory
Ad-specific memory
b. Specific beliefs
Inferred beliefs
c. Ag
d. Aao
e. Intentions
Those in la-7e

Not supported
Not supported
Not supported
Supported
Supported
Supported
Not supported
Not supported
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Table 4.22 (continued)
SUMMARY OF HYPOTHESES TESTED
Hypothesis

Dependent
Variable

Results

9a.
9b.
9c.

Pictures > No pictures
Pictures < No pictures
Pictures > No pictures

Quality
Elaboration
Quantity

Supported
Not supported
Not supported

1 0 a.

Concrete > Abstract
Concrete < Abstract
Concrete < Abstract

Quality
Elaboration
Quantity

Supported
Not supported
Not supported

Interactive > Noninteractive
Interactive < Noninteractive
Interactive > Noninteractive

Quality
Elaboration
Quantity

Not supported
Not supported
Not supported

1 2 c.

Instructions > No instructions
instructions > No instructions
Instructions > No instructions

Quality
Elaboration
Quantity

Supported
Supported
Supported

13.

Style of Processing moderates 9a-12c

Those in 9a-12c

Not supported

14.

Quality positively related to:

a.

Car-specific memory
Ad-specific memory
b. Specific beliefs
Inferred beliefs
c. Ag
d. A ad
e. intentions

Not supported
Not supported
Supported
Supported
Supported
Supported
Not supported

15.

Elaboration positively related to:

a.

Car-specific memory
Ad-specific memory
Specific beliefs
Inferred beliefs

Not supported
Not supported
Not supported
Not supported
Supported
Supported
Supported

1 0 b.
1 0 c.
1 1 a.
1 1 b.
1 1 c.
1 2 a.
1 2 b.

b.
c.
d.
e.
16.

Quantity positively related to:

Ag
A ad

Intentions

a.

Car-specific memory
Ad-specific memory
b. Specific beliefs
Inferred beliefs
C.

Ag

d. Aa 0
e. Intentions
17.

Imagery processing mediates 1a-7e

Those in 1a-7e

Not
Not
Not
Not
Not
Not
Not

supported
supported
supported
supported
supported
supported
supported

Partially supported

*> means the condition on the greater than side will result in greater, stronger, or more positive effect in
the dependent variable.
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including instructions to imagine in an advertisem ent resulted in higher quality, greater
elaboration, and greater quantity of imagery processing. The hypothesized moderating role of
style of processing on relationships betw een imagery-eliciting strategies and co n seq u en ce
variables and betw een imagery-eliciting strategies and dim ensions of imagery processing w as
not supported.
With th e exception of quantity of imagery processing, dim ensions of imagery processing
influenced several co n sequence variables. Quality of imagery processing w as positively related
to specific beliefs, inferred beliefs, AB, and Aao, while elaboration of imagery processing w as
positively related to A0, Aad, and intentions. Thus, several of the hypotheses predicting a
positive relationship between dim ensions of imagery processing and co n seq u en ce variables
w ere supported.
Finally, th e mediating role of imagery processing w as examined. Tests for mediation were
limited by th e conditions set forth by Baron and Kenny (1986). Thus, tests for mediation of an
imagery processing dimension required an imagery-eliciting strategy to significantly influence the
consequen ce variable a s well as the dimension(s) of imagery processing. Furthermore, the
dimension(s) of imagery processing had to significantly influence the co n seq u en ce variable.
Thus, quality of imagery processing’s mediating role w as examined between th e relationships of
pictures and instructions to imagine on A0 and Aad, respectively. Since instructions to imagine
and elaboration influenced inferred beliefs, a test for mediation w as performed. Finally, because
instructions to imagine, quality, and elaboration all influenced AB and Aad, sep arate te sts for
mediation w ere performed. In all tests for mediation, the mediating role, either partial or
com plete, of a dimension(s) of imagery processing w as supported.

CHAPTER FIVE
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS

INTRODUCTION
As stated in Chapter One, the dissertation research set out to examine four general
research questions. First, the question of whether or not imagery processing could be
m easured w as addressed. While this issue cannot be resolved with one dissertation, ft was
assum ed that mental imagery does exist and can be measured. Support for this assumption is
provided by the psychometric properties of the scale developed in the dissertation research to
m easure imagery processing in concert with the support toward nomological validity of the
construct that was provided by applying the scale in the experiment.
Second, the dissertation research examined antecedents to mental imagery, namely, the
imagery-eliciting strategies of pictures and instructions to imagine, and their effects on
consequence variables of memory, beliefs, attitudes, and intentions. While both imagery-eliciting
strategies have been studied in the past, the dissertation research expands extant knowledge
concerning these two strategies. Specifically, the dissertation research examined effects of a
range of pictures instead of simple pictures versus words. Also, it was shown that including
instructions to imagine within a m essage stimulus was more effective than not including
instructions to imagine within a m essage stimulus for several consequence variables studied.
This is something that has not been previously supported in the imagery literature, for the
majority of studies manipulating instructions to imagine have done so externally to m essage
stimuli, which is not very applicable in an advertising context.
With respect to consequence variables, pictures included in a print advertisement
enhanced brand attitudes; more specifically, concrete pictures resulted in greater brand attitudes
than either abstract or no pictures. More positive attitudes toward the advertisement were
evident from concrete pictures as opposed to abstract pictures. Thus, for enhancing attitudes,
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concrete pictures w ere more effective than abstract pictures, instructions to imagine enhanced
inferred beliefs and attitudes. While hypothesized in previous studies (e.g., Wright and Rip
1980), th e dissertation research is th e only study that h as successfully found this effect in a print
advertising context. O ne possible explanation could be th e w ay the instructions w ere em bedded
in the copy (i.e, different phrasing instead of “Imagine yourself). The instructions to imagine
statem ents appealed to different senses, not only visual. However, another reason could b e due
to dem and effects, but if this is true, it would b e expected that all dependent variables would be
influenced, which they were not. However, future research could examine the sam e
manipulation without measuring imagery processing, which might provide insight into w hether or
not dem and effects occurred. Future research could also exam ine the effect of including
instructions to imagine in other media, for exam ple broadcast.
Third, th e dissertation research set out to exam ine the moderating role of processing
preference on relationships betw een imagery-eliciting strategies and co nsequence variables and
betw een imagery-eliciting strategies and dim ensions of imagery processing. While this
hypothesis w as not supported in the dissertation research, possible explanations are discussed
in this chapter, and further research is still necessary in this area.
Fourth, the last research question ad d ressed by the dissertation research concerned the
mediating role of imagery processing on relationships found between imagery-eliciting strategies
and co nseq u en ce variables. Coupled with the scale developed to m easure dim ensions of
imagery processing, th e dissertation research has m ade a contribution to th e extant knowledge
b ase of imagery processing. Concrete pictures positively influenced quality of imagery
processing, and instructions to imagine influenced all three dim ensions of imagery processing.
When the mediating role of imagery processing, specifically elaboration and quality, w as
examined, relationships between imagery-eliciting strategies and con seq u en ce variables were
completely or partially explained by those dim ensions. Thus, the dissertation research has
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opened up the "black box," which provides further understanding of the effects of imageryeliciting strategies in a print advertising context.
In short, the dissertation research addressed these four research questions in a
methodologically sound manner. The scale that w as developed to m easure imagery processing
began with a definition of the domain of the construct followed by qualitative research to
generate and content-validate items. Then, the items were evaluated and refined through
quantitative research in which scale items were administered to three different samples. The
result is a psychometrically sound m easure to a sse ss quality, quantity, and elaboration of
imagery processing. However, this attem pt is only a beginning of research in this area, not an
ending. Finally, the experiment that w as conducted w as carried out by adhering to good
experimental design, which strengthens conclusions that can be drawn from the results.
In this chapter, discussion and implications of the research questions examined in the
dissertation are provided. First, m easurem ent of dimensions of imagery processing is
addressed. Second, findings from the experiment that w as performed are discussed. Finally,
managerial implications and directions for future research are provided.

MEASUREMENT OF IMAGERY PROCESSING
As discussed in Chapter One, the question of whether or not mental imagery could be
m easured w as open to two criticisms. First, and most extreme, it could be argued that no
mental pro cess can be m easured adequately with verbal responses because individuals are
unable to report what they know or how they think (Nisbett and Wilson 1977). Second, it could
be argued that verbal scales are inappropriate for measuring nonverbal phenom ena (Holbrook at
al. 1984; Maclnnis and Price 1987; Sheehan et al. 1983). Even though these are plausible
criticisms, and one dissertation cannot resolve these issues, the attem pt in this dissertation does
shed som e light on these controversies. The dissertation research did exhibit evidence toward
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nomological validity with a much improved measure of the imagery processing construct, which
advances understanding in this area.

Measurement o f Mental Processes
The criticism concerning m easurement of mental processes with verbal (i.e., written)
responses can be attacked. If verbal responses are not used, there are only two alternatives:
(1) not m easure the mental process at all, but rather, rely on restrictive manipulations to Infer
that a mental process could have been the only mechanism and (2) use alternative m easures of
the mental process. An example of using restrictive manipulations to infer a mental process is
Kisielius and Sternthal (1984). The authors manipulated the time respondents were allowed to
view a m essage stimulus. They hypothesized that greater cognitive elaboration was the mental
process that caused respondents to exhibit less favorable judgem ents in one condition
com pared to another condition. When they restricted the time respondents could view the
m essage stimulus, the differential effects between the two conditions disappeared, thus leading
the authors to conclude that cognitive elaboration was lower due to the viewing time restriction.
While there is nothing wrong with this approach, it would be beneficial to attempt to measure the
explanatory construct, also. Thus, even greater understanding of the underlying process may
result.
In contrast to not measuring a mental process at all, the second alternative is to use
m easures other than verbal reports, such as physiological measures. As discussed in Chapter
Two, physiological responses, such as brain wave patterns, have been used a s Indicators of
imagery processing (Maclnnis and Price 1987). Since imagery processing is a mental process,
these techniques may provide a superior assessm ent of imagery processing. However, these
m easures are inferential, highly obtrusive, and require technical sophistication. Moreover, there
is no guarantee that these types of m easures are assessing mental imagery.
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Thus, the options available are to not attempt to m easure imagery processing, which still
leaves open the possibility of other explanations, m easure physiological responses, which also
still leaves open the possibility of other explanations, or use a verbal response measure, which
also still leaves open the possibility of other explanations. However, in the latter option, rigorous
assessm en t of construct validity, in which reliability, convergent validity, discriminant validity, and
nomological validity are assesse d could lessen the possibility of other explanations while
opening the "black box" to provide som e explanation. Finally, a verbal response m easure of
imagery processing that could be applied in other situations in which communication-evoked
imagery processing is considered an explanatory variable would be of interest to researchers
examining this construct, for it not only provides further support for construct validity, it provides
explanation.
Results of the scale development process and the application of the scale developed also
w eaken the criticism against measuring a mental process with verbal responses. First, the scale
developm ent procedure involved a definition of the domain of the construct, followed by
rigorous assessm ent of content validity, reliability, convergent validity, discriminant validity, and
finally, nomological validity. While construct validity is a never ending process (Peter 1981),
support toward construct validity of mental imagery dimensions w as found in the dissertation
research. That is, development of the scale used in the dissertation involved qualitative research
in which a focus group w as used to help define the domain of imagery processing dimensions,
judging procedures in which content validity of dim ensions and items proposed to a s s e s s those
dim ensions was assessed , and quantitative analyses in which proposed items were administered
to three different sam ples to evaluate and refine scale items with respect to reliability and
dimensionality. In sum, psychometrically sound scales were used to m easure quality, quantity,
and elaboration dimensions of imagery processing in the final test assessing nomological validity
of the construct. Given that dimensions of imagery processing, particularly quality and
elaboration, exhibited partial or complete mediational effects on relationships between imagery-
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e licitin g s tr a t e g ie s a n d c o n s e q u e n c e v a r ia b le s , s u p p o r t to w a r d n o m o lo g ic a l v alid ity o f t h e m e n ta l
im a g e r y c o n s tr u c t w a s p r e s e n t. If n o m e d ia tin g e ffe c t w a s e v id e n t, th e n it c o u ld b e c o n s id e r e d
in a p p r o p r ia te to m e a s u r e d im e n s io n s o f im a g e r y p r o c e s s in g .

Future research should involve further application of the measure developed to assess
dimensions of imagery processing. Results from application of the scale In the dissertation
research indicate quality as the strongest dimension of imagery processing, but elaboration was
affected by instructions to imagine and did exhibit a mediating role with respect to inferred
beliefs, Ab, and Aad. Quantity of imagery processing appeared to be the weakest dimension
within the context of the dissertation experiment, for only instructions to imagine influenced this
dimension. Moreover, quantity of imagery processing did not significantly influence any
consequence variable. Quantity may be the most difficult to stimulate, but it may have profound
effects on consequence variables. In this application of the scale, nomological validity of this
dimension is questionable and requires further research. If further assessm ent of this dimension
does not result in support for nomological validity, then it should not be considered an important
dimension of imagery processing. An experiment that compares all three dimensions may
provide further insight.

Measurement of Nonverbal Process With Verbal Responses
The second criticism that can be lodged against measuring a nonverbal process, such as
mental imagery, with verbal responses can be attacked, also. Holbrook et al. (1984), Maclnnis
and Price (1987), and Sheehan et al. (1983) point out that verbal scales may be inappropriate for
measuring nonverbal phenomena because an individual must translate a nonverbal process into
a verbal response. As an example of an attempt to overcome this, Holbrook et al. (1984)
combined verbal and nonverbal reference points in a scale to measure processing style (i.e., the
V/V Index). Each item contained a stimulus (a word or picture) and an anchor (a word or
picture), and subjects were asked to place a check closer to the anchor that was more strongly
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associated with the stimulus. Thus, one could argue that a scale assessing mental imagery
would need to incorporate visual instead verbal responses. There are two problems, however.
First, mental imagery is not only visual, but rather, it can involve all senses. Thus, arguing that
visual responses are necessary to a ssess imagery processing Is incomplete considering the
domain of the construct. Second, Holbrook et al. incorporated visual responses in their scale,
which w as administered on three different occasions in the dissertation research. The V/V Index
exhibited poor reliability in all three administrations (i.e., a < .60), and several respondents had a
difficult time responding to the scale because it was confusing. Even though instructions were
provided, som e respondents did not understand what they were supposed to d o with the items.
Thus, if this experience is generalizable, trying to use nonverbal responses to a sse ss mental
imagery may not be reasonable, especially when considering how to m easure all senses, not
just visual. The use of a verbal report is the most reasonable alternative, and the scale
developed in the dissertation research provides a good starting point.

IMAGERY-ELICITING STRATEGIES AND CONSEQUENCES
In this section, effects of manipulated imagery-eliciting strategies of different picture
conditions and instructions to imagine on consequence variables are discussed. Also discussed
are the moderating role of style of processing and the mediating role of dimensions of imagery
processing, and possible explanations and directions for future research are provided.

Memory
No manipulated imagery-eliciting strategy influenced car-specific memory, but ad-specific
memory w as influenced by abstract pictures. Specifically, abstract pictures resulted in greater
memory of ad-specific memory, which is contrary to what was hypothesized, which was based
on Paivio’s (1986) dual code theory. However, reasonable explanations exist for: (1) no effect of
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imagery-eliciting strategies on recall of car-specific information and (2) abstract pictures
significantly affecting recall of ad-speciflc information but not car-specific information.
Insignificant differences between the manipulated conditions and car-specific memory could
have been due to the experimental procedure that w as employed. First, respondents viewed
only one advertisement, which reduces interference from other stimuli. Second, respondents
viewed the advertisement, placed it back into an envelope, and immediately responded to the
memory protocol on the first page of the questionnaire. The protocol w as assesse d immediately
because the m easure of beliefs was placed later in the questionnaire, and specific attribute
information w as included in these items. Thus, to eliminate respondents using belief items to
respond to the memory protocol, the two m easures were placed in the order of memory
assessm en t first and beliefs-strength assessm ent considerably further back in the questionnaire.
As a result, Information concerning the car advertised was relatively salient in the minds of all
respondents, which could have been the reason for insignificant differences between groups on
this variable; indeed, m ost information written in the protocols w as car-specific information rather
than ad-specific information, and m eans in all conditions were between 2.22 and 2.57 items
correctly recalled about the car advertised (maximum possible score for car-specific information
w as 7). Since there is no way of knowing whether or not there truly were no differences with
respect to imagery-eliciting strategies and car-specific memory or the results being an artifact of
the experimental procedure, future research would be necessary to investigate this further. An
improvement for future research would be to investigate a portfolio of advertisem ents and ask
respondents to respond to the questionnaire for only the target advertisement (e.g., Unnava and
Burnkrant 1991) an d /o r administer an interference task between exposure to the stimulus and
m easurem ent of memory to clear short term memory.
Abstract pictures, however, did result in greater ad-specific memory, which w as contrary to
what w as hypothesized. The hypothesis was based on Paivio’s dual co d e theory (1986), and
several empirical results support pictures resulting in greater memory than no pictures (see
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Table 2.7). However, few have studied concrete versus abstract versus no pictures (e.g., Palvio
and C sapo 1969). Thus, hypotheses tested in the dissertation research were based on
established theory, but there are other explanations. First, since no effects were found for carspecific memory, possibly due to the experimental procedure, this effect could som ehow be
spurious and a result of the experimental procedure, also. For example, respondents knew the
researcher w as interested in "copytesting" different advertisements, which may have m ade them
concentrate more on the advertisement than the product advertised. On the other hand, this
may be a nonspurious effect that requires further testing because this result can be explained
with Kisielius and Sternthal’s (1984, 1986) Availability-Valence (AV) Hypothesis, also. They argue
that greater cognitive elaboration of information results in that information being more available
for recall. The abstract picture w as illustrated as three different panels in which it w as obvious
that the picture w as of a car, but it w as not obvious what the car actually looked like.
Consequently, respondents given an abstract picture may have had to spend more cognitive
effort piecing together an image of a car than those given a concrete picture, which implies
greater elaboration on their part. Thus, when asked everything they could remember from the
advertisement, respondents in the abstract picture condition may have had more picture-related
information available than those in other picture conditions, which may have been the reason for
more ad-specific memory being reported in the abstract picture condition; indeed, respondents
in this condition tended to write something about the picture (e.g., “there were three pieces of a
car pictured"), w hereas those in the concrete picture condition tended not to write anything
about the picture in the advertisement. This could be due to the fact that the concrete picture
condition w as typical of car advertisements, but the abstract picture condition w as not. Thus, it
would be interesting in future research to examine this further with more appropriate
experimental procedures with respect to this consequence variable. Furthermore, to determine if
greater elaboration is the explanatory construct, varying the time respondents are allowed to
view a stimulus may provide further insight. Thus, while not supporting hypotheses given in the
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dissertation research, th e empirical results provide interesting avenues for future research a s
very few researchers have examined the range of pictures a s the present study.

Beliefs
Effects of manipulated imagery-eliciting strategies on brand attribute beliefs, specific and
inferred, w ere examined. For specific beliefs, there were no significant differences with respect
to manipulated imagery-eliciting strategies of pictures and instructions to imagine. However,
while not significant, differences in m eans w ere in the direction hypothesized. For inferred
beliefs, however, it w as found that, when com pared to not including instructions to imagine,
including them within the m essage stimulus resulted in stronger inferred beliefs. Specific belief
items related directly to brand attribute information from the advertisement, but inferred belief
items w ere implied by specific information regarding the brand. Thus, stronger inferred brand
beliefs may result from greater cognitive elaboration. Since instructions to imagine provide a
com m and to elaborate on information presented in the stimulus, stronger inferred brand beliefs
could have resulted. This is consistent with Kisielius and Sternthal's (1984, 1986) AV Hypothesis,
in which they contend that instructions to imagine would result in greater cognitive elaboration,
which may then influence attitudes. Applying the AV Hypothesis to inferred beliefs, stronger
inferred beliefs may have resulted in the instructions to imagine condition becau se the cognitive
elaboration that took place w as favorable, thus resulting in stronger inferred beliefs d u e to the
positive valence of the cognitive elaboration. While there w as no way of knowing for sure if
respondents given instructions to imagine in m essage stimuli actually experienced positiveiyvalenced cognitive elaboration, these respondents did report greater elaboration of imagery
processing, and all elaboration items were phrased in positive term s. Thus, while th e AV
Hypothesis offers a viable explanation, further research in which the actual valence of cognitive
elaboration is assesse d (or manipulated) instead of inferred would be n ecessary to resolve this
issue.
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The AV Hypothesis also offers explanation concerning insignificant differences am ong
conditions for specific beliefs. Since specific beliefs related to unvarying specific brand attribute
information provided in the m essage stimulus, no cognitive elaboration w as necessary. If no
differences in cognitive elaboration took place, it is reasonable that there would be no
differences regarding strengths of specific beliefs. Thus, no differences with respect to
relationships between imagery-eliciting strategies and specific beliefs could have been due to no
differences in cognitive elaboration. However, future research would be necessary to resolve
this issue because instructions to imagine did influence elaboration of imagery processing but
not specific beliefs, and elaboration of imagery processing w as not significantly related to
specific beliefs.
Picture manipulations influenced neither specific- nor inferred-beliefs. Again, this can
possibly be explained with cognitive elaboration. Even though pictures can elicit cognitive
elaboration, pictures may be subtie com pared to instructions to imagine; indeed, instructions to
imagine com m and the viewer to d o something, w hereas pictures do not. This could also explain
why pictures influenced quality of imagery processing, but not elaboration or quantity, and
instructions to imagine influenced all three dimensions of imagery processing.

Attitude Toward the Brand
A0 w as significantly influenced by pictures and instructions to imagine. Although not all
hypotheses concerning effects of different picture conditions on Ae w ere supported, it was found
that pictures, specifically concrete pictures, were more effective in eliciting m ore positive
attitudes toward the brand than either abstract or no pictures. These results are consistent with
Kisielius and Sternthai’s AV Hypothesis because it w as assum ed that pictures encourage
cognitive elaboration. Whether that cognitive elaboration is m ore positive or less positive than
the advocacy would determine whether or not judgem ents were favorable or unfavorable. For
pictures, it was hypothesized that the most favorable cognitive elaboration would occur for the
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concrete/interactive picture condition, followed by the concrete/noninteractive, abstract, and no
picture conditions, respectively. The dissertation results support this hypothesis, for the
concrete/interactive picture condition resulted in the most positive

Ag,

followed by the other

three picture conditions in the hypothesized order. However, only significant differences
occurred between concrete and abstract pictures and concrete and no pictures, but this is
consistent with the AV Hypothesis. These results provide implications for advertising
practitioners, also. It is a widely held belief that including pictures in an advertisement results in
greater brand attitudes (Rossiter 1978), but the dissertation research examined different picture
conditions. It was found that including a concrete picture was more effective with respect to

AB

than including an abstract picture or having no picture.
When compared to not including instructions to imagine in a m essage stimulus, including
them resulted in more positive brand attitudes. This result is also consistent with Kisielius and
Sternthal’s AV Hypothesis because instructions are considered to elicit cognitive elaboration.
Since it was assumed that the cognitive elaboration that took place was positively-valenced, a
more positive Ae resulted in the instructions to imagine condition.
A topic for future research would be to manipulate or measure the valence of the cognitive
elaboration that took place to further test the AV Hypothesis. Since empirical results tend to
support that positive cognitive elaboration occurred, the dissertation research provides a basis
for future research. Until this is done, one can only speculate that positively-valenced cognitive
elaboration occurred in the concrete picture condition and the instructions to imagine condition,
respectively. However, because instructions to imagine did result in greater elaboration of
imagery processing and elaboration items were phrased in a positive manner, some support for
the assumption of positively-valenced cognitive elaboration was provided.
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Attitude Toward the Advertisement
AADw as significantly influenced by pictures and instructions to imagine. Although not all
hypotheses concerning effects of different picture conditions on Aad were supported, it was
found that pictures, specifically concrete pictures, were more effective in eliciting m ore positive
attitudes toward the advertisement than were abstract pictures. These results, coupled with the
finding that abstract pictures resulted in greater ad-speclfic memory, provide support for the AV
Hypothesis. Since greater memory of ad-specific information occurred in the abstract picture
condition, it can be assum ed that respondents in this condition experienced greater cognitive
elaboration, which, if negatively-valenced, would result in a less positive Aad. Also, som e time
w as necessary to solve the abstract puzzle, so there was less time for cognitive elaboration. It
is reasonable to assum e that the cognitive elaboration that occurred in respondents placed in
the abstract picture condition was less positive than for respondents given a concrete picture
because of the idiosyncratic nature of the elaboration. Concrete pictures are consistent with
respondents’ established cognitive networks, but abstract pictures are not (Kisielius and
Sternthal 1986). Thus, a cognitive network'had to be generated in the abstract picture condition,
which required more idiosyncratic elaboration when com pared to a cognitive network that
already exists. Thus, according to Kisielius and Sternthal (1986), less positive attitudes result in
abstract conditions when com pared to vivid (i.e., concrete) conditions.
When com pared to not including instructions to imagine in a m essage stimulus, including
them did result in more positive attitudes toward the advertisement. Again, these findings are
consistent with the AV Hypothesis because it is reasonable to assum e that instructions to
imagine elicit positively-valenced cognitive elaboration from respondents. Future research,
however, is necessary to verify this assumption.
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Intentions
Manipulated Imagery-eliciting strategies of pictures and instructions to imagine did not
significantly influence behavioral intentions. While it w as hypothesized that pictures and
instructions to imagine would favorably influence intentions, there are reasonable explanations.
First, although the choice of automobiles a s an experimental product w as reasonable from the
standpoint that undergraduate students po ssess sufficient knowledge structures to be able to
imagine the product and the product w as not purely functional in nature, actual purchase of an
automobile may be to o far in the future for them to be able to respond to intentions measures.
Even though it w as found that the majority of undergraduates sampled in the pretest expected
to purchase a car within the next two years, this time gap between intentions and actual
purchase may be too long to adequately examine intentions. Furthermore, expecting a single
advertisement to move intentions for a large durable good that is probably a first time purchase
for the sample is a long shot. The second explanation for the insignificant results with respect to
intentions concerns the artificial nature of the experiment. While a fictitious brand nam e (i.e.,
'The 1993 Concept") w as used to prevent bias from prior attitudes, this could have resulted in
respondents being unwilling to "commit" to any behavioral intentions. Informal interviews with a
few respondents that participated in the study indicated that this could have been the reason.
Not only w as the brand name fictitious and unfamiliar to respondents, but there w as no mention
of the automobile manufacturer in the advertisement. Consequently, if the experimental
advertisem ents had included the car nam e a s "Honda Concept" or T o y o ta Concept," there
might have been som e differences in intentions. However, since Honda and Toyota are wellknown automobile manufacturers, prior attitudes could have biased results. Also, som e
respondents felt that since 1993 model cars have not been introduced to the market yet, it was
difficult to report intentions to examine the automobile further.
A final explanation for the insignificant effects of imagery-eliciting strategies on intentions
could be the self-related ness of the imagery that took place. Since imagery processing was
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measured, it can be assum ed that mental imagery actually took place. However, a s discussed
in Chapter Three, care w as taken to try to elicit imagery without references to the self, especially
with respect to instructions to imagine. Anderson (1983) asked som e respondents to draw
them selves or another person performing a behavior and assessed attitudes and behavioral
intentions. While mental imagery (i.e., drawing a cartoon) enhanced attitudes in the imagery
condition, it w as found that intentions were not greater within all mental imagery conditions.
Specifically, it w as found that only those that drew them selves performing the behavior reported
greater behavioral intentions. Thus, the author concluded that while imagery may enhance
attitudes, only self-related imagery enhances behavioral intentions. While mental imagery may
have occurred in the dissertation study, it may not have been self-related. If so, results from this
study are consistent with Anderson (1983).

Moderating Role o f Style o f Processing
The moderating role of an individual’s style of processing w as not supported. This
hypothesis w as not firmly based in theory, but it was assum ed that a presentation format that
w as congruent with an individual's processing preference would result in stronger effects of
imagery-eliciting strategies (e.g., Holbrook et al. 1984). This hypothesis may not have been
supported for two reasons.
First, perhaps style of processing is not an important m oderator between imagery-eliciting
strategies and consequence variables or dimensions of Imagery processing. Lack of a
significant moderating role of style of processing has been reported in other studies examining
this variable a s a moderating variable (e.g., Burns et al. 1992). Thus, other possible moderators,
such a s opportunity to imagine or motivation to imagine, could provide insight into situational
and individual difference variables that may be important.
Second, the fact that an individual’s style of processing w as assessed during a study in
which imagery-eliciting strategies were manipulated may have influenced this measure. There is
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no way of knowing if there was a contamination effect from the imagery processing items on the
styie of processing items. Future research could examine if there Is an effect, and implications
may be to assess individual difference variables separately from the actual experiment. Since
the dissertation research did not assess this individual difference variable separately from the
final experiment, there is no way of knowing if style of processing is not an important
moderating variable or if context of the study influenced responses to this measure.

Mediating Role of Imagery Processing
The last, and possibly most important, implication of the dissertation research is the
mediating rote of dimensions of imagery processing because not only did this provide support
toward nomological validity of the measures developed, it also provided explanation regarding
the effects of imagery-eliciting strategies on consequence variables. The mediating role of an
imagery-processing dimension (s) was assessed for relationships that were significant between
imagery-eliciting strategies and consequence variables, in all cases in which the mediating role
of an imagery processing dimension(s) was assessed, partial or complete mediation was found.
When quality of imagery processing was included as a covariate with the previously
significant relationship between instructions to imagine and inferred beliefs, a mediating role of
quality was supported because the standardized beta coefficient for instructions to imagine
became insignificant and the quality coefficient was significant. Thus, quality of imagery
processing completely mediated the relationship between instructions to imagine and inferred
beliefs.
Pictures, instructions to imagine, quality of imagery processing, and elaboration of imagery
processing all influenced AB and Aad. Again, quality and elaboration exhibited complete
mediation for instructions to imagine and partial mediation for pictures with respect to AB. For
Aad, when examining pictures, instructions to imagine and quality of imagery processing, quality
of imagery processing exhibited complete mediation with respect to pictures but only partial
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mediation with respect to instructions to imagine. However, when the mediating role of quality
and elaboration was examined with respect to the relationship between instructions to imagine
and Aad, complete mediation was indicated, providing further support for the AV Hypothesis
explanation given earlier. Since mental imagery is a form of cognitive elaboration, measuring
elaboration of imagery processing gives som e insight into the extent and valence of cognitive
elaboration that had taken place. Furthermore, since the elaboration of imagery processing
completely mediated the previously significant effect of instructions to imagine on Aad, more
support is given for the assumption that instructions to imagine elicit greater cognitive
elaboration.
An interesting serendipitous finding was that style of processing significantly influenced Aad
and elaboration of imagery processing. When a test for mediation was performed, it was found
that elaboration of imagery processing completely mediated the previously significant positive
main effect of style of processing. A conclusion that can be drawn from this finding is that visual
processors elaborated on the advertisement irrespective of the type of advertisement given.
A final implication that can be derived from the mediational tests of dimensions of imagery
processing is that, in the majority of cases, a dimension(s) of imagery processing completely
mediated the effects of instructions to imagine but not the effects of pictures. Thus, it appears
that while imagery processing does mediate relationships, respondents have to be told to
imagine. While pictures did influence quality of imagery processing, instructions to imagine
influenced quality, quantity, and elaboration of imagery processing. Consequently, if an
advertiser wants to elicit mental imagery, it is important to note that the audience should be told
to imagine. The dissertation research also illustrated that instructions to imagine can be
em bedded within a written m essage effectively, which has alluded researchers until now (e.g.,
Wright and Rip 1980).
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MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS

Even though the major thrust of the dissertation research w as concerned with measuring
and predicting the mental process of imagery processing, the results hold several managerial
implications. However, limitations concerning generalizability (e.g., sample, task setting, and
experimental procedures) mitigate managerial implications. The first implication pertains to
nonverbal elem ents of print m essage design. It was found that including pictures in a print
advertisem ent w as generally m ore effective in positively influencing attitudes than not including
pictures. However, concrete pictures were more effective than abstract pictures, possibly
because abstract pictures require respondents to allocate a greater proportion of their limited
processing capacity to piecing together a picture in their mind. A concrete picture is congruent
with established memory networks, which may have allowed respondents given this type of
picture to allocate a greater proportion of their limited processing capacity to other elem ents of
the m essage. Furthermore, by giving the com plete image to the audience, less idiosyncratic
information w as used in processing the advertisement, which may have resulted in more positive
cognitive elaboration. Thus, m ore positive attitudes resulted, in sum, then, it w as found that
imagery processing does influence communication effects, and imagery processing can be
stimulated with nonverbal elements of the advertisement. While imagery processing is desirable,
it is recom m ended to provide the image for the audience instead of making them have to work
to form one.
The second managerial implication pertains to verbal elements of a m essage. It was found
in the dissertation research that imagery processing can also be stimulated by instructions to
imagine included within m essage stimuli. By instructing respondents to form mental imagery,
attitudes were favorably influenced. This may have been due to the fact that the m essage told
the audience what to do, which resulted in positive cognitive elaboration. Thus, if an advertiser
w ants to stimulate cognitive activity, specifically mental imagery, it's best to instruct the
audience.
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DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
There are several directions for future research from the dissertation research. One
research agenda pertains to the scale developed to measure imagery processing. First, the
scale developed is only a beginning, not an ending. Further application and refinement of the
scale is necessary to provide further support toward construct validity. The purpose of the scale
is to measure communication-evoked imagery processing. While it was developed and applied
in a print advertising context, it should be applied and refined in other communication contexts.
For example, while the scale is useful in advertising research and should be applied in other
media, it could also be useful in communication contexts such a s personal selling. It would be
interesting to examine whether or not eliciting mental imagery in a personal selling situation is
effective, and using the scale developed in the dissertation research could provide
understanding about any mental imagery that may have taken place. Thus, advertising is only
one communication context marketers are interested in. Since eliciting mental imagery appears
to be effective with respect to attitudes, the scale could be used in other areas of
communication.
Another avenue of research with respect to the scale developed would be to further analyze
the dimensions of imagery processing. While three dimensions of imagery were proposed and
measured, there may be more dimensions, such as self-relatedness of mental imagery. To
further analyze the domain of the dimensions, an experiment could be devised that compares
the three dimensions, and examination of different manipulations that affect one dimension vis-avis the others would advance understanding of this construct as well as the imagery-eliciting
manipulations. Finally, while the scale attempts to measure communication-evoked mental
imagery processing, which is nonverbal cognitive processing, measurement of verbal cognitive
processing, such as arguments and counterarguments, would provide a greater understanding
of the domain of the construct as well as provide further evidence of discriminant validity. This
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may provide further understanding of the mediating role of imagery processing, especially in the
cases where only partial mediation was evident.
Another research agenda pertains to imagery-eliciting strategies. The dissertation research
examined two strategies: pictures and instructions to imagine. Concreteness of wording was
not manipulated due to the overwhelming evidence in support of concrete over abstract words.
None of these studies, however, have attempted to measure and understand the mediating role
of imagery processing. Thus, while it is clear that concrete words are more effective, especially
for memory, it is not clear why. Measurement of dimensions of imagery processing would
provide further understanding. Finally, while a range of pictures was examined in the
dissertation research, other picture configurations could be examined.
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INSTRUCTIONS

The LSU department of Marketing is working with an automobile company
on a purchase plan designed especially for college students. Your class has been
selected to help us evaluate an advertisement which is being developed to
announce this plan in Fall 1991.
This plan is especially designed for college students in their Senior year. The
manufacturer will mail q, brochure to the student containing information on the
automobile and the special purchase plan. To qualify, all students have to do is
call a toll free number in the brochure, and they will be sent an application form to
send back with copies of their latest transcript and college ID.

Once approved, all

that is required for purchase is a minimal down payment and a special 48-month
financing arrangement. The first payment will not be due until 3 months after
graduation, and the deferment is good as long as the student is enrolled full-time.
Please read the advertisement contained on the following page. This is one
of the ads being pre-tested to be used in the brochure, it is important that you
respond to the questions after the advertisement as accurately and as completely
as possible. We are interested in your overall evaluation of the ad and the car, not
the specifics of the advertising copy. Therefore, please read the ad as naturally as
you would an ad found in a magazine or a brochure you would receive in the mail.

J U S T PICTURE YOURSELF
BEHIND THE WHEEL OF THE 1 9 9 2 CONCEPT
A CAR THAT FITS YOUR IMAGE

(Illustration)

You could be driving to work or
meeting clients looking mature,
professional, and confident. Qualities
that you possess and Concept helps to
express.
But there are times when we all
leave our business suits in our closets
and act carefree. The 1 992 Concept
would be a perfect machine in those
situations too - because the Concept is
just as much fun to drive as it is to be
seen in.
Position yourself in the Concept's
contoured sport bucket seat and just

fire the engine up. The 128
horsepower engine quivers. On the
road the sporty,'aerodynamic
design cuts through the wind like
no other car in its class.
And then, with its performanceengineered suspension, you could
be gliding across the rolling plains
or attacking curves and climbing up
hills across the country in your
1992 Concept. Whistling along
alone or sharing the bright sunshine
with that special friend.

TAKE A FEW MOMENTS, CLOSE YOUR EYES, A N D ...
IMAGINE YOURSELF IN THESE SITUATIONS IN YOUR 1 9 9 2 CONCEPT

IS N 'T IT EXCITING?
Call us at 1-800-CONCEPT
Available In 4-door sedans or 2-door coups 28 city/32 highway estimated mpg
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Please respond to the following questions and statements without looking back to the advertisement. There are
no ’right* or ’ wrong’ answers, so please just answer as honestly and accurately as you can.
1.

What type of car do you think the ad described? (please circle one)
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
fl
it.
i.
jk.

2-door coupe
sports car
4-door mid-size sedan
4-door full-size sedan
compact car
luxury car
pick-up truck
4-wheel drive vehicle
van
other (Diease soecifv:
no idea

)

Do you have access to a car to drive? ____ yes ____ no
If yes, whoowns it?

3.

I probably willpurchase a car within the next (circle the most realistic time frame):
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

4.

____ you
your parents
someone else(specify:___________________ )

year
2 years
3 years
4 years
5 or more years

Realistically, what car would you purchase next?

Please respond to the following statements by circling the number that best represents your response:
Strongly

Strongly

Agraa

Disagree

The ad instructed me to picture myself
behind the wheel of the car.

1

2

3

4

5

6.

Cars are for transportation only.

1

2

3

4

5

7.

Cars can be used to express one's image to others.

1

2

3

4

5

8.

The ad told me to close my eyes for a few moments.

1

2

3

4

5

9.

1 pictured myself driving this car.

1

2

3

4

5

10. Cars can be fun.

1

2

3

4

5

11. 1don't care what my car looks like.

1

2

3

4

5

12. The ideal car is the least expensive one.

1

2

3

4

5

13. The ad told me to picture others driving this car.

1

2

3

4

5

5.

14. Were the following words in the advertisement? (circle the number that corresponds to your response)

Yes

M2

Not
Sure

a. quivers

1

2

3

b. reacts

1

2

3

c. engine

1

2

3

d. Imagine

1

2

3

e. sunshine

1

2

3

f. air

1

2

3

g. whistling

1

2

3

h. riding

1

2

3

i. fun

1

2

3

How familiar are you with the following automobile models?
Not familiar
at all

Extramaly

a. Accord

1

2

3

4

familiar
5

b. Beretta

1

2

3

4

5

c. Bonneville

1

2

3

4

5

d. Capri

1

2

3

4

5

e. Concept

1

2

3

4

5

f. Corrado

1

2

3

4

5

g. Eclipse

1

2

3

4

5

h. Finch

1

2

3

4

5

i. Integra

1

2

3

4

5

j. Jato

1

2

3

4

5

k. Mustang

1

2

3

4

5

I. Radiant

1

2

3

4

5

m. Scoupe

1

2

3

4

5

n. Stylus

1

2

3

4

5

o. Talon

1

2

3

4

5

p. Taurus

1

2

3

4

5

How believable do you think the advertisement is? (circle number corresponding to your response)
Not

baliavabfe
a t all

1

2

Vary
beliavebla

3

4

5

Please describe a picture that would be appropriate for the wording of the advertisement you just read.

Please list the features that you feel the car described in the ad possessed. Some examples include a
turbocharged engine, fuel efficiency, safety features, etc.

The picture should include (please circle one):
a.
a man
b.
a woman
c.
both a man and a woman
d.
a family
e.
a group of friends
f.
no people
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20.

The last set of items concern your involvement or interest In the product class of automobiles. For each
Awn, place an "X* in the space that best corresponds to how you perceive automobiles.
Important _

of no concern

unimportant
of concern to me

irrelevant

relevant

means a lot
to me _

means nothing
to me

useless

useful

valuable

worthless

trivial
beneficial
matters to me
uninterested

fundamental
not beneficial
doesn't matter
interested

significant

insignificant

vital

superfluous

boring

interesting

unexciting

exciting

appealing

unappealing

mundane

fascinating

essential
undesirable
wanted
not needed

nonessentiat
desirable
unwanted
needed

APPENDIX B
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THE 1993 CONCEPT
Imagine the Concept In your mind.
A car that fits your image. O ne that's fun to
drive and to be seen in.
im agine it...
The Concept has contoured sport bucket seats.
H ear it...
The engine fires up and the 128 horsepower
engine quivers.

Picture it...
The sporty, aerodynamic design cuts through
the wind like no other car in its class.

Feet R...
The performance-engineered suspension glides
across the rolling planes or attacks curves and
climbs hills.

Available in 2-door coup* and a -d o o r aad an.
24 dty/30 highway aanm aiad m pg.
C al 1-aoo-CONCEFTIor a brochure and locabon ol your n*are*t dealer.

260

THE 1993 CONCEPT
Imagine the Concept In your mind...
A car that fits your image. O ne th at's fun to
drive and to b e se e n in.
Im agine ft...
The C oncept has contoured sport bucket seats.
H ear it...
The engine fires up and th e 128 horsepower
engine quivers.

Picture It..
The sporty, aerodynamic design cu ts through
th e wind like no other car in its d ess-

Feel It...
The performance-engineered suspension glides
a cro ss the rolling planes or attacks curves and
climbs hills.

Available in 2-door coup* and 4-door aadan.
24 ciry/30 highway aadmatad mpfl.
Cal 1- 800 -CONCEPT lor a brochure and locadon ol your naaroat daalar.

THE 1993 CONCEPT
Imagine the Concept in your mind...
A car that fits your image. One that's fun to
drive and to be seen In.
Im agine it...
The C oncept h as contoured sport bucket seats.
H ear It...
The engine fires up and th e 128 horsepower
engine quivers.

P icture It...
The sporty, aerodynam ic design cu ts through
the wind like no other car in its class.
Feel It...
The performance-engineered suspension glides
acro ss the rolling planes or attacks curves and
climbs hHls.

Available In 2-door coup* and 4 -d o o r M d in .
24 city/30 highway n d m a w d mpg.
C al 1 -800-CONCEPTtor a brochure and location ol your naaraat daaiar.
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(The finished ad will have a picture here.)

THE 1993 CONCEPT
Im agine the Concept in your m ind...
A car that fits your image. One that's fun to
drive and to be seen in.
Imagine ft...
The Concept has contoured sport bucket seats.
Hear ft...
The engine fires up and the 128 horsepower
engine quivers.

Picture it...
The sporty, aerodynamic design cuts through
the wind like no other car in its class.
Feel it...
The performance-engineered suspension glides
across the rolling planes or attacks curves and
climbs hills.

Available In 2-door coupe and 4-door sedan.
24 city/30 highway estim a te d m pg.
Call 1-800-CONCEPT (or a brochure a n d location of your nearest dealer.

THE 1993 CONCEPT

A car that fits your image. O ne th at's fun to
drive and to be seen in.

The sporty, aerodynam ic design c u ts through
the wind like no other car in its class.

The C oncept h as contoured sport bucket seats.

The engine fires up and the 126 horsepow er
engine quivers.

The performance-engineered suspension glides
a c ro ss th e roiling planes o r attacks curves and
climbs hills,

Available In 2-door coupe and 4 -d o o r e ed in .
24 eity/30 highway esom aled mpg.
Ca4 i-600-CO N C EPTIor a brochure and loeabon o l your naaraat dealer.
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THE 1993 CONCEPT
A c a r that fits your im age. O ne th at's (un to
drive and to b e se e n In.

The sporty, aerodynam ic desig n c u ts through
th e wind like no other c a r in Its class.

The C oncept h as co n to u red sport bucket seats.

The engine fires u p an d th e 128 horsepow er
engine quivers.

T he perform ance-engineered su sp en sio n glides
a c ro s s th e rolling planes o r atta c k s curves and
clim bs hills,

Available In 2 -door coupe and 4-door sedan.
24 aty /3 0 highway estim ated m pg,
C a l 1-80O-CONCEPT for a brochure a n d iocaoon of your nearest dealer.

THE 1993 CONCEPT

A car that fits your image. One that's fun to
drive and to be seen In.

The sporty, aerodynamic design cuts through
the wind like no other c a r in its class.

The Concept has contoured sport bucket seats.

The engine fires up and the 128 horsepower
engine quivers.

The performance-engineered suspension glides
across the rolling planes or attacks curves and
dim bs hills.

A vdabta In 2-door coupe and 4-door sedan.
24 city/30 highway estimated mpg.
Call l-SOO-CONCEPTfor a brochure and location ot your nearest dealer.
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fThe finished ad will have a picture here.)

THE 1993 CONCEPT
A car that fits your image. One that's fun to
drive and to be seen in.

The sporty, aerodynamic design cuts through
the wind like no other car in its class.

The Concept has contoured sport bucket seats.
The engine fires up and the 126 horsepower
engine quivers.

The performance-engineered suspension glides
across the rolling planes or attacks curves and
climbs hills.

Available in 2-door coups and 4-door sedan.
24 city/30 highway estim ated m pg.
Call 1-80O-CONCEPT for a brochure and location ot your n earest dealer.

APPENDIX C
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Please write down everything and anything you can remember about the
advertisement you just saw. Include any information that you can remember about the
car advertised and the advertisement itself. There are no right or wrong answers, so
anything you write will be of interest to the researcher. If you can’t remember
anything, please write "can’t remember anything."

What was the name of the car advertised?
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The following items concern any imagery (I.e., visualizations or pictures you saw in
your head, sounds you may have heard in your head, anything you imagined, etc...)
you may have experienced while viewing the advertisement. Respond to these items
by circling the number that best represents how strongly you agree or disagree with
the statement All of the items concern what was going .through your head while
Mewing the advertisement.
Example: *The imagery which occurred was pale.'
If you formed images from the ad, but they weren’t very dear in your mind, you would
drde 7 (strongly agree), if things were very dear and lifelike, you would drcie 1
(strongly disagree). Cirde one of the responses in between 1 and 7 if you agree or
disagree, but not very strongly.

I

s
I

I

I

1.

The Imagery which occurred was clear.

1

2

3

5

6

7

z

My imagery was very distinct

1

2

3

5

6

7

3.

1fantasized about the product In the ad.

1

2

3

5

6

7

4.

The Imagery 1experienced was detailed.

1

2

3

5

6

7

S.

The imagery 1experienced was crisp.

1

2

3

5

6

7

6.

1formed very specific imagery.

1

2

3

5

6

7

7.

The Imagery which occurred was weak.

1

2

3

5

6

7

8.

1would describe the imagery 1
experienced as hazy.

1

2

3

5

6

7

1Imagined what It would be like to
use the product advertised.

1

2

3

5

6

7

10. Nothing came to my mind.

1

2

3

5

6

7

11. 1experienced very definite imagery.

1

2

3

5

6

7

1Z My imagery was explicit

1

2

' 3

5

6

7

13. The imagery which occurred was fuzzy.

1

2

3

5

6

7

9.

14. The Imagery which occurred w as vague.

i

2

3

IS. 1 really only experienced one Image.

1

2

3

1& The imagery which occurred w as vMd.

1

2

17. 1 imagined other people using the p ro d u ct

i

IS. The imagery which occurred w as sharp.

4

5

6

7

4

5

6

7

3

4

5

6

7

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

19. 1 imagined a num ber of things.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

20.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

21. The imagery which occurred w as well-defined.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

22.

1

2

3

4

5

0

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1 Imagined the feel of the product

Things were blurry In my mind.

23. Many Images cam e to my mind.

'

The next set of questions concerns your reaction to the advertisement. Please rate
your reaction to just the advertisement (not the automobile) using the rating scales
below.
Example:
The advertisement was... (circle a number corresponding to your opinion)
rwiK) Vmy
Hi m la—tM Wry faflramtf]
Messy
7
5
Neat
1 2
3
4
6
If you thought the advertisement was neat, but not extremely so, you might
circle 2 to Indicate your opinion. If you thought the advertisement was
extremely messy, you would circle 7 to Indicate that opinion.
The advertisement was... (circle a number corresponding to your opinion for each
set of items)
Wry Imwm MM ln»r.h* Wry ft— W
1. Boring

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Interesting

2. Good

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Bad

3. Unpleasant

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Pleasant

4. Nice

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Awful

5. Favorable

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Unfavorable
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The next s e t of q u estio n s concerns your reactions to the automobile b a s e d only on
th e information con tain ed in the advertisem ent. T h ese items refer to your opinion
about the car, n o t th e advertisem ent
I th in k th e a u to m o b ile Is... (circle a num ber corresponding to your opinion for e a c h
ft—

Naunri

w-y

1 Vary n—

1.

Attractive

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Unattractive

2.

Desirable

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Undesirable

3.

Not for m e

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

For m e

4.

Uninteresting

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Interesting

5.

Appropriate

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Inappropriate

6.

U nreasonable

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

R easonable

7.

Unappealing

1

2

3

4

5

6

7'

Appealing

8.

A bad car

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

A g o o d car

The next set of q u estio n s concerns how likely you are to do som ething b a s e d on the
advertisem ent you ju st saw.
If yo u rece iv ed a b ro c h u re containing th e a d v e rtise m e n t y o u ju s t saw , h o w likely
is.it th at y o u w o u ld ...
Vary lowwawhf
v«nr
NuM ULtfy
OrMr Unaufy Urtujr
1.

...think ab o u t this offer?

1

2

3

4

5

6

2.

...look into this plan?

1

2

3

4

5

6

3.

...call the 800 nu m b er?

1

2

3

4

5

6

4.

...apply for this plan?

1

2

3

4

5 '

6

5.

...consider buying this car?

1

2

3

4

5

6

6.

...go to a d ealer?

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

7.

...buy this autom obile?

1

2

3

4

5

6

7
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T he following s e t of q u estio n s co n cern s w hat attributes you believe th e c a r advertised p o sse sse d .
For each attribute, circle th e re sp o n se representing how strongly you a g re e o r d isagree th a t th e car
p o s s e s s e d that attribute. W e are interested in w hat attributes you b e lie v e th e c a r advertised
p o sse ss e d , s o th ere a re n o right or w rong answ ers.
I
f

T h e c a r a d v e rtis e d ...

11 i I 11 t

1. ...h a s a sleek d esig n .

2

3

4

5

6

2. ...h as a 128 h o rsep o w er engine.

2

3

4

5

6

3. ...has bucket s e a ts .

2

3

4

5

6

4. ...is sporty.

2

3

4

5

6

5. ...has poor su sp e n sio n .

2

3

4

5

6

6. ...gets 35 city/45 highway
estim ate m pg.

2

3

4

5

6

7. ...is available in a 4 -d o o r sed an .

2

3

4

5

6

8. ...has a nice interior.

2

3

4

5

6

9. ...is aerodynam ic.

2

3

4

5

6

10. ...has a w eak engine.

2

3

4

5

6

11. ...is fuel efficient.

2

3

4

5

6

7

12. ...is reliable.

2

3

4

5

6

7
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The aim of this exercise Is to determ ine th e style or m anner you u se w hen carrying o u t different m ental tasks. Your
n s p o n s e s to th e statem en ts should reflect th e m anner In which you typiceOr en g ag e in e a ch of the ta sk s mentioned. There
a re no right o r w rong answ ers, w e only a sk th at you provide honest an d accu rate answ ers. P lease respond to each
atatem ent by circling o n e of th e five possible responses.
Example: 1 seldom read books.*
w o d d circle 5 (Strongly Agree).

If th is w as your

typical behavior, even though you
f

might read o n e book a year, you
/

/ / i!

/

/

2

3

6

2

3

5

3. I can never se e m to find th e right w ord w hen I n eed 1L

2

3

5

4. I d o a lot of reading.

2

3

5

5. T here a re so m e special tim es In my life th a t I like to relive
by mentally *plcturing* Just how everything looked.

2

3

S

a

2

3

5

7. Before I perform a n activity, I often d o s e
m y ey es a n d picture doing It.

2

3

5

6.

2

3

5

2

3

S

1 2 .1 find It helps to think In term s of mental
pictures w hen doing m any things.

2

3

5

13. I often think of synonym s for w ords.

2

3

5

14. W hen I have forgotten som ething I frequently try to form
a mental “picture* to rem em b er It

2

3

5

1 5 .1 have difficulty using new w ords.

2

3

5

1 6 .1 enjoy using m ental pictures to help m e solve problem s.

2

3

5

1 7 .1 prefer activities th a t d o n 't require a lot o f reading.

2

3

5

IB. I spend very little tim e attem pting to increase my vocabula ry.

2

3

5

1 8 .1 seldom picture p a st ev en ts In m y mind.

2

3

5

20. My thinking often c on sists of mental ‘pictu res' o r Im ages.

2

3

5

1. I enjoy w ork th a t requires th e u se of w ords.
2.

I like to picture future ev e n ts o r situations in m y mind.

I think I often u se w ords In th e w rong way.

I enjoy learning new w ords.

B. I think of writing a s o n e of m y hobbles.
10. When listening to so m e o n e describing their experiences,
I try to mentally picture w hat w as happening.
11. W hen I think of so m eo n e I know, I often ‘picture*
In my mind w hat th ey look Ilka.
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In this e c a rd s e , consider the numbered sdmiius (■ word or a picture). Place an *5CInthe apace doaer to the anchor (a
word or a picture) more strongly associated with that sttmdus.

(1 ) W O R K

_____

ft

(6 )

t

FA CTO RY

W OMAN

(7 ) M O N E Y

COINS

(3 ) H O M E

HOUSE

TRACTOR

(9) MOTHER
BABY

(5 ) N A V Y
S H IP

(1 0 )
J L i .

T R A IN ____;:

:

:
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Please indicate your response to the following questions by circling your response or
by placing an "X" in the appropriate blank.
1.

How believable do you think the advertisement is?
Not
believable
at all

Extremely
believable

1
2.

2

3

4

5

6

How familiar are you with the automobile model advertised?
Not
familiar
a t all

Extremely
familiar

1

3.

7

2

3

4

5

6

7

Did th e ad tell you to imagine or picture anything in your mind?

yes
no
not sure
4.

W hen you first looked at th e picture in the ad, how easy w as it to recognize it
a s a picture of a car?
Extremely
difficult
1

5.

Not s o
E asy
2

3

4

5

6

7

Which of th e following b est describes th e car in th e ad?
probably moving

6.

Extremely
easy

Easy

probably not moving

Did th e c a r in th e picture look like a particular model of autom obile you’ve seen
before?
y es (which m odel?__________________ )

no

n o t su re

P lease re sp o n d to th e following for classification p u rp o se s by placing an *X“ In the
appro p riate blank or by filling In th e co rrect re sp o n se .
1.

You are:______ ____ Male
Fem ale

2.

How old a re y o u ?

3.

Y our c la ss Is:

y ears old
F reshm an
S o p h o m o re
Junior
Senior
G rad u ate stu d en t

4.

You are:

____ Right-handed
Left-handed

5.

Do you hav e a c a r to u se ?

Yes

No

6.

If you a n sw e re d “yes" to num ber 5, w ho o w n s th e car?
You
Your p aren ts
S o m e o n e else (please specify:_____________________________)

Finally, p le ase write dow n w hat you think is th e p u rp o se of this study.

APPENDIX D
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR EXPERIMENTAL SUBJECTS IN A NO PICTURE CONDITION
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Please write down everything and anything you can remember about the
advertisement you just saw. Include any information that you can remember about the
car advertised and the advertisement Itself. There are no right or wrong answers, so
anything you write will be of interest to the researcher. If you can’t remember
anything, please write 'can't remember anything.”

What was the name of the car advertised?
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The following items concern any imagery (i.e., visualizations or pictures you saw in
your head, sounds you may have heard in your head, anything you imagined, etc...)
you may have experienced while viewing the advertisement. Respond to these items
by circling the number that best represents how strongly you agree or disagree with
the statement All of the Items concern what was going through your head while
'Viewing the advertisement.
Example: "The imagery which occurred was pale.”
If you formed images from the ad, but they weren't very dear in your mind, you would
circle 7 (strongly agree). If things were very dear and lifelike, you would circle 1
(strongly disagree). Cirde one of the responses in between 1 and 7 if you agree or
disagree, but not very strongly.

1.

The imagery which occurred was dear.

1

2

3

5

6

7

2.

My imagery was very distinct

1

2

3

5

6

7

3.

I fantasized about the product In the ad.

1

2

3

5

6

7

4.

The Imagery I experienced was detailed.

1

2

3

S

6

7

5.

The Imagery 1experienced was crisp.

1

2

3

5

6

7

6.

1formed very specific Imagery.

1

2

3

5

6

7

7.

The Imagery which occurred was weak.

1

2

3

5

6

7

8.

1would describe the Imagery 1
experienced as hazy.

1

2

3

5

6

7

1Imagined what It would be like to
use the product advertised.

1

2

3

5

6

7

10. Nothing came to my mind.

1

2

3

5

6

7

11. 1experienced very definite imagery.

1

2

3

5

6

7

12. My Imagery was explicit

1

2

3

5

6

7

13. The Imagery which occurred was fuzzy.

1

2

3

5

6

7

9.
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I
i
!

.

I

/ I i

I

I!

.

!

I

14. The Imagery which o ccu rred w as vague.

2

3

5

6

7

IS. 1 realty onty experienced o n e Image.

2

3 ‘

5

6

7

16. T he im agery w hich o ccu rred w as vMd.

2

3

5

6

7

17. 1 im agined other peo p le using th e p ro d u c t

2

3

S

6

7

18. T h e Imagery which o ccu rred w as sharp*

2

3

5

6

7

1B. 1 imagined a n um ber of things.

2

3

5

6

7

20. 1 imagined the feei of th e p ro d u c t

2

3

5

6

7

21. The Imagery which o ccu rred w as well-defined.

2

3

5

6

7

22. Things w ere blurry In m y mind.

2

3

S

6

7

23. Many Im ages cam e to m y mind.

2

3

S

6

7

The next set of questions concerns your reaction to the advertisement. Please rate
your reaction to just the advertisem ent (not the automobile) using the rating scales
below.
Example:
The advertisem ent was... (circle a num ber corresponding to your opinion)
Neat

M essy

6

If you thought th e advertisem ent w as neat, but not extremely so , you might
circle 2 to Indicate your opinion. If you thought the advertisem ent w as
extremely m essy, you would circle 7 to Indicate that opinion.
The advertisem ent was... (circle a number corresponding to your opinion for each
set of Items)
IWy 1
1.

Boring

2

3

4

5

6

7

Interesting

2.

Good

2

3

4

5

6

7

Bad

3. Unpleasant

2

3

4

5

6

7

Pleasant

4.

Nice

2

3

4

5

6

7

Awful

5.

Favorable

2

3

4

5

6

7

Unfavorable
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The next set of questions concerns your reactions to the automobile based only on
the information contained in the advertisement. These items refer to your opinion
about the car, not the advertisement
I think the automobile Is... (circle a number corresponding to your opinion for each
set of items)
■ in hi «*nr
HUM
Mr; A*«Miy
1.

Attractive

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Unattractive

2.

Desirable

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Undesirable

3.

Not for me

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

For me

4.

Uninteresting

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Interesting

5.

Appropriate

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Inappropriate

6.

Unreasonable

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Reasonable

7.

Unappealing

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Appealing

8.

A bad car

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

A good car

The next set of questions concerns how likely you are to do something based on the
advertisement you just saw.
If you received a brochure containing the advertisement you Just saw, how likely
ls.lt that you would...
V»y
Mry SoMiM
UnUy IMMfy Ur*J*y taM *u2*h1.

...think about this offer?

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

2.

...look into this plan?

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

3.

...call the BOO number?

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

4.

...apply for this plan?

1

2

3

4

5 '

6

7

5.

...consider buying this car?

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

6.

...go to a dealer?

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

7.

...buy this automobile?

1

2

3

4

5

6

7
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The following set of questions concerns what attributes you believe the car advertised possessed.
For each attribute, circle the response representing how strongly you agree or disagree that the car
possessed that attribute. We are interested in what attributes you believe the car advertised
possessed, so there are no right or wrong answers.

I

#

I

The car advertised...
I

I

I

I

I

i

1. ...has a sleek design.

2

3

4

5

6

2. -.has a 128 horsepower engine.

2

3

4

5

6

3. ...has bucket seats.

2

3

4

5

6

4. ...is sporty.

2

3

4

5

6

5. —has poor suspension.

2

3

4

5

6

6. —gets 35 city/45 highway
estimate mpg.

2

3

4

5

6

7. —is available in a 4-door sedan.

2

3

4

5

6

8. ...has a nice interior.

2

3

4

5

6

9. —is aerodynamic.

2

3

4

5

6

10. ...has a weak engine.

2

3

4

5

6

11. ...is fuel efficient.

2

3

4

5

6

12. ...is reliable.

2

3

4

5

6

I
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T h e aim o f this ex ercise Is to d eterm in e th e stylo o r m an n er y o u u se w h en carrying o u t different m ental task s. Your
re s p o n se s t o th e sta te m e n ts should reflect th e m an n er In w hich you typfeaOy e n g a g e In e a c h of th e ta s k s m entioned. There
a re no right o r w rong a n sw ers, w e only a s k th at y o u provide h o n e st a n d a cc u ra te a n sw ers. P le a se resp o n d to e ach
statem en t try circling o n e o f th e five p o ssib le resp o n se s.
Exam ple: *1 se ld o m re a d b o o k s.”
w ould circle 5 (Strongly A gree).

If th is w a s your

typical behavior, ev en

th o u g h you m ight re a d o n e b o o k a year, you
/
/
/

//if

/ /

2

3

5

2. I Uke to picture future events or situations In m y mind.

2

3

6

а.

I c a n n e v e r s e e m to find th e right w o rd w hen I n e e d tL

2

3

5

4.

I d o a lot o f reading.

2

3

5

5. T here a re so m e sp ecial tim es in m y life th a t I like to relive
b y m entally "picturing’ Just how everything looked.

2

3

S

б.

I think I often u s e w o rd s In th e w ro n g way.

2

3

5

7.

Before I perform a n activity. I o ften d o s e
m y e y e s a n d picture doing h.

2

3

S

&

I enjoy learning n ew w ords.

2

3

5

8.

I think o f writing a s o n e of m y h o b b les.

2

3

6

12. I find It h e lp s to think In term s of m ental
p ictu res w hen d o in g m an y things.

2

3

5

13. I often think of synonym s for w ords,

2

3

S

14. W hen I h av e forgotten so m eth in g I frequently try to form
a m ental "picture" to rem em b er tt.

2

3

S

1 6 . 1 hav e dHHcdty using n e w w o rd s.

2

3

5

1 6 .1 enjoy u sin g m ental pictu res to h e lp m e solve problem s.

2

3

5

1 7 .1 prefer activities th a t d o n 't require a k it o f reading.

2

3

5

18. I s p e n d very Uttle tim e attem p tin g to in c re a se m y vocabulary.

2

3

5

1 0 . 1 se ld o m picture p a s t e v e n ts in m y m ind.

2

3

5

20. My thinking o ftsn c o n sists of m en tal "pictures* o r im ages.

2

3

S

1.

I en jo y w ork th a t req u ires th e u s e o f w ords.

10. W hen listening to so m e o n e d escrib in g their experiences,
I try to m entally picture w hat w a s hap p en in g .
11. W hen I think of so m e o n e I know, I o ften "picture"
In m y m ind w hat th e y look like.
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In this exercise, consider the numbered sdmiius (s word or ■ picture). Piece an *X* In the space closer to the anchor (a
word or a picture) more strongly associated wfch that stimulus.

(1) WORK
FACTORY — ;—

|
BBS

(6)
'

‘__: :

:

:

:

WOMAN

nnrr’

(7) MONEY
COINS

(3) HOME
HOUSE

TRACTOR

(9) MOTHER
BABY

(5) NAVY
SHIP

:

:

:

.

TRAIN

:

(10)^ C
:

:

Please indicate your response to the following questions by circling your response
by placing an "X" in the appropriate blank.
1.

How believable do you think the advertisement is?
Not
believable
at all
1

2.

Extremely
believable
2

3

4

5

6

How familiar are you with the automobile model advertised?
Not
familiar
a t all
1

3.

7

Extremely
familiar
2

3

4

5

6

7

Did the ad tell you to imagine or picture anything in your mind?
yes
no
not sure

4.

Please describe a picture that you think would be appropriate for this
advertisement.
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P lease respond to th e following for classification purposes by placing an "X" In the
appropriate blank o r by filling In the correct response.
1.

You are:

____ Male
Female

2.

How old are you?

3.

Your class is:

years old
Freshman
Sophom ore
Junior
Senior
G raduate student

4.

You are:

Right-handed
Left-handed

5.

Do you have a car to u se?

Yes

No

6.

If you answ ered y e s ’ to number 5, who ow ns the car?
You
Your parents
Som eone else (please specify:___________________________ )

Finally, please write down what you think is th e purpose of this study.

APPENDIX E
INFORMATION SHEET GIVEN TO JUDGES IN SCALE DEVELOPMENT STAGE
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PROPOSED DIMENSIONS OF IMAGERY PROCESSING
QUALITY
Representing the clarity and vividness of the mental Image an Individual forms,
regardless of the number of images or the content or elaboration of that imagery.
Describes how 'good* the Imagery was in terms of details.
Example Item: The Image was dear.'

QUANTITY
Representing the number of different Images generated.
Describes how many different scenarios/situations were imagined.
Example Item: *1 Imagined a lot.*

ELABORATION
Representing the activation of stored Information In the production of Images beyond
what is provided by the stimulus.
Describes how 'deep* images were (i.e., did they simply image what was provided In the
ad, or did they bring in other experiences?) Also includes forming mental images from
the wording In the ad.
Also indudes the use of one's Imagination or fantasy in the formation of images.
Example item: *1 remembered several things from my life that related to the ad.'

APPENDIX F
QUESTIONNAIRE GIVEN TO JUDGES RATING
THE REPRESENTATIVENESS OF AN ITEM
ON A PROPOSED DIMENSION
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PROPOSED DIMENSIONS OF IMAGERY PROCESSING
QUALITY
Representing the clarity and vividness of the mental image an Individual forms,
regardless of the number of images or the content or elaboration of that
Imagery.
Describes how 'good" the imagery was in terms of details.
Example item:

"The image was clear."

QUANTITY
Representing the number of different images generated.
Describes how many different scenarios/situations were imagined.
Example hem:

"I imagined a lot."

ELABORATION
Representing the activation of stored information In the production of images
beyond what is provided by the stimulus.
Describes how "deep" images were (i.e., did they simply image what was
provided in the ad, or did they bring in other experiences?) Also Includes
forming mental Images from the wording in the ad.
Also includes the use of one’s imagination or fantasy in the formation of
images.
Example hem:

"I remembered several things from my life that related to the
ad."

Based on the descriptions of the proposed dimensions, the following hems ware judged to be
representative of a specific dimension. For each hem, judge whether that hem is dearly
representative, somewhat representative, or not representative of the dimension h is proposed to
represent by pladng an "X* In the appropriate column. Do not feel you have to vary your
responses, it's fine if you respond that most of them are deariy or somewhat representative of the
dimension. Any information you can give to improve an hem will be appreciated.
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QUALITY
D IM

CLEANLY
MPKSENTATIVE

SOMEWHAT
IBMESENTATIVE

1. I experienced very dim Imagery._____________ _____

_____

2. I formed realistic Imagery._______________________

_____

3. The imagery I experienced was crisp.

_____

_____

4 . My imagery was very distinct____________________

_____

5. Very dull images came to my mind.

_____

_____

6. I would describe the imagery I
experienced as hazy.

_____

_____

7. I experienced very definite Imagery.

_____

_____

8. I formed very specific Imagery.

_____

_____

9. My imagery was explicit

_____

_____

1 0 .1 formed graphic imagery.

_____

_____

11. My imagery was fancy.

____

_____

12. The imagery which occurred was brilliant

____

_____

13. My imagery was ambiguous.

____

_____

14. My imagery was poor.

_____

_____

15. Things were blurry in my mind._____________ _____

_____

16. My imagery was accurate._________________ _____

_____

17. The imagery which occurred was dear.

_____

_____

18. The imagery which occurred was fuzzy._______ _____

_____

19. The imagery which occurred was detailed.

_____

_____

20. The imagery which occurred was weak.

_____

_____

21. The imagery which occurred was vivid.

_____

_____

MOT
MPHESEWTATtVt

292

QUALITY
IT B U

CLEARLY
MPREKNTATTVE

COMEWMAT
REPRESENTATIVE

22. The Imagery which occurred was Intense.

_____

_____

23. The imagery which occurred was lifelike.______ _____

_____

24. The imagery which occurred was sharp.

_____

_____

25. The imagery which occurred was well-defined.

_____

_____

26. The imagery which occurred was vague.

_____

_____

27. The imagery which occurred was pale.

_____

_____

2 8 .1 saw the picture In the ad in my mind.

_____

_____

29. The picture in the ad was
reproduced In my head.____________________ _____

_____

NOT
MPRESENTATIVE
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QUANTITY
CLEARLY
SBftEMNTATTVE

ITEM*

SOMEWHAT
WP H E M KTATTVE

NOT
REPRESENTATIVE

1. I experienced lots of Images.________________ _____

_____

_____

2. I Imagined several different scenarios.

_____

_____

_____

3. I imagined quite a few things.

_____

_____

_____

4. I thought of several things.

_____

_____

_____

5. Nothing came to my mind.

_____

_____

_____

6. I can count the number of images i
experienced on one hand.

*__________

7. I can count the number of images I
experienced on two hands.

_____

_____

_____

8. I didn't imagine much.

_____

_____

_____

9. I Imagined so many things that
It’s hard to count them.

_____

_____

_____

1 0 .1 reaify only experienced one image.__________ _____

_____

_____

1 1.1was amazed at how many images
flashed into my head.

_____

_____

_____

12. Just one scene came to my mind.____________ _____

_____

_____

1 3.1 probably imagined more from
this ad than most people.

_____

_____

_____

14.1 imagined a considerable amount In my head.

_____

_____

_____

15. The quantity of my imagery was large.________ _____

_____

_____

1 6 .1imagined a number of things.____________________

_____

_____

17. Marry images came to my mind.____________ _____

_____

_____

____________

_____

1 8 .1saw several distinguishable scenes in my mind.
19. Numerous images were aroused from the ad.

____

, ._________ _____
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ELABORATION
(TIM S

CLEARLY
IBHECENTATIVE

SOMEWHAT
fCPfKSENTATIVE

1. The ad reminded me of other times In my life.

_____

_____

2. The ad brought back memories of events
that happened to me in the past_____________ _____

_____

3. I Imagined more than what was In the ad.

_____

_____

4. I imagined what it would be like to use
the product advertised.

_____

_____

5. I remembered things from my life
that related to the ad.

_____

_____

6. Some of the things I imagined
were not in the ad.

_____

_____

7. In my mind, I saw more than just
the picture given.

_____

_____

B. I thought of how it would feel
to use the product

_____

_____

9. I imagined the smell of the product

_____

_____

10. I projected an image in my head
from other things that I know.

_____

_____

11. Things I imagined lacked factual reality._____________

_____

12. Everything I imagined was based on
something I already know.__________________ _____

_____

13.1fantasized about the product in the ad.

_____

_____

14 .1 imagined other people using the product

_____

_____

15. Things I imagined were based
on fantasy, not facts._______________________ _____

_____

16.1 let my imagination run wild.________________ _____

_____

17 .1imagined improbable situations.

_____

_____

NOT
KFftESENTATIVE
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ELABORATION
CLEARLY
REPRESENTATIVE

non

SOMEWHAT
REPRESENTATIVE

18.

I imagined the texture of the product_______ _____

_____

19.

t imagined what the product tasted like.

_____

_____

20 .

I sensed a feeling of motion.______________ _____

_____

21 .

I ’heard* sounds In my head.

_____

_____

22.

Experiences from my life flashed
Into my head.

_____

_____

I thought of others I've seen using a
product similar to the one advertised.

______

______

I could really see myself using a product
similar to the one In the ad.

_____

_____

25.

My Imagery included members of my family. _____

_____

26.

My imagery included one or
more of my friends.

_____

_____

27.

I Imagined bizarre scenes.

_____

_____

28.

I imagined extreme situations.

_____

_____

29.

I imagined all sorts of unrelated things.

_____

_____

23.
24.

NOT
REPRESENTATIVE

APPENDIX G
ADVERTISEMENTS USED IN SCALE DEVELOPMENT
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H a v e n 't W e M e t S o m e w h e r e B efo re ?

Mazda M tata

It may have been thirty yean ago, or

Even the most jaded automotive critics have fallen

just yesterday. A little two-seater caught your eye, and

head over heels. "Automobile of the Year" proclaimed

you've never been quite the same. Memories like this

Automobile Magazine. While Rood & Track judged the

created the Mazda Miata. A product of both dreams

Miata to be one of the five best cars in the world. Kind

and advanced technology, its the perfect reason to

of makes it hard to resist, doesn't it?

pursue your love of the classic sports car.

So stop torturing yourself. Look up your Mazda

Slip into the cockpit and you're greeted by snug,

Dealer, and take the Miata fora spin. You might just fall in

supportive seats and traditional round analog gauges.

love with a roadster. For the fust time, or all over again.

Twist the key and the 1.6-liter DOHC engine answers

36-MONTH/5QOOO-MILE WARRANTY

with a throaty growl—a note tuned to perfection by

No-deductible,"bumper- co-bumper" protection. See your

testing more than 100 exhaust pitches.

dealer for limited warranty details. For information on

As you snap through the gears with the short-

any new Mazda car or
truck, call toll-free,

throw shifter, the front-engine/rear-drive
layout and four-wheel double-wishbone suspension combine to deliver
razor-sharp handling. There’s little
doubt that the Miata b a purists dream.
Yet this is one dream car that's also
thoroughly down to earth. It's been named
the most trouble-free sports car in America*

m azoa
It Ju s t F eels R ig h t .*

IP

1-800-345-3799.

It had been the kind o f mttmm U « day that S C
to a halt for a slow moving night so I p
the stove and poured a big cup,
m

^

a

'

d

reechdS
J

e

d

10

- iu minty sweetness witA a

u as I curled m y feet under the covers and slowly sipped the hot, honeyed

- -* •
my face a n d ^ r a fj p e ^

,

J i k e a sweet dream that

into the p j f | o W y

I d I f I O W y softness o f the

*

p u lle d m

^

a T o«

d me

sleepy tim e night which was so very quiet save the soft lootAinj m z z z z Z Z Z*1

«zzZZ Z Z Z Z zm rU P

m p

f l i p of my A L AR M C L O C K ? I
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Q U E S T IO N N A IR E U S E D IN F IR S T R O U N D O F D A TA C O L L E C T IO N
IN S C A L E D E V E L O P M E N T
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The following Kama concern any imagery you may hava experienced wtde viewing the ad. Respond to these Kerns by
circling the number that b ee represents how strongly you agree or disagree wfth the statement. A t o f tho ftom t
ooncom softer sras going through your hood whto ofowing tho od.

Example: The Imagery which occurred was pale*
If you formed Images from the ad, but they weren't vary dear In your mind, you would circle 7 (strongly agree). If things
were very dear and lifelike, you wotid circle 1 (Strongly disagree). Circle one of the responses In between 1 and 7 If
you agree or disagree, but not very strongly.

1. 1formed realistic Imagery.

//

/

/

/

1

/

1

2

3

8

6

7

2. 1experienced lots of Images.

1

2

3

6

6

7

3. The Imagery which occurred was dear.

1

2

3

5

6

7

4. My Imagery was very distinct

1

2

3

5

6

7

5. The ad reminded me of other times In my life.

1

2

3

S

6

7

6, 1fantasized about the product In the ad.

1

2

3

5

6

7

7. The Imagery which occurred was detafled.

1

2

3

5

6

7

8. My Imagery was ambiguous.

1

2

3

5

6

7

8. 1didn't Imagine much.

1

2

3

5

6

7

10. In my mind, I saw more than |ust the picture given. 1

2

3

5

6

7

11. I thought of how Kwould feel to use the product

1

2

3

5

6

7

12. The Imagery I experienced was crisp.

1

2

3

5

6

7

13. I formed very specific Imagery.

1

2

3

5

6

7

14. The Imagery which occurred was weak.

1

2

3

5

6

7

15. 1imagined quKe a few things.

1

2

3

5

6

7

I wodd describe the imagery
1experienced as hazy.

1

2

3

5

6

7

17. 1imagined what Kwould be like to
use the product advertised.

1

2

3

5

6

7

IB. 1thought of several things.

1

2

3

5

6

7

IB. 1formed graphic Imagery.

1

2

3

5

6

7

20. Nothing came to my mind.

1

2

3

5

6

7

21. The ad brought back memories of events
that happened to me In the past

1

2

3

5.

6

7

16.
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22. I experienced very definite imagery.

1

2

3

5

6

7

23. My Imagery was explicit.

1

2

3

6

6

7

24. The Imagery which occurred was fuzzy.

1

2

3

5

6

7

25. I Imagined so many things that It's
hard to ccuntthem.

1

2

3

5

6

7

26. I remembered things from my
He that related to the ad.

1

2

3

5

6

7

27. The imagery which occurred was vague.

1

2

3

5

6

7

28. I really only experienced one Image.

1

2

3

5

6

7

29. I Imagined the smell of the product

1

2

3

5

6

7

30. The Imagery which occurred was vMd.

1

2

3

5

6

7

31. Just one scene came to my mind.

1

2

3

5

6

7

32. I Imagined other people using the product

1

2

3

5

6

7

33. I pro|ected an Image in my head from
other things that I know.

1

2

3

5

6

7

34. The Imagery which occurred was sharp.

1

2

3

5

6

7

35. I Imagined a number of things.

1

2

3

5

6

7

36. I imagined the feel of the product

1

2

3

5

6

7

37. My Imagery included one or mors of my friends.

1

2

3

5

6

7

38. The imagery which occurred was well-defined.

1

2

3

5

6

7

39. I sensed a feeling of motion.

1

2

3

5

6

7

40. The imagery which occurred was lifelike.

1

2

3

5

6

7

41.1cotid really see myself using a product
almlar to the one In the ad.

1

2

3

5

6

7

42. Things were blurry in my mind.

1

2

3

5

6

7

43. Many images came to my mind.

1

2

3

5

6

7

44. Experiences from my life flashed Into my head.

1

2

3

5

6

7

45. I knagined what the product tasted like.

1

2

3

S

6

7

46. I saw several distinguishable scenes in my mind.

1

2

3

5

6

7

47. I “hearer sounds in my head.

1

2

3

5

6

7

APPENDIX I
Q U E S T IO N N A IR E U S E D IN S E C O N D R O U N D O F DATA C O L L E C T IO N
IN S C A L E D E V E L O P M E N T
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Please describe any (if any) and all im ages, such a s pictures, sounds, ta stes,
sm ells, sc en es, e tc ..., that cam e to your mind whUe you were viewing the
advertisement. Comment on the quality of that imagery. Be as specific as
possible. There are no right or wrong responses, so anything you write is of
interest to the researcher.
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T h e follow ing Item s c o n c e rn a n y Im ag ery y o u m a y h a v e ex p erien ced w hile view ing th e a d . R e sp o n d to th e s e
h e m s b y circling th e n u m b e r t h a t b e s t re p r e s e n ts h o w stro n g ly y o u a g re e o r d is a g re e w ith th e s ta te m e n t. A ll o f

Me Roms concern w hst wax going through your hood whBm viewing the md.
E xam ple: "T h e Im ag ery w h ic h o c c u rre d w a s p a le ."
If y o u fo rm e d im a g e s fro m th e a d , b u t th e y w e r e n 't v e ry d e a r in y o u r m in d , y o u w o u ld circle 7 (stro n g ly ag ree). If
th in g s w e re v e ry d e a r a n d lifelike, y o u w o u ld circle 1 (S tro n g ly d isag re e). C ird e o n e o f th e r e s p o n s e s In b e tw e e n
1 a n d 7 if y o u a g re e o r d is a g re e , b u t n o t v e ry stro n g ly .

/ / //l I ,
1.

T h e im ag e ry w h ic h o c c u rre d w a s c le a r.

2

3

5

6

7

2.

M y im ag ery w a s v e ry d is tin c t.

2

3

5

6

7

3.

1 fa n ta siz e d a b o u t th e p ro d u c t in t h e a d .

2

3

5

6

7

4.

T h e im ag e ry w h ic h o c c u rre d w a s d eta ile d .

2

3

5

6

7

S.

T h e im a g e ry 1 e x p e rie n c e d w a s c risp .

2

3

5

6

7

6.

1 fo rm e d v e ry sp e c ific Im ag ery .

2

3

5

6

7

7.

T h e im ag ery w h ic h o c c u rre d w a s w e a k .

2

3

5

6

7

8.

1 w o u ld d e sc rib e th e im a g e ry
1 e x p e rie n c e d a s h a 2 y.

2

3

5

6

7

1 im ag in ed w h a t it w o u ld b e like to
u s e th e p ro d u c t a d v e rtis e d .

2

3

5

6

7

1 0 . N o th in g c a m e to m y m in d .

2

3

5

6

7

1 1 . 1 e x p e rie n c e d v e ry d e fin ite im ag ery .

2

3

5

6

7

1 2 . M y im a g e ry w a s ex p licit.

2

3

5

6

7

1 3 . T h e im a g e ry w h ic h o c c u rre d w a s fu zzy .

2

3

5

6

7

1 4 . 1 rem e m b e re d th in g s fro m m y
life t h a t re la te d to t h e a d .

2

3

5

6

7

1 5 . T h e im ag e ry w h ic h o c c u rre d w a s v a g u e .

2

3

5

6

7

1 6 . 1 really onfy e x p e rie n c e d o n e im a g e .

2

3

5

6

7

1 7 . T h e im ag ery w h ic h o c c u rre d w a s vivid.

2

3

5

6

7

1 8 . J u s t o n e s c e n e c a m e t o m y m in d .

2

3

5

6

7

1 9 . 1 im ag in ed o th e r p e o p le u sin g th e p ro d u c t.

2

3

5

6

7

2 0 . T h e im ag ery w h ic h o c c u rre d w a s s h a r p .

2

3

6

6

7

9.
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/ /

/ L /
/ // /

/ V

2 1 . 1 im agined a n u m b e r o f th in s * .

1

2

3

4

e

6

7

2 2 . I Im agined th e fe e l o f t h e p ro d u c t.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

2 3 . T h e im ag ery w h ic h o c c u rre d w a s w ell-defined.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

2 4 . T h in g s w e re b lu rry In m y m in d .

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

2 5 . M any im a g e s c a m e to m y m ind.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7
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T he aim of this exercise is to dot erm ine th e style o r m anner you u se w hen carrying out different mental task s. Your
resp o n ses to th e statem en ts s h o d d reflect th e m anner in w hich you typicaHy e n g ag e In e a c h of th e tasks m entioned. There
are no right o r w rong answ ers, w e only a s k th a t y o u provide honest a n d a c cu rate answ ers. Please respond to each
statem ent by circling o n e of th e five p ossible resp o n ses.
Example: *1 seldom read books.*
w ould circle 5 (Strongly A gree).

If this w as your

typical behavior,

even though you m igh^read o n e b o o k a year, you

/ 4
////

f

/

2

3

5

I like to picture future ev e n ts o r situations Inmy mind.

2

3

6

3.

I can never se em to find th e right w ord w hen I n e e d ft.

2

3

5

4.

I d o a lot of reading.

2

3

6

5. T here a re so m e special tim es In m y life that I like to relive
b y mentally -picturing* fust how everything looked.

2

3

5

(L I think I often u se w o rd s In th e w rong way.

2

3

5

7. Before I perform a n activity, I often d o s e
m y ey e s an d picture doing ft.

2

3

S

6.

I snjoy learning new w ords.

2

3

5

6.

I think of writing a s o n e of m y hobbles.

2

3

S

1 2 . 1 find It helps to think In term s of mental
pictures w hen doing m any things.

2

3

5

1 3 .1 often think o f synonym s for w ords.

2

3

6

14. W hen I hav e forgotten som ething I frequently try to form
a mental -picture' to rem em b er ft.

2

3

5

1 5 .1 have difficulty using new words.

2

3

5

1 6 .1 enjoy using mental pictures to help m e solve problem s.

2

3

5

1 7 .1 prefer activities th a t d o n 't require a k x of reading.

2

3

5

1 8 .1 sp en d very little tim e attem pting to Increase m y vocabulary.

2

3

5

1 8 .1 seldom picture p a s t ev en ts In m y mind.

2

3

6

20. My thinking oftan consists of m ental -pictures* or Im ages.

2

3

5

1.

I snjoy w ork th a t requires th e u se of w ords.

2.

10. W hen listening to so m e o n e describing their experiences,
I try to mentally picture w hat w as happening.
11. W hen I think of so m eo n e I know, I often -picture*
in m y mind w hat th ey look like.
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In thJ* exercise, consider the numbered stimulus (sword or a picture). Place an TC* In the apace closer to the anchor (a
word or a picture) more strongly essodeteri w#h that stimulus.

i

(1) WORK
FACTORY__

(6)
_

WOMAN

(7) MONEY

(2)
CAR

_ —

(3) HOME

:

:

:

:

COINS

(B)
HOUSE

TRACTOR

_

j

: :

(9) MOTHER

(4).

BABY

BOY _

(5) NAVY
SHIP__

You are: _____ Male

You are: _____ Right-handed

£

F em ale

Lett-handed

(1 0 )4 ^ ^
TRAIN _

VITA
Laurie Anne Babin w as bom in Detroit, Michigan on April 10,1960. She received a
Bachelor of Science degree in Engineering Arts from Michigan State University In 1982 and a
Masters in Business Administration from the University of Central Florida in 1987. She taught for
fours years at the Naval Nuclear Power School, and she is still a Lieutenant Commander in the
Naval Reserve with over ten years service. She has published in the Journal of Consumer
Marketing and Advances in Consumer Research a s well a s several other conference
proceedings. Currently, she is employed at the University of Southern Mississippi teaching
Principles of Advertising and Promotion Management courses.

309

DOCTORAL EXAMINATION AND DISSERTATION REPORT

Candidate:
Major Field:

Laurie Anne Babin
Business Administration

Title of Dissertation:

Effects of Imagery-Eliciting Strategies on
Imagery Processing, Memory, Beliefs, Attitudes,
and Intentions from Print Advertisements

Approved:

— -______

Major Professor and Chairman

"Cy— J )
Dean of the Graduate School

EXAMINING COMMITTEE:

Date of Examination:

